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Introduction 
.I he relationship between morality and the emotions is a theme which has provoked debate 
within ethics for perhaps as long as it has existed as an identifiable area of study-. Yet in 
spite of its recurring; presence across different periods of philosophy, and despite the great 
disparities in the style and content of thinkers who have written on the subject, there is a 
surprising simplicity to the way in which philosophers have tended to view the emotions in 
this context. They are generally- seen either as a powerful and dangerous distraction to the 
operation of reason - the true basis 
for morality-, or as being at the very heart of morality, 
making; it possible for us toi be the kind of moral beings we are, and indispensable to the 
leading of a moral life. 
The two philosophers who arc perhaps most emblematic in this sense are Kant and 1-fume. 
Iýor Kant, 'inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish'. ' The 
emotions were incapable of generating maxims in accordance with the moral law, and 
could at best provide additional but nevertheless unwelcome) support for the 
effectiveness of the moral law in motivating us. To be free entailed being free from the 
influence of inclination, and being governed by pure practical reason. Hume, by contrast, 
fanuýush at uccl that morality was 'more properly felt than judo d of. The sentiment of 
benevolence, as well as our wider sensual capacities, were absolutely central to morality, 
and rcaso n co uld do no more than guide the passions. 
I1'hc divisions are not always this stark, but the same sort of concerns arise constantly with 
regard to how we should understand the role of the emotions. Plato identified 
'spiritedness' as one of the three elements in his tripartite division of the soul, and argued 
that it is the 'natural auxiliary of the rational, so long as it is not corrupted by evil 
upbringing. " . 
Aristotlc agreed that having the right education of the emotions was central 
to becoming a virtuous agent, and saw the cultivation of the right sort of feelings as a 
crucial step along the Path to becoming a virtuous agent. ' Once again, the image is of 
emotion having a potentially overwhelming force which needs to be guided if we are to be 
capahlc of right action. This sort of debate also captures much of the content of 
c(antcmhoorarv moral philosophy when it deals with the issue of the emotions, with 
Immanuel Kant, C'rilic iie of Practical Reason, 124. 
I)av id Ilume. Treatise of Huumon Malure, 470. 
Plato. Republic. 44I a. 
See in particular Aristotle, Nic"omachean Ethics, Books I and II. 
distinctly hatitian thinkers standing opposed to those whose allegiance is closer to I lumc 
or . Aristorlc. 
' 
The aim of this thcsis will be to defend a form of scntimcntalism. More specifically, 
I shall 
argue that compassion and reason are jointly necessary and sufficient 
for a proper morality. 
.A study Of Compassion will 
be the focus of chapter six, but it is worth taking some time 
now to indicate what I intend to show. By compassion, 
I shall mean an emotion which 
involv cs the perception that someone is suffering or 
deprived, coupled with an associated 
feeling, and a desire to alleviate the suffering or deprivation. 
In claiming that reason must 
be involved, I mean that it is only vvllcn reason comes to be both influenced 
by 
compassion, as well as guiding our compassionate responses, that we can acquire a 
full 
moral coutl()( . 
An infant or some animals may have the capacity to act in what we might 
dcscribc as a compassionate manner, but they could not understand it as compassion, or 
be 
i ()tiv-arcd to act because they sec a particular action as the compassionate thing to 
do. It is 
diese features or the virtuous agent which are made possible by the onset of reason. 
'balk of a 'proper' morality reflects the \-icw that there could 
be acts which fall under a 
description employing moral concepts, but which might not be possible to 
interpret in 
ways v. -Inch are consistent with compassion. To take an obvious example, the 
heroic, 
noble type who) has entered xhat Nietzsche described as the 'extra moral' phase, 
" will act in 
wavs which reflect a set of moral standards, but not ones which 
involve the Christian 
compassion of sickly, modern I ; uropcan man. If there can 
be morality without 
compassion, then compassion cannot account for all morality. In the 
face of this, I shall 
claim that compassion does account for any proper n-iorality, and this claim will 
be cashed 
out in the context of a naturalistic psychology. By this I mean that given the 
kind of beings 
,, x e are, one,, capable of suffering and responding to the suffering of others, capable of 
happiness and promoting the happiness of others, then a morality- based on compassion 
and guided by reason is proper in virtue of its reflecting the kind of creatures we are. 
In OFdcr to defend this line of argument, I shall structure the thesis 
into tw() distinct 
sccti<ms. hic first thrcc chapters will be an enquiry into the nature of utn(>tiom, and the 
following five chapters will be a considcration of the relationship of the emotions toi our 
Amongst the legion of works which deal with this issue, prominent, recent contributions of a distinctly 
I lumean or Aristotelian line which defend a role for the emotions in ethics include Simon Blackburn, 
Ruling Pa. s. sions, Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Philippa Foot. Natural Goodness, Rosalind 
I lursthouse. On I "iriue Ethics. For positions which are more distinctly Kantian. see Thomas Nagel, The 
Po. ssibiliiv o/ 1 /nroisn!. and Christine Kors_gaard. The Sources of Norniaiiviti" and Creasing the 
Kingdom 
n/ Lnds. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, 13evoncl Goucl and Evil, § 32. 
1) 
ethical lives, with a particular emphasis on compassion. 
There are two reasons for 
structuring the work in this way-. The first is that 
if there is going to be an attack or a 
defence Of the role Of emotion within ethics, then it is best to he clear about the nature Of 
emotion. Such a policy makes less likely the danger of advancing certain premises which 
rclh On an inaccurate characterisation of one of the key areas of 
debate. In order toi 
highlight this, let me Offer an example of where such a case has occurred in the past 
literature. 
A AN er's treatment of morality was to claim it was composed of a series of 
'hscud<t- 
concepts'. I Ic claimed that when advancing supposedly ethical 
judgements, 'the function 
of the relevant ethical word is purely 
"emotive". It is used to express feelings about certain 
Objects, but not to make an assertion abtut them. 
' Given that such language is calculated 
purely toi excite emotions in others, then there could be no real agreement or 
disagreement 
in ethics, because the moral part of the statements didn't constitute a statement about the 
world it was simply an expression of one's own 
feelings about the world. It is an 
unexamined premise of \yer's argument that the expression of 
feeling cannot be the 
subject of agreement or disagreement, and this in turn suggests a theory of the emotions as 
simple, unanalvsable phenomena, akin to sensations, which 
include no judgements about 
the world. If this account of emotion and feeling is wrong, then the wider moral theory 
may be dependent on a false premise, and I suggest that this is exactly , vhat occurred with 
ctnc>tivism. The theory of emotions which I shall be defending 
is to the effect that they are 
complex phenomena which involve beliefs about the world, and which can therefore 
be 
the subject of disagreement. If for example, someone is afraid of the neighbour's 
dog on 
the grounds that she believes all dogs bite humans at every opportunity, the 
fear (I shall 
argue) involves the belief that she is in danger from all dogs, and there 
is plenty of room 
for discussion and disagreement over whether or not her fear is appropriate in this context. 
By failing to consider adequately the nature of emotion, : Avcr assumes that 
if moral 
language is founded in our moral lives then it cannot be a source of agreement or 
disagrcctncnt, and this now looks like a questionable premise. 
'I he second principal reason for addressing in some detail the nature of emotion 
is that I 
believe it will provide important insights into the nature of morality, and once again, 
let me 
offer an example of how this might work. One of the claims 
I shall make is that although 
emotions are naturally occurring in humans, they arc' developmentally open'. 
That is to say 
that we are born with a capacity for fear, for example, but precisely what we actually come 
to fear v, -ill be partially dependent on environmental circumstances. This means that those 
_> 
horn into different communities may well come to share quite general fears, such as fear of 
physical harm, but there may also be dramatic discontinuities between what some of us 
come to fear and some don't. To take an extreme example, contrast the attitude of the 
I ondon stockbroker and the African farmer with regard to falling share prices. The first 
may be so terrified by the prospect of this that she becomes suicidal, whereas the second 
may look on with complete indifference. Yet each may react in a similarly fearful way 
towards a car approaching them at high speed. As such, it looks as if the content of our 
emotional lives is less consistent across communities than physical traits such as visual 
hcrccpti<)n, but more consistent than language. This conclusion has considerable 
implications if we are to defend a moral theory which has a key role for the emotions. It 
indicates that if this sort of pattern is typical, and our moral lives are in some way 
dependent upon our emotional development, we may expect a divergence between the 
content of differing sets of moral judgements. Furthermore, if the content of our 
emotional and moral lives is partly constituted by our locatedncss within a particular 
community, there may be points of divergence between different communities which arc 
irresolvable. 
A further feature of our emotions which contributes to the claim that they are complex 
phcnomcna is the role of desires. It is widely argued in the contemporary literature that 
emotions can be understood as beliefs or judgements. I shall be supporting the view that 
all emotions involv-c beliefs or perceptions, which is how they acquire the property of 
intentionality - the state of being 
directed towards the world. But in arguing that emotions 
necessarily involve feelings I will be confronting some of these contemporary thcorics. .A 
further move away from such 'cognitivist' views will come in the form of the relationship 
which I shall trv toi show exists between our emotions and desires. In some cases, desires 
arc necessarily iný"<ýh-ed in emotions, most obviously in instances of envy and jealousy. If I 
envy my neighbour his new car, a desire for such a car or that particular car, Or of her 
status in light of the possessing of the car is a necessary constituent of the emotion. 
Similarly, if 1 am jealous of my colleagues relationship with our boss, then I desire such a 
relationship, or else I desire that she should not have it. In such cases, the desire is bound 
uh with the beliefs and feelings, all of which are jointly involved in the emotion. 
( )nc vV aV in which the 1-()lc of desire adds a further twist to the complexity of our emotions 
is that one can arguc that thcv arc necessary constituents of emotions such as thOsc 
mentioned above, but only contingently part of certain other emotions. I might feel a 
burning pride at a vict(, rv in a tennis match and, whilst in the throes of the emotion, invite 
A 
.1 
Ay cr. I IJignag , 
Triiih anti Logic, I1I. 
my Opponent to play again. Onc way of construing this is that the desire toi issue the 
invitation was part of the general emotional of experience of pride at the winning of the 
match. That said, it is cyuallyý plausible that I might have been satisfied at the victory, and 
felt nO desire to hlav again, or any other desire to act which could be explained in light of 
the enn)tioon. 
These issues point in turn to the rather tricky issue of motivation. It is, I think, 
Uncontroversial to claim that emotions have motivational potential, but if we are presented 
with theories of the emotions which range from cognitivist accounts on the one hand 
which attempt to reduce emotions to beliefs or judgements, through to complex 'feeling- 
ladcn' accounts can the other which claim that emotions contain beliefs or perceptions, 
feelings, and sometimes desires, then we need to be clear about what provides emotions 
with the motivational force emotions they have. The account offered here will be broadly 
consistent with a bclicf/desire account of motivation, claiming that emotions have 
motivational force either because they involve desires, or because they cause desires to 
emerge. In practice this might mean that our envy directly involves a desire for an object, 
and that desire explains our later action of purchasing the object. Or it might be the case 
that I am flushed with pride, and later recollection of the pleasing nature of the pride 
provokes a desire to reheat the experience which was the source of the pride in the first 
place. As such, the appearance of the desire is explained by a thought along the lines ()f 'l 
x-vant toi experience that emotion again'. 
I have said that the thesis is divided into two broad sections, but I shall now offer a more 
detailed account of the line of argument I shall be taking. In the initial chapters on the 
nature of emotion, there are two 
key- themes which will emerge. The first is an opposition 
toi rcductivism, and in particular to any attempt to reduce emotions either to the status of 
simple sensations, or to an attitude towards a proposition. Both sorts of reduction, I shall 
claim, result in an inadequate account of what emotions are, and as such would have a 
distorting effect on am later moral theory. In the case of the first sort of reduction, that of 
portraying emotions as purely internal physiological phenomena, the danger will be that the 
later moral theory \x ill suffer from the sort of problem encountered in cnuýtivism. If, on 
the other hand, we try the second form of reduction, that of analysing emotions into a 
series of beliefs, it may lead perversely to a sentimentalist theory of ethics vvhich is also 
co'(; nitivist. If ethics is founded ultimately on, for example, compassion, ' and compassion 
can he analysed into a series of beliefs, then we could accept the first premise, carry out the 
reduction, and establish whether or not the beliefs which go to make up compassionate 
5 
reslx, nscs in a particular instance are true or false representations of the world. 
As such, 
the validity of moral judgements need not differ greatly from other Putative empirical 
claims alx)ur the world 
At a purely intuitive level, the idea of a coýgnitivist, sentimentalist theory of ethics just 
seems profoundly odd, and I shall attempt to rule out such a possibility in arguing that 
emotions are complex phenomena which 
include minimally either beliefs or perceptions 
on the one hand, and feelings on the other, which is to say 
both cognitive and non- 
a>gnitiv-c clcmcnts. " As such, any reductive programme is doomed to 
failure if it attctnpts 
to reduce cmOticm to <mc or other of these elements. Alorem-er, as I shall he arguing that 
thcsc arc ncccssarv features of emotion, the dismissal of reduction will be an ßi»170/7 claim. 
Part of the ccýmhlexltv' of any emotion derives from the necessary presence of 
feelings, 
which I shall characterise as perceptions of the state of one's body, and this will 
lead 
directly to the second key claim I shall be making in the first section. 1 shall show that 
there is a 'background of directed feeling' which orients us towards the world, and which is 
shaped by our social environment. This means that through innumerable transactions with 
others around us over many years, we come to associate certain feelings with the world 
around us. These feelings condition our perception of many features of the world, and 
guide us in our dealings with other persons. To offer an example, when a child comes 
across an unfamiliar object, and the caregiver looks on with horror as the child approaches 
it, this response is one to which a child often responds, and is capable of deterring her 
from going near it. This sort of simple example is symptomatic of the way in which we 
come toi 'feel towards' the world in one way rather than another. It is when this sort of 
scenario occurs on many occasions with regard to a wide variety of persons, objects and 
activities, that we come to 'see' the world in some ways rather than others, in ways which 
are conditioned by the way in which we feel about it. 
The opening chapters will develop this theory at some length, but represent primarily the 
groundwork for the ethical theory which is to follow. The bridge between the theory of 
the emotions in the initial three chapters and the moral theory of the 
final five chapters will 
1>c a discussion of what it is to have a moral perspccti\-c, which I shall charactcrisc as a part 
of our cmcýti<ýnal (lcV clopnunt "1'hc focus of the discussion will be a concept prominent 
This is Schopenhauer's claim in On the Basis of Alora/ül'. 
I do not claim that emotions are characterised only be beliefs and feelings, in that there are other 
features such as their evolutionary development or their neural correlates which one might argue to be 
essential. For this reason. I say only that emotions necessarily include beliefs and feelings, as it is these 
features wIiich are most relevant to the later moral theory. 
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of Bernard \\'illiauis' discussion in Sbcr/rre that of the 
intcrnaliscd other. I 
shall characterise this is a metaphor for the way in which our emotional responses conic to 
be shaped by those around us, resulting in the needs and claims of others coming to be a 
part of our o>v, ýn 
identity. this means that when we confront the world, we do so frone a 
perspective which already includes the presence of others' interest within it, thereby 
creating the possibility of altruism. 
'" 
'l he next stage of the thesis will be to justify the claim that there is a sort of content that 
the internalised other ()Light to have in light of the kind of beings we are, but in making this 
claim I shall consider in some detail what I take to be a major hurdle in reaching such a 
conclusion. Let us say- we make the claim, as Schopenhauer did, that morality is based in 
co mpassio n, and that the meaning of moral terms can be understood in terms of 
compassion. If this is true, then it should he true a priori that compassionate responses are 
ood responses, but this just doesn't seem to be the case. We might even argue, with 
Nietzsche, that this smacks of Christian pity, and that we should rid ourselves of such 
sickly modern I : uropcan thoughts. As such, we arrive at how the emotion binds us to the 
world, but not yet how it relates to morality. Ehe way- to overcome such a conceptual 
hurdle is by tricans of a naturalistic psychology which allows us to conclude that the 
content of the internalised other is one which should be reflective of our nature as beings 
whop both need those around us, and have the capacity to respond to such needs in others. 
Compassion is a response which characterises both our needs and such possible responses, 
and this will he the basis for the claim that it grounds a proper morality. 
l'hc final chapters will confront two particularly challenging problems for am- 
sentimentalist theory of ethics, those of practical necessity and moral reasoning. Given 
that emo do nis arc generally taken to be a dangerous distraction to sound reasoning, the 
sentimentalist is under pressure to provide an account of whether or not such reasoning 
could take place, and if so, how. As with, the discussion of emotion and morality in the 
preceding chapters, I shall argue that a sound understanding of the nature of emotion, one 
which I hope to have provided in the opening chapters, will provide satisfactorv answers 
on these issues. Oncc we have a view of emotions as partly constituted by beliefs or 
perceptions, and that these are coloured by feelings, then insofar as our beliefs and 
perceptions are similarly 'feeling-laden', 'w e have the potential for agreement and 
disagrccment. I or example, if we each hold the fccling-laden belief that human life has 
"' This is, needless to say. a radically different explanation to that provided by Nagel in his book of the 
same name. 
"I take this phrase from Michael Stocker. See in particular his I'uluing Emolionns. 
7 
great value, hut disagree over issues related to euthanasia, we have the potential for a 
resolution of our disagreement if one of us can bring for\vard certain evidence which will 
convince the other that the value of human life is better respected by one side rather than 
the other in this debate. I he shared feelings which are combined in consciousness with a 
similar range of beliefs held by each agent provide a platform upon which discussion can 
he conducted in much the same way- as ordinary debate - drawing inferences, weighing the 
evidence, reaching conclusions. In contrast, should we not share the feeling-laden belief 
that animals' lives have value, then such debate would be impossible, but there is, so I shall 
argue, sufficient communality of interest amongst humans such that broadly similar 
emotional and feeling-laden responses to the world are more rather than less likely to result 
in the possibility of moral reasoning and discussion. 
Prior to this, I shall consider how it is that sentimentalism can account for our sense of 
moral obligation. '1'hc difficulty here is addressing the Iiantian claim that the categorical 
nature of moral obligation requires that we ground it in the moral law. If we are to claim 
that ohligation is based in contingent features of the human condition such as compassion, 
then all imperatives become hypothetical ones along the lines that `if I wish to be 
c(mipassionatc, then I need to help those in need'. The danger is that this may not be 
adequate to account of the force of our sense of obligation, and sentimentalism therefore 
encounters the danger of being unahlc to account for a key area of moral thought. 
The line I shall take in defence of how sentimentalism can indeed explain our sense of 
obligation stems from arguments of one finds in Hume and in Bernard Williams. ', Flume 
provides us with all account of how a sense of obligation can emerge from a combination 
of self-interest and our sentiment of benevolence, and I shall argue in favour of his 
account of hone- we come to accept a `general rule' on the grounds that we recognise that 
the rules of justice benefit us personally. This is supplemented by a sense of fellow-feeling; 
with others, such that we come to dislike those who flout justice even when we personally 
do not stand to lose. This, I shall claim, is consistent with the development of a moral 
sense which can he captured in the concept of the internalised other. Our emotions are 
shaped such that we come to feel a particular way about the world, and this includes 
acquiring a respect for rules of justice. It is Williatns' discussion of what he calls 
'dispositions of character' which provide the grounding of our sense of obligation. That is 
to say, the compassionate agent is one who perceives the world in light of her 
1' hie kev sections in Hume come in Book Ill of A Treatise o/ HuumuniNuture, and Williams key 
areuments are to be found in 'Practical Necessity' and 'Moral Incapacity', reprinted in his Moral Luck 
and \Iaki; i, ' Sense o/ Hrunumit. respectively. 
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cOmhassi(>natc disposition, and her perccptions of the world condition her understanding 
of the suffering of others, and motivate her to act on perceiving that suffering. There are 
some (occasions when our reasons for action overwhelm any other reasons , x-c may have to 
act differently, and this is when we feel we tlrrr. rl act in one way- rather than another. 
There are two further comments it is important to make at this stage. 'Flic first is that the 
(overwhelming emphasis will be on advancing a positive theory of how the emotions help 
ground morality. In particular, I aim to provide a plausible account of how the emotions 
c(>ntributc to our moral psychology. This means that I shall not be concerned to attack 
opponents of sentimentalism, although the final two chapters arc intended to provide 
answers in the areas of moral philosophy where sentimentalism is traditionally considered 
tu be most vulnerable. More specifically, I shall try to confront what I take to be the most 
pressing concerns that a hantian is likely to have, those in the areas of the nature of moral 
obligation and the process of moral reasoning. I shall not on the other hand be setting out 
the positive case that the Kantian would make with the aim of attacking it. The second 
point is that I shall not he addressing the question of how sentimentalism relates to the 
content of our concept of justice. Although I would like to have considered this issue, 
co nsidcrations of time and space made it impractical adequately to address this in addition 
toi writing on both the nature of emotion, and how emotion relates to morality. 
The overall thrust of this thesis will he that it is through our emotions that the world takes 
on sir nificancc for us, and that we not only encounter a world which is enlivened by the 
emotional responses it elicits in us, but find ourselves bound to others by those same 
emotional commitments. The wide range of emotions we experience in a plethora of 
different contexts impels us into an engagement with the world, and part of that 
engagement comes in the form of responding to the hold that others have over us through 
our emotional tics to them. It is here where we find the moral domain. 
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1. Cognitivism in the Emotions 
1 n/rocht( /inn 
I said in the main introduction that part of what I wish to argue for is the view that our 
emotional life has a central role to play in our engagement with the world. Our emotions 
help us to Find colour and wonder in the world around us, and bind us to certain persons 
and projects. One aspect of this for which I shall be arguing is that there is a distinct 
ontcýlo', v of the emotions, and this claim would be vulnerable if it could be shown that 
emotions, far from being distinct, can he reduced to a combination of beliefs, or beliefs 
and desires. This has been a view widely held within analytical philosophy from the 
second half of the twentieth century onwards, and in order to fortify the position I shall 
be trv ing to establish, it is necessary to consider the essentials of such `cognitivist' views. 
I shall look more closely at the role of desire in the following two chapters, but my aim 
here will be to consider positions which defend an account of emotions as collections of 
beliefs. 
1'hcrc arc four charactcristics, most or all of which one typically finds in the positions I 
shall be c, \anl1ii1i1 . 
" cl-notions can be understood purely in terms of the beliefs they entail 
" feelings are not part of an cnnc)tion 
" emotions have propositional content 
" cinOtions have intentionality 
I shall argue that the first two claims are wrong, but that the second two are correct, and 
provide us with a genuine advance in our understanding of emotion. My aim is to show 
that we need to avoid any reductive account which singles out either beliefs or feelings as 
being the defining feature of emotions, and accept an account of emotions as complex 
phenomena comprising both beliefs and feelings. As such, the position I shall refer to as 
COgnitiv ism Would be wrong in the narrowness of its focus, but right in placing an 
emphasis on the role of huhcf. 
It is perhaps wise in the first instance to underline how radical the shift towards 
cognitivisrn was, in that emotions had traditionally been considered as simple, 
unanaly sahlc states, largely physiological in character. 
' To sec them discussed as beliefs 
flies in the face not simply of many traditional historical approaches, but also of intuitive 
thinking about emotions as being feelings which defy full analysis or undcrstanding. 
We 
just are afraid or angry, and there 
isn't anything more which can be said about the 
content of such states. _Although I shall try to show that congnitivist accounts of the 
emotions cannot succeed in the final analysis, I shall also 
be emphasising the great leap 
forward which such accounts represent in comparison to the historical ones they 
have 
countered. I shall argue that attempting to understand emotions as 
beliefs and desires is 
fatally flawed, but that even those philosophers who have roundly rejected such theories 
have largely accepted key aspects of the cognitivist position', and the fact that 
c<mtcmpOrary accounts often stress the complexity of the issue 
indicates the influence of 
many of the accounts I shall be discussing. 
The 
I have said that the aim of this chapter is principally to discuss cognitivist accounts of the 
emotions, but I shall be starting with one of the classic non-cognitivist accounts, as 
it has 
provided so much ammunition for the cognitix-ists, and represents something of an 
historical starting point for contemporary philosophy- of the emotions. The james-Lange 
theory essentially secs emotions as perceptions we have of states within our own bodies. 
' 
James consciously inverts the conventional framework for understanding our emotions. 
Our natural wan of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some 
fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter stale of mind eivcs rise to 
the hOdilv expression. AIv thesis on the contrary is that tbye bodily c/a1i '. r %ollof' dire"IhT M 
PI : RCI ,P ION nJ lAe etiýrliýr; /ýrtl, dill /hu/ orn-leelürt n/ i/ic s the 1hun; er as Me) 0,., ///-Is Nie en/olioir. 
' For an historical account of theories of the emotions in ancient, medieval and early modern 
philosophy, see Susan James. Passion and lction. 
See tor example Michael Stocker. I'alubng Emotions. 38-51, Peter Goldic, The Emotions, I 1-28. 
See William James, 'What is an Emotion`? ', aline 9,188-205. Carl Lange was a Danish psychologist 
credited by James with having developed the sane theory independently of him at around the same 
tine. 
Will lam James. 'W hat is an Emotion? ', Mind 9,190-191. 
In other words, rather than a perception giving rise to bodily changes which we take to 
be part of fear, anger, disgust, and so on, the body responds directly to an external 
stimulus, and mir perception of our racing heart or trembling knees is the emotion. 
This 
is the legacy of our evolutionary design, in that we have developed in such a way that the 
brain is adapted to respond in a particular way when presented with certain 
circumstances. .A number of arguments are 
invoked to support the theory, of which 
some are of particular importance when we come to consider the cognitivist views which 
I shall be looking at next. dames argues that one piece of evidence supporting 
his thesis 
is that if we try to abstract away all the feelings and the sensations which are 
characteristic of strong emotions such as great fear or anger, then all we are 
left with is a 
rather flat perceptual state. Or to use James' more colourful terms, `What kind of an 
emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened 
heart-beats nor of 
shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of gox>sc- 
flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. " 
There are certain aspects of James' theory which are of central importance for what 
follows. The first is that James lays enormous emphasis on the role played by feelings in 
his thesis. Throughout the article we are treated to numerous passages similar to the one 
yuotcd above in which the presence of feeling is seen as the defining characteristic of 
these emotions with `distinct bodily expression' in which he is interested. It is this aspect 
of his vv-ork which was to be rejected by the cognitivists, largely perhaps, 
because it was 
felt to be closely associated with what is universally regarded by the overwhelming 
w eakness of the theory. The problem is that if an emotion is the perception of a 
bodily 
state, then how can we distinguish between emotions which have identical bodily states? 
If my heart heats quickly, this can be out of fear, anger, excitement, elation or a range of 
other cmc)tiOns. We could try- turning to combinations of behavioural activity and 
physiological activity to narrow down the range of options, so that we might look at the 
combination of running, screaming, accelerated heart rate, sweating and certain other 
features to define fear. But this would only pick out an individual emotion in a small 
number of cases, and only a minority even of those emotions with `bodily expression' in 
which dames is interested. 
Ibid. 193-194 
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One obvious direction in which to turn is towards the object of our emotions. If the 
emotion is one of fear, and the object of the emotion is an elephant charging towards us, 
then our bclicfs about the approaching elephant provide a means of distinguishing this 
particular emotion from others. l'nfortunately for James, this option was denied him, 
because the object of the emotion was a bodily state rather than an external object. As 
such, we can't distinguish very easily which emotion is instantiated on a particular 
occasion by my heart thumping or my muscles tightening. Although there is `an exciting 
fact', this isn't the object of the emotion on a jamcsian account. One way of 
understanding the problem with James' account, is that he has restricted the complexity 
of his conceptual account. By describing emotions as perceptions of bodily states, he 
provides them with intentionality, but the intentionality does not provide the right sort of 
relationship to the external world. We want an account which explains our fear with 
direct reference to the charging elephant, and this relationship is not explicit enough in 
the account we have before us. 
The hr<ýhlctn of providing too narrow an ontology of the emotions is prccisclY the samt 
one cncountcred by the cognitivists, v,, -ho overcome Jaincs' problem over hov,, - emotions 
brim; us into contact with the external world, but leave out Jatncs' most powerful 
ohscrvations as to how they affect us internally. 
11! t, lit/(,, tlioilci/ill' 0/ /A' 1 , atotioii. i 
Perhaps the most prominent cog"itivist account of emotions has been offered by- 
\nthony Kenny, whose principal focus was precisely on the intentionalitti- of cmotions. " 
TTo talk of intentionality in this context means that our emotions must always be directed 
towards someone or something - they must have an object. For hcnny, not only must 
any emotion have an object, but `emotions are specified by their objects'. This is 
established in light of two different features of objects in language. "' In the first place, 
there is the logical role of object-expressions related to a particular class of ivrbs in which 
objects describe species of the genus described by the verb. I-or example, stealing a car 
is one specific species of stealing, and smoking a cigarette is a species of smoking. In the 
second place, objects can also pick out the /orimnal objýil. r. the formal object of ýing is the 
Anthony Kenny. , Iclion, 
Emotion and Will, especially 187-194 
ibid. 73 
1> 
colbjcct under the description which must apply if it is possible to ý at all. ( )bvious 
examples which Kenny cites are that only what is edible can be eaten, and only what is 
inflammable can be burned. But there are also more informative cases, such as only 
what is dirty can be cleaned, and only what is , ý-ct can be dried. 
Given the claim that all emotions must have objects, then the formal requirements on 
what could possibly constitute the objects of love, fear, envy and so on, will inevitably 
provide a much broader understanding of our emotions in two senses. I'irstly, the 
intentionality on its own sheds light on the central importance of seeing that emotions 
cannot be understood as simply sensations or private phenomena. They necessarily force 
us into a relationship with the world around us. This is an obvious break with the 
Jamcsian account set Out earlier, and conforms to the powerful intuition that there is a 
strong relationship between our emotions and the features of the external world which 
appear to elicit them. Sccondly, the formal restrictions, Kenne argues, will restrict the 
range possibilities as to when it is possible for us to experience particular emotions. As 
he puts it, 'One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever'. ' 
Peter (; oldie highlights two further necessary properties for an ctncýtion's object. It must 
he sufficiently Fine-grained to explain why the person feels the , vay he does. `Oedipus 
might be delighted that he married Jocasta, but not delighted that he married his mother. ' 
I'urthcrmc>rc, the object need not exist, in that it is perfectly coherent to be afraid of 
ghosts or the abominable snowman. 
The First of Kenny's points does seem to provide a genuine insight into our emotions. 
WC must fear something or love someone, and it is this feature of emotions which allows 
us to break out of the conceptual restrictions of the body which Kenny detects in earlier 
philosophers such as Descartes and Hume. This aspect of our emotions is also one 
which has been largely accepted by those who have follow,. -cd Kenny, regardless of 
výhcthcr or not they are sympathetic to his cognitivism. '' 
ihicl, 188-189 
ihij, 192 
Peter Gold je. The Emutlo»s, 18 
Among, the many philosophers who accept the intentionality of the emotions. see Robert C Solomon, 
The Passions, or Gabrielle Taylor, Pride, Shame und Guilt, for alternative cognitivist accounts, or else 
see Justin Oakley, Alorulih' and the Emotions, Michael Stocker, I tIuing Emotions, Peter Goldie, The 
Emotions, for theories of the emotions which retain the intentionality but reject the distinctly cognitivist 
approach. 
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The debate surrounding the formal restrictions on what we can fear or envy is more 
difficult, and Once again points us in the direction of a complex ontology. It seems right 
to sav that that I cannot be proud of something I find unequivocally bad, or that I must 
Find some value in something I envy, but this tells us very little, and even such relatively 
modest claims can prove difficult. Kenny gives us a useful account of how emotions can 
be inappropriate, explaining that if I envy my neighbour's fruit trees the envy would 
become inappropriate on discovering that the trees were actually growing in my own 
gardcn'-'. Clearly, certain emotions just Ought to cease in light Of learning certain facts, 
but we also need to be clear about just what Our story is going to be when it comes to 
listing the relevant facts. Take for example Kenny's claim that one can't be afraid of just 
am-thing. Ideally, we might want to say that either we are afraid only of what we take to 
be dangerous, car else the fear is inappropriate. But what if we have a case of someone 
who is scared Of spiders, and is able to offer an account along the lines that the thought 
Of such a repellent creature scuttling across her skin is so appalling that she just doesn't 
want to have a spider anywhere near hcrý Such an explanation clearly fails toi meet the 
putative formal requirement Of fearing what is dangerous, but we can surely present a 
strong case to the effect that it can be appropriate to fear what we find disgusting, 
hccausc we find the experience of disgust so awful. This would mean that the object of 
Our fear might be disgust rather than danger. 
Kenny is surely right to claim that we can't be afraid of just anything, but the problem is 
that we can be appropriately afraid of an awfully lot things which aren't dangerous. One 
obviOus route is to try to fall back on certain natural properties of objects as the stimulus 
for what we fear, and there is some mileage to be gained from this. As William James 
pointed out, `In advance of all experience of elephants no child can but be frightened if 
he suddenly find one trumpeting and charging upon him. ''' But such brutally clear 
circumstances account for only a fraction of the cases in which we are afraid. The fear of 
death or serious bodily injury is much less common for most of us than more complex 
instances of fear such as fear of losing a job or fear of embarrassment in a philosophy 
SCIl11nar. 
Hie issue of when an emotion is appropriate is one I shall consider at various points, but it is worth 
givin1 an example now in order to highlight the intuition behind such an idea. Imagine you are in a 
restaurant and a diner at the next table flies into rage because the young waitress who laid the table had 
put the knife and fork on the wrong side of one of the places at the table. Part of our view would be 
that rage was an inappropriate emotional response in the face of such a trivial mistake, and when I talk 
of inappropriate emotions. I shall be referring to this sort ofcase. 
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There is also a danger that if we try to develop a theory along the lines that fear is an 
emotional response stimulated bv natural properties in the external world, then it can 
lead us in the wrong direction when we collie to interpret the object of fear. If I say that 
I am frightened of , x-hat the . 
Australian fast-bowling attack may do to the I ; nglish 
batsmen, then the phv sical dangers present in an Australian hurling a ball at an 
1. nglishman might conccivably be the object of my fear, in which case the physical 
properties of a cricket hall and the potential injury to a human body will provide us with 
the right sort of explanation. But a more likely interpretation, one which may be lost if 
X VC focus on natural properties, is that the object of me fear is not the prospect of 
physical Injury, but the more subtle dangers of swing and scam bowling, the fear of 
which must be explained within the cultural context. These more subtle and complex 
examples are absolutely crucial to the debate on the emotions, because they are so central 
toi what makes human life distinct. Although we can make a case of the young boy in 
James' scenario experiencing fear of the elephant which can be compared to the elk's fear 
Of a lion, the plausibility of such comparisons fade in proportion to the subtlety and 
complexity Of the emotion we are discussing. More specifically, when distinctly human 
capacities such as language and self-awareness start to figure in the development and 
experience of emotions such as remorse or jealousy, then it will be ever more difficult to 
pick Out natural properties in the world in order to explain their occurrence. The size 
and pov, 'cr of an elephant could provide much of the explanation of why we might fear 
one charging towards us, but in cases such as fear of the possibility of future failure, then 
there just may not he any salient features of the physical world which could explain this 
emotion. 
I. lpplvac'h 
Onc major problem which we are left with then, is how- emotions come to he directed 
towards some objects rather than others. .A different tack can he found In Donald 
1)av-idso n's account of emotion, where the focus moves from intentionality to beliefs. '' 
Davidson argues that we can extract from F-Iume's discussion of the passions in Boot: 11 
of his 1 ftd//c a more persuasive theory of the emotions. I'ollowing I Iumc, Davidson 
William James. 'What is an Emotion? ', A/ind 9,191 
Donald Davidson, -1lunne's Cognitive Theory of Pride', reprinted in Es, sai"a on Actions anti Evc°ni. s, 
? 77-290. 
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focuses on pride, but then proceeds to discard the aspects of Flume which lie finds 
unfortunate. Pride does not entail any particular feelings or sensations, much less are 
there ones which constitutes pride. These are simple phenomena which may accompany 
pride on certain occasions, and we need to set aside such 'psychological atomism, in 
order to unearth the real insights I lumc offers us. 
Davidson is particularly- interested in what lie believes Hume reveals about 'propositional 
pride', which is to say pride evident in sentences such as, `She was proud that she had 
been elected president'. It is argued that a certain reading and reorganisation of the 
double relation of ideas and impressions will provide us with a much better theory. 
Davidson summarises I Iumc as follows: 
The cause of pride is a conjunction of the idea of a house, say, and a quality 
(beauty). The quality causes the separate and pleasant passion, which under the 
right conditions causes (bv association) the similar pleasant passion of pride. the 
passion of pride itself always causes the idea of self to appear, and this idea must 
be related (causally, by association) to the idea of the object (the house) on which 
the quality is placed. '' 
In short, the first impression is the pleasure caused by the beauty of the house. The first 
idea is the ownership of the house. The second idea is brought to the fore by the first - it 
is not simph, that the house is owned, but it is owned bv mime, therebv bringing out the idea 
of the self. These features combine to produce pride, and the pleasure of this emotion is 
the second impression. We need to hold on to the causal role played by certain beliefs, 
and the relation of the object of pride to self, but to introduce an attitude of appronul in 
order to gig-c us the appropriate structure. 
\cc<ýrding toi Davidson, this can bust he captured in the form a practical svllogisin such 
as ncc tOll()v), -ing;; 
\11 v,, -h<> have the quality of o-winin ;a house arc hraiscv, -orthy in that respect 
Ibid. 282. The original discussion in Hume can be found in pages 285-290 of, A Treatise ai Humus 
Va/urc'. As Davidson makes it clear that lie is interested only in what he believes Hume should have 
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I have the property of owning a house 
Therefore 
I am praiseworthy in that respect. 
I'he beliefs about my ownership of the house are coupled with the pro attitude towards 
people vvith this property combine to cause pride. Davidson claims that this formulation 
helps to explain pride in two ways, in that it gives both a causal explanation and the 
person's reasons for being proud. 
At this stage, it is worth considering one of the principal criticisms vvhich has been put 
against this sort of theory, which focuses on the exclusion of the concept of feeling from 
the accounts offered by both Kenny and Davidson. The problem with the sort of 
coýgnitivist account which we have looked at is that it appears that even if all the relevant 
beliefs are in place with regard to the appropriate object, there is still no guarantee that 
there is any emotion. Consider, for example, a situation in which two people are walking 
down the street, and a deadly snake slithers out of the undergrowth and turns towards 
them. It is possible for both onlookers to form the beliefs that the snake is deadly, and 
that they are in danger if they do not immediately stop and allow it to continue on its wav- 
with<ýut approaching it. We can even include relevant desires such as that of avoiding a 
fatal bite. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the first might be paralysed with fear while 
the second waits calmly for the snake to pass so they can continue their conversation. 
The crucial point seems to be that without certain /<e/th . s, we cannot 
be sure that the 
content of the beliefs, coupled with certain desires, will give us what we require for the 
fear to be present. If it is possible for two agents to hold all of the relevant beliefs and 
desires, but for one to be experiencing fear and not the other, then it looks as if beliefs 
and desires cannot be the whole story when it comes to our emotions. 
( )nc uscful attempt to defend a cognitivist line against this sort of criticism comes from 
those 'v h<o agrcc with the failings in something like the I)avidsonian account, but try to 
rctain the co gnitivist theor in a different form. The move they make, correctly in mV 
said, rather than in providing a fully accurate interpretation, I have not questioned the summary he 
offers. 
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view, is to emphasise the complexity of our emotions by requiring us to understand 
them within the context of a wider life. This sort of elaboration is offered bv both 
Gabrielle "1`avlcn- and Robert C Solomon, although with slight v ariatim-ts. ' Taylor begins 
her account with a criticism levelled specifically at Davidson, before developing a richer 
theory of her own. In the first instance, she points out that the structure of pride (or am 
other propositional emotion) needn't take the form set out by Davidson. Someone 
might, for example, decide to purchase a house with purely prudential considerations in 
mind, then find herself unexpectedly satisfied xvith the state of being a home caner, and 
finallv come to the view that anyone in this state ought to feel worthy of admiration for 
getting there. As such, the major premise is derived from the minor one, rather than the 
other way round. 
The more far-reaching criticism is one which concerns how we should come to 
understand w-h\ someone is experiencing a particular emotion. Rather than explaining 
this in terms of similar beliefs held by others, there arc times wwihcn we need to look 
much more closely at the life of the particular individual concerned, and to idcntifv the 
place of the emotion within a much wider framework of beliefs and experiences relating 
solely to the person concerned. In order to bring out this point, consider the following 
passage from Guiseppe I'omasi l, ampedusa's 11e Leopal'(1. ' The scene takes place in the 
dccav ing Palace of the Salinas, a once great family of Sicilian aristocrats. Princess 
(; cmcctta, noxv in her seventies, is receiving l assoni, the Cardinal of Palermo. He has 
inadvcrtcnth let slip that'1'ancrcdi, the man with whom she had been in love many v, cars 
before, had also loved her, but had been put off by what he believed to be her coldness 
towards him. This shatters her belief that her father had kept them apart in pursuit of his 
political aims. She has never married or taken a lover since. 
If '1'assoni had told the truth, then the long hours spent in savouring her hatred 
before hei- father's picture, her hiding of every photograph of 'l'ancrcdi soy as not 
toi be forced to hate him too, had been stupidity- worse, cruel injustice; and she 
suffered now at the memory of Tancrcdi's warm and imploring tone as he had 
begged his uncle to allovk him into that convent; thcv had been words of io c 
'° Gabrielle Taylor, Pride. Shame, and Guilt. 1-16. Robert C Solomon, The Passions, and 'Emotions 
and Choice'. in Amelie 0. Rorty, ed. Evplaining Emotions 251-282. 
1-Taylor uses and excerpt from Joyce's The Dead in order to make a similar point. I have substituted a 
dilterent passage which better suits my purposes. 
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towards her, words not understood, routed by her pride which at her harshness 
had drawn back with their tails between their legs like whipped puppies. lFrom 
the timeless depth of her being, a black pain came welling to spatter her all over 
that revelation of the truth. (186) 
Later I shall suggest that such passages pose considerable difficulties if one tries to 
reduce them toi a series of beliefs, but many of the points which Taylor raises in setting 
out such a theory nevertheless extend our understanding of what has gone wrong. She 
suggests that if we are to take a 1)avidsonian approach to understanding any of the 
numnrc>us emotions im-01\ed in such an episode, then we will lose sight of the 
interweaving role of the beliefs and experiences of Concetta at the personal level. To 
choose but one of the emotions involved here, it would be misleading to try to frame her 
sadness in the form of a syllogism such as: 
\11 pc<)hlc v,, -ho ) have missed out on the opportunity of marrying someone they love are 
spul insofar as thcv have missed this opportunity. 
('OÜicctri has missed this opportunity. 
II'hcrcf<>rc 
Concctta is sad. 
'1 he problem conics in trying to phrase the major premise in such a way that it is not 
open to obvious counter examples. In this instance, it is entirely possible that Concetta's 
feelings might have receded over the years to the point where she felt little u-iorc than a 
touch of amusement at this news. : Alternativ-cly, her beliefs about the immense 
happiness of 1'ancredi's marriage to someone eise, and the satisfaction at the solitary life 
she had led might have left her relieved at the way things had worked out. '1'hc problem 
appears to lie in the fact that our emotions often fail to conform to the law-like structure 
of the syllogism the wide variety of possible emotional responses to Particular situations 
makes abstraction hazardous because it calls into question whether or not there really 
could he general laws of logic toi describe our emotional responses. 
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Such arguments indicate that appreciating why an individual experiences a particular 
emotion at a particular moment is less successful if we try to abstract from a range 
examples toi achieve a general set of laws, and better understood if we focus on emotions 
as integrated into a wider life. Concetta's sadness can only be understood when 
considered alongside her h)ve, her hatred, her sense of injustice, her pride, and countless 
other aspects of her life which have preceded this moment. there are certainly some 
cases ww-here we can usefully talk in broader terms about the kind of emotions people are 
likely toi experience in particular circumstances, as I conceded with reference to William 
dames earlier, ', but such cases will become ever rarer once we leave behind the clear-cut 
beliefs we are likely to develop in the face of charging elephants, and arrive at the more 
dcchlý personalised emotions which spring from our more individual circumstances. At 
this stage, only kno>-\,, -Icdgc of the agent's more particular history, set against the backdrop 
of who they are, will give us the explanatory material we need to understand why they are 
having a particular emotion. Taylor herself concludes that, `the appeal is no longer to the 
wholly rational being; it is to the admittedly far less neat and precise notion of what it 
would he human and natural for a person to feel, given that person's other beliefs and 
attitudes . 
['his emphasis on the complex, interlocking role of emotions within a life is echoed in 
Robert Solomon's early theory. He argued for emotions not as beliefs, but as 
judgements. Like Taylor, he was at pains to avoid what he saw as the irrelevant use of 
feeling in the understanding of the emotions. `It is at the heart of my argument that 
"feelings" and physiology and, with qualifications, dispositions to behave, do 11o/ play an 
essential role in the constitution of emotions. "" Like Taylor, Solomon stressed the 
complexity of the phenomenon, arguing that, `an emotion is never a single judgement, 
but a system of judgements, and although one might well make one or several 
judgements of the system without having the emotion, my claim is that one cannot make 
(///of them and not have the emotion. 
"' All the essential judgements necessarily involve 
oneself in a scenario which one has created. `. Anger, for example, is to be analysed in 
ýs Sec page 16 above. 
Gabrielle Taylor, /Title, Shame, and Gu i/l, 14 
Robert C Solomon, 'Emotions and Choice', Appendix, 274, in Amelie 0 Rorty ed. Explaining 
Eniotinri. s. Although Solomon uses the term 'judgement'. there appears to be no relevant distinction 
between his use of this term and the use of the term 'belief which we find in Kenny and Davidson. I 
have therefore addressed his theory on the assumption that the two terms are interchangeable in this 
context. 
21 lhicl, 275 
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terms of a quasi--courtroom scenario, in which one takes the role of judge, jury, 
prOýsccutin(; attorney and, can occasion, executioner......... Fhe object of anger is the 
accused, the crime is an offence, and the overall scenario is one of judgemental self- 
rlghteOusne55. 'ý` 
According to Solomon, the fact that this doesn't appear to reflect the ordinary experience 
of anger could be explained by the fact the judgements we make which arc emotions are 
not of the category which are the result of deliberation. They are judgements which are 
`undclihcrated, unarticulated, and unreflective'. " The practicalities of life mean that we 
simply don't have time to carefully think through all the options we will often have 
before us, and a mechanism which leads us to flee unthinkingly before possible danger is 
ding toi be useful in saving our necks more often than not. 
Solomon supplements the description of emotions as judgements by giving an account 
of the functional role emotions play in helping us through ordinary life. `1 . mcrtions are 
rational responses to unusual situations .......... , 
An emotion is a necessary hasty 
judgement in response to a difficult situation. ', ` Such a view carries obvious force when 
we come to emotions such as fear or anger, where they fit into an obvious account which 
one might wish to provide in the context of an evolutionary theoretical account of the 
devc1opment of the emotions: 
( )ncc again, there seem toi be invaluable observations offered by Taylor and Solomon, 
but ones which cannot conceal deeper problems with their accounts. Solomon in 
particular seems to struggle in trying to square his cognitivist aims with the peculiar 
hhencrmcnologv of the emotions, in that he must try to show how the emotions are 
rational despite the intuition that they arc partly characterised by non-rational elements 
such as physiological changes and unreflective responses. This is particularly evident in 
the use of the courtroom as a metaphor for anger. It is surely an exaggeration to think 
that we set up such a scenario in our minds, even subconsciously or metaphorical]-. 
Indeed, the formality and organised structure of a courtroom just looks inappropriate 
even as a metaphor for the potentially uncontrolled and destructive impulses which anger 
Ibid, 275 
Robert C Soloneon, The Passions, 131 
Robert C Solomon, 'Emotions and Choice', 261-265, in Amelie 0 Rorty cd. Explaining Emotions 
For a thorough treatment of this area, see Paul Griffiths, Whai Emotions Reallr. lre. 
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often involves. In addition, to think of emotions as ultimately rational responses to the 
world around us seems to leave out the rather unhelpful, irrational behaviour often 
associated with such responses. If I argue with my neighbour over a trivial issue, and 
some of his comments irritate me such that I find it difficult ever to look at him, and 
spend years resenting him and throwing rnv grass cuttings over the fence into his back 
garden, the ongoing nature of my anger does nothing to help me deal with an unfamiliar 
situation, still less does it help me get through my life. 
These points raise problems for Solomon's theory, but the central argument which both 
he and "Taylor put is that emotions have to be understood as being embedded in a life, 
and it is only in the context of this life that we can understand why someone has a 
particular enu>tion. Such an approach is supplemented by certain arguments which 
Taylor emphasises in terms of what she sees as the rational intelligibility of certain 
emotions. I or example, if I say that I am afraid because I believe the world will end 
tomorrow, the content of the belief and the fact that it is my belief jointly live a reason 
for my fearing tomorrow's sunrise. This is similar to the point raised by Kenny with 
regard to my envying tnv neighbour's fruit trees, and then discovering they are my own. 
We can make an emotion more or less intelligible, and decide it is more or less 
appropriate, by considering the beliefs which contribute to it. This is precisely because 
beliefs have a clear causal potential in the generation of emotions. If I come to believe 
that you are about to push me over, this can cause fear, and if I do become afraid we will 
need to explain why- I am experiencing this emotion by referring to that belief. 
The problem with all of these arguments is that it is far from clear that any of them make 
even the slightest dent in the view that we cannot have emotions without feelings. If we 
return for a moment toi the scenario of the two people who happen upon a deadly snake, 
then Solomon would tell us that they simply cannot both have exactly the same set of 
relevant judgements. If that were the case then they would both experience fear. I 
assume that Taylor might suggest that a contcxtuahsed understanding of how their 
beliefs about snakes fit into the wider pattern of their beliefs about the world would 
allow us to sec that the superficial similarity disappears once we realise that these beliefs 
play a different role from one person to the next. I'or the person who experiences no 
fear toi believe that he is in no danger is a belief honed by experience to the point ww-here 
it plays a different role in the way in which it leads one to sec the world. It is at this 
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1)<mnt where it is time toi tackle head on what I take to be the fundamental weakness in 
full blown coognitivist accounts, and it is necessary to do so by examining the difficulty in 
Irving to understand el T)tiofls as beliefs - as ultimately understandable as an attitude 
towards a proposition. 
I ; /vto/mus [inrl I'ioposi ioits 
If vVC accept the v icvti- that cmC>tions can be understood as a collection of beliefs, and that 
they are therefore attitudes towards propositions, then we ought to be able toi show that 
they can be analysed. 'Ibis means that when we come to statements which employ 
emotion concepts such as; 
(1) John is angry with bam« 
v,, -c can anah°sc them into sentences of the form '; A believes that p'. '1'hc analysis can be 
made on the grounds that each emotion has a formal object, and this determines the 
description under which the object of any emotion must fall. As such, the analysis v. -ill 
involve replacing the emotion concept with a belief whose propositional content is 
determined by the formal properties of any object which falls under that emotion 
concept. 'thus, we might argue that the formal object of anger is 'being wronged', so the 
analysis of (1) might read; 
2) John bclicVcs that he has been wrongcd by. james 
the first problem is that (1) could not be cyuivalcnt to (2), because we can be angry with 
someone even when we do not believe they have wronged us - it might just be that we 
arc having a bad day, and our anger is directed towards the first person we happen to sec. 
I lerc the co gnitivist has a response based on Kenny's claim that the agent must hold 
certain relevant, true beliefs in order for it to be an dpp/vprzute emotion, so that it is an 
inappropriate case of anger if we falsely believe someone has wronged us or if we don't 
even hold the belief they have done something wrong. As such, the cognitivist can refine 
his claim to the effect that (2) is an analysis of John's being appropriately angry with 
J aincs. 
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['he more difficult problem, one which I see as insurmountable is that even narrowing 
the claim to cover only appropriate instances of anger does not take us to the point 
where (1) is equivalcnt to (2), which it , vould do if 
it were a full analysis. We ought to he 
able to conclude that John's correctly believing that jamcs has wronged him is cyuivalent 
to his being angry with dames, but this just doesn't seem to follow. We can believe that 
we have been wronged, but the reaction simply needn't be one of anger. We can imagine 
scenarios in which we might react with indifference, regret, sadness, even amusement, 
but without anger. And it seems the same sort of problem potentially arises for any 
claim to cyuivalcnce between type (2) statements which set out the beliefs involved in the 
cmoýti<>n concepts, and hype (1) statements in which the emotion concepts are present. 
We can believe something is dangerous without fearing it, believe someone is worthy of 
love without loving them, believe someone is worthy of hate without hating them. At 
each turn, we can construct some sort of plausible account of why we can believe the 
type (2) proposition without experiencing the emotion in the type (1) statement. In other 
words although emotions involve certain relevant beliefs, a full statement of the relevant 
beliefs need not involve the experiencing of the emotion. 
If this is correct, then type (2) statements capture an important advance on the part of 
the c<ýgnitivist theories, in that we can conclude that it is a necessary condition for an 
emotion to be held appropriately that the agent has the true beliefs relevant to such 
emotions. As such, being afraid appropriately would entail that the agent hold certain 
beliefs about the fearfulness of a particular object or possible state of affairs. But the 
hurdle which the cognitivist still faces is that something is still lacking in the account, 
which is why we cannot conclude that holding the true relevant beliefs about the 
fearfulness of the object necessarily involves having the emotion. 
A further technical problem emerges in the form of emotion statements which cannot be 
reworked into the form `: 1 believes that p'. The cognitivist literature is littered with 
examples in which statements of the `John is angry with James' type are analysed, but 
there IS a Llucsti<)n as to vVhcthcr or not all emotion statements can be recast in this vvav. 
yurncrous emotions are described in sentences such as `John hates James', or `Mary 
loves French cooking', and there just scums to be something wrong in describing these 
emotions as attitudes towards propositions. ", urcly the object of the love and hate in 
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such statements are not propositions, but the physical objects referred to by means of 
them. If there is a discontinuity between the `propositional' emotions and the rest, then 
-\k c need an explanation of this, as well as a defence of the claim that all statements 
expressing emotions can he rewritten in the manner required for the analysis to begin. 
there is a further problem which also confronts any cogniti\-ist account, concerning the 
character of beliefs. the problem extends beyond the debate about the emotions, but it 
has particular relevance in this context due to the role of feelings in the debate. I have 
already said that I believe feelings to be partly constitutive of emotions, but I also intend 
to argue that feelings can be a part of the beliefs which may figure in an emotion, rather 
than a distinct phenomenon, and it is for this reason that no full analysis in terms of 
beliefs can he accomplishcci. I shall be looking at this in far greater depth in the next two 
chapters, but I wish to raise it first here in order to press home the shortcomings of 
(()gnitiv-ism. 
Hic kind Of distinction I wish to draw can best be brought cut by means of an example. 
Consider a young boy ý, vho holds the belief 'cricket is a great game'. He has acquired this 
belief from his father, who has instilled in him from a very earl- age the importance, 
tradition and beauty Of the game, and the boy has always accepted this unquestioningly, if 
unenthusiastically. There then comes the point at which he plays in his first competitive 
match, and shortly after arriving at the crease to bat he receives a poor delivery to which 
he steps forward to play a flowing straight drive. He feels the impact of the ball on the 
centre Of the bat, senses instantly that he has, for the first time, struck the ball with 
perfect timing, and sees it sail straight back over the bowler's head for a gigantic six. He 
experiences a surge of excitenicnt, and the thought comes to him 'cricket is a great 
game', but this time accompanied by an intensity which was previously absent. 
.h is question arises as to how Nvc capture the difference which has arisen. Given that we 
arc dealing with two arses of believing, then the propositional attitude remains constant. 
lt thcrefi>rc seems more plausible to describe the difference as one which can be seen in 
the content of the beliefs, and we might best describe the latter belief as one which is 
held 1n/'/L) in a «-ay which the earlier one was not. fluch more will be said about 
this in the next chapter, but there are two points which I wish to highlight at this stage. 
.l he first is that there is an important and gcncralisahlc distinction between the beliefs 
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held before and after the ball flew over the boundary, and the second is that the 
distinction cannot be captured in terms of the semantics of the proposition. It is my 
contention that beliefs held with feeling partly constitute many of our emotions, and if 
the young cricketer were to express his joy- after the match, this tyre of belief would be 
part of the emotion in this instance. If the nature of the belief has changed, and this 
change comes despite the propositional content remaining constant, then we must look 
hcvond this for an understanding of the nature of feclingful and fcuhnglcss beliefs, and 
therefore for understanding of what an emotion containing; such a belief is. To return toi 
the cricket scenario), many emotions involve the kinds of beliefs held after the boy has hit 
the sip and not before. 
This criticism is more far-reaching than the general argument set out earlier that it always 
seems possible to hold the relevant set of beliefs and desires without experiencing the 
cnu>ti()n. It means that it is not only a necessary condition to have feelings present for us 
to have such an emotion, but they must also colour the belief itself, rather than stand 
separately. This also works against Taylor's view that what we need is a better 
understanding of how the belief relates to the agent's wider experience and history which 
will make clear \vh\- some of us experience emotions in particular circumstances, whilst 
others don't. Once again, this may well be true on occasion, but it still won't do the 
reeuircd work to restore a full- cognitivist theory. In the story of the snake, what other 
relevant beliefs could there be beyond those which I have given. Both agents already 
have all the necessary true beliefs about the properties of the snake, and about the 
appropriate course of action. L"ncarthing more information about their past experiences 
with snakes may indeed help to explain why one of them is afraid and one isn't, but the 
explanatory force will not come in the form of additional beliefs, but in the form of how 
those beliefs are held. '-, urely we would want to provide an account along the lines of the 
fearless agent never developing any feelings of fear of snakes because he never learned toi 
be afraid of them, or else gradually overcoming such feelings as his confidence grows in 
the COmpan. \ of others experienced in this way, and finally reaching the point where the 
fear he used to have exists only as a distant trace. The explanatory force comes not from 
holding different beliefs, but from holding the beliefs iii a Ji//eil way, and that difference 
is captured by the presence or absence of certain feelings. 
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( )nc further point which applies to the kind of account offered by Taylor is that in the 
midst of a cognitivist theory, she nevertheless refers to `what it would be human and 
natural for a person toi feel under certain circutnstanccs'. "' . 
Although I have criticised 
overall account of emotions, I have also suggested that her emphasis <m 
understanding them within a wider life is a crucial observation, but this is so partly 
because she offers what Michael Stocker calls a `feeling-laden' account. ' Her extended 
discussion of humiliation is at its most convincing precisely when she is drawing can 
material from James J<ov-ce, in the same way as I used the extract from Lampedusa. But it 
is immensely difficult to conceive of such passages as an intricate series of beliefs `; A 
shameful c(onscio)usness of his ovvn person assailed him. He saw himself as a ludicrous 
figure, acting as a penne-bo for his aunts, a nervous well-meaning sentimentalist, Orating 
to vulgarians,... the pitiable, fatuous fellow he had caught a glimpse of in the mirror. "`, ý 
"There is something within such writing which appears to capture the sense of humiliation 
v hich both 1cov, cc and '1'ay-lor wish to bring out, but is this not precisely because it 
describes and explores curtain feelings, rather than providing an adequate list of Gabricl's 
relevant beliefs" .A similar point can be raised with regard to Solomon's writing, in that 
despite his explicit aim of providing an account which explains emotions without relying 
on the concept of feeling he nevertheless writes in such a way which often approaches a 
literary, feeling-laden style. His discussion of love in TA' Pei sioits includes the following 
passage; 
But how difficult it is to be so vulnerable and trusting, to reject those manv 
temptations to think of ourselves as superior rather than merely equal, to give up 
the successful defences and strategies that have ,x orkcd so well for us in the past. 
But who can say of him/herself, "I don't want to love" or "I can't love", without 
the most profound regret. (277) 
At an intuitive level, there just seems to be something wrong in trying to increase our 
understanding of sentences such as `Concetta loves "1'ancrcdi' by subjecting it to 
conceptual analysis. The language of loycc and Lampedusa does not simply describe, it 
evokes, and Sto cker's concept of `feeling-laden' description seems once again to be apt 
here. Insofar as our response to literature is unfeeling, then we cannot understand 
Gabrielle I avlor. Pride, Shame, and Guilt, 14. 
2 Michael Stocker. I'cluing Emotions, 38-5 
Quoted from Gabrielle 1 aylor. Pride, Shame, cmd Guilt, 9 
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(; abriel's humiliation or Concetta's despair. We would simply have a flat description of 
something like mental states which would not engage us in a vvay which we would want 
to call an understanding of the texts. Our distance would cut us off from the intended 
meaning. 1f this holds true for literature, then it tells us something much wider about the 
em( ti<ms in general. The attempted analysis of emotions in terms of beliefs and attitudes 
or desires leaves out a key concept and the means for understanding an emotion. The 
way in which we speak of the emotions is itself important, and this is because the feelings 
which the cognitivists leave out in analysis are precisely what is required for us to 
experience an emotion, as well as understand what it is for someone else to experience 
()tic. ( )ncc we are restricted to beliefs, in whatever combination, one cannot successfully 
cypress or understand what an emotion is. 
(. iii Gi. uo, i 
It is now time to focus more specifically on the concept of feeling, and the role it plays in 
our emotions, which Will be the subject of the next chapter. But it is worth highlighting 
the aspects of the cognitivist theories which must play a key part in our understanding. 
The idea of emotions having objects is one which is accepted even by those who would 
reject the full cognitiv ist account. Our fear, anger or love is always for someone or 
something. This property of intcntionality is integral in the role emotions play in our 
lives, in that it is through the emotions that the outside world takes on the significance 
that it has for us. The parts of the world which we fear and the people whom we love 
are not contingent aspects of our survival, but central features of a life, and the specific 
objects of our emotions therefore take on immense importance in light of this. 
Flic causal role of beliefs in our emotions are also central, in that they systematically 
provoke and alter emotions, often in immediate and dramatic fashion. If I am informed 
that me beloved car which is missing has been stolen by the friend who is now 
co mfo rting me, feelings of despair and gratitude can be instantly transformed into 
righteous anger. If im emotions remain unaltered in light of new beliefs, as in henny's 
example of my cnvv of what turns out to be in own fruit trees, then the emotion can he 
deemed inappropriate. '\Iv beliefs can also influence the appropriate intensity of nn- 
emo>tio>ns, in that the degree of my fear ought to alter depending on whether I believe I 
have lost one hundred or one million pounds on an ill-judged stock market deal. As 
29 
such it is important to understand emotions as complex phenomena, and to resist the 
tendency to reduction. This complexity is not only in terms of the various elements 
which go to make up an emotion, but also in the importance of how many of our 
emotions must be seen as part of a wider life, and fully comprehensible only 
in that 
COtttcst. 
()ncc we have established the crucial part of beliefs in our emotions, then it remains to 





1'hc aim of the last chapter was to highlight weaknesses in accounts of emotion which try 
to dispense with the concept of feeling. The tendency amongst cognitivist thinkers is to 
see feelings as a distraction to a proper analysis of the emotions. Kenny, for example 
tells us that `feelings of emotion are the sensations linked with the symptoms of an 
cmm)tiun; " 'I'hc aim of this chapter will be to argue that feelings are absolutely central to 
the experience of having an emotion, and to the understanding what an emotion is. 
Discussion of feeling is complicated by the different senses in which this concept is used, 
and it is as well to identify two which are izot relevant to my usage here. The first is 
feelings related to our sense of touch in statements such as 'I felt the roughness of the 
old fabric'., The second is that of 'proprioccption', meaning our awareness of our own 
body and limbs, and their spatial location with regard to one another, as in statements 
such as 'I felt my arms hanging limply by my side'. ' The, concept of feeling to which I 
shall refer when defending the claim that feelings partly constitute an emotion is used in 
phrases such as 'I feel tired' or 'a feeling of satisfaction'. I shall treat such feelings as 
perceptions of the state of one's own body,. ' and unless otherwise stated, I shall use both 
verb and noun in this sense. One further important distinction which needs to be made 
is between bodily feelings and bodily sensations. I shall take bodily sensations to he 
characterised by their locatcdness in a specific part of the body, as in cases of one's eyes 
stinging, one's back aching or one's temples throbbing. Bodily feelings typically indicate 
a perception of the physical state of the body as a whole, as in cases such as feeling 
fatigued, where it is the whole body which is the object of the perception. Feelings thus 
tend to be perceptions of more generalised states of the body, but they may wcll include 
sensations, such as in cases where I feel hungry, and this involves the sensation of my 
stomach rumbling. 
Anthony Kenny. Action, Emotions uni Will, 99 
For a discussion of this topic, see MGF Martin. 'Sight and Touch', in The ('when[ u/ f; _v/)criciicr, cd 
'I M Crane. 
For discussion ofthis concept, see Brian O'Shaughnessy, 'Proprioception and the Body Image'. in 71 
/3ocdi uni the Sch', eds Bermudez, Marcel and Eilan. 
In treating feelings in this way, I follow the line in recent treatments of this concept in philosophy of 
mind. See for example DM Armstrong, .a Aluteriulist Theonr of Alind, Chapter 14: MGF Martin, 
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III <, rkicr to shed light on the concept of feeling, I shall look at several 
issues amccrning 
the nature (d feelings which partly ccmstitutc cnu>ti<ins. I irstlv, I shall be 1(x)king at the 
distinction which h has been drawl between bctclily, feelings on the one hand, and 
`psv chic' feelings on the other, which broadly equates to the contrast hetvV ucn fccliugs 
vv hich lick out physical states on the one hand, such as feeling phv sically 
drained, and on 
the other hand the feelings associated with lx>rcdom (where we are i-\, atc cif nt> 
scilsati<ins ()r bodily feelings). Next, I shall consider the relationship 
1>ctv,, ccn 
cypcricncing feelings and our level of awareness ()f them. We see this sort ttf lxtssibIc 
(list incti<tn in cases xx here \vc might talk of our fear of a bully, something which we think 
(d as an un uing state, and the kind of fear we might experience ehern we scc 
him 
app o>aching us, when the kind of bodily feelings described abo\ c tnav well afflict us. We 
need to) be clearer alx, ut the kind of feelings involved in both sorts ctf experience, and 
about the different levels of awareness of these feelings which we v ill have. 
A further 1ucstic>n arises as to whether or not feelings must he present at all times duritng 
an emotion, or vv hcthcr or not it is sufficient for them to be present ()It certain t>ccasio>us 
in 0)rclcr to describe the experience as an emotion. This is important in that we often 
shoal: in terms of emotions which last over extended periods of time, such as eng yin 
s<>nic<>ne for v cars. 1f feelings partly constitute emotions, then must V, e he committed to 
the \ icvv that v,, -c have experienced certain feelings over a period of wears in order to 
ju"tifv the claim vve have envied someone all this time? l'inalk, I shall consider the 
c)>nccht of `fecling tttvk ands', and the idea that our feelings have an object, as against 
being perch internal phcn"mctia. 
1 fO Idlv speaking, the po ition vvhich I shall be arguing for can each of these yucsti0ms is 
that %x c require av cry broad conccht of what feelings are which can take account of 
their multifarious nature. We need a conceptual scheme vV-ithiii vvhich we can 
accOýmmc, datc the feelings associated with extreme fear, which include lxodily sensations 
such as the thumpi»g (>f onus heart, as well as the more subtle psyých(il ogical state ( 
feeling priLlc pit ,I clcv cr chess m<>\ c. We need to recognise that feelings earn «ax and 
vv anc (, ccr time, and that ww c vv ill not alvv av s be fully av-irc of what we are feeling. 
-I3udilý Avvareneýs: A Sensc ul O iicrship'. in ßermudcz. [ilan and Marcel, edd. ihr' l3ucli mid thn' 
Sý//: Brian O'Shauýkhnessv. %hr Ii ill. Vol I. Chapter Five. 
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meaning that "vc mav be feeling something vVithout 'attending tct it'. I'hcrc are also) 
eyhcricnccs whcrc vV-c feel nothing in circumstances where this vVOUld not n(>rmallv he 
tlic case, as with athletes who claim to have felt no tiredness as they were striving to 
Cl-( )SS the tinishing hue in an important race. I shall also he trving to sho that the kcv to 
understanclüig ll(ny ()III- cmoti()ns bind its to the world around us is the c(>nccpt (>f 
`fccling t( )wards'. It is ()tit- feelings to>vv ards persons, c>1>jccts and activities in the external 
vv odd which force us into an engagement with the wo rid which we find significant. This 
vv ill Inc the conclusion which I hope emerges from the arguments vd huch I shall offer on 
each (>f the issues listed al)(>vc, but I shall also introduce <mc <)f the kcý c<>tlcchts 
in 
(>utlining the relationship between ()tit- emotional life and 1ucstic>n, <>f value. I shall 
argue fc>r the existence of vv-hat I have called a 'background of directed feeling', v,, hick is 
all acyuirccl reactive ý>lbilitN to respond to the ,,., ()i-ld in one vvav rather than another. This 
will form the foundation of the later thco>rv, but first requires a fuller c, \lx>siti()n (>f the 
m>>re basic concept of feeling. 
13oeIi/ nrdlI? r/Ihr II cc/irr{. r 
( )t the tvv() catcgOrics of fouling under discussion here, it is clear which is the caster toi 
idcntifv. The bodily feelings and corresponding sensations normally associated wtli 
cmc>tuin arc th()sc such as tightening of the muscles, increased heart rate, sweating, 
trembling and other changes toi the autonomic Heil ous system which vv. c experience as a 
part Of a ýx idc range of different ciTiotions. . 
An initial point which is rcduircd for the sake 
ý)f clarity- IS that feelings do not correspond to bodily changes, but oonlv to those h idilv 
chanties vxhich can As such, thcv don't include the increased speed at '\klllcll tile 
lbloxodl sometimes races through m\ 1)()d \, but thcv do include the perception ()f rile 
increased speed at v\, hick Illy heart is beating, which is causing this. It is also ,v Ortli 
reiterating the point fl-()Ill the last chapter that we cannot sa\ that any particular bo dilv 
feelings indicate the presence of a particular cnzoti<nl. Indeed, if we consider extreme 
examples (if an. cnu)ti<>n then it is usuallv p )ssiblc to think if sccnariOs iii which the 
more common h idilv feelings might be present. I tnav feel extremely tense at moment" 
well A, vý hen \\ illiam J, imes' elephant eimies racing towards mc, ()r on disci critig that 
mm car has been Stolen, or oil seeing the wcmlan I have vv ()rshipped ff, r .\ 
Cars at the 
theatre vv, ith mv long-time riv al for her , tffccti()ns. 
It may also he imp( ssiblc to attribute 
such feelings to a single crnc, tion. If we take the last example of niN seeing the amebic at 
the thcatrc, mv cmc>ti()nal statc mav be a combination of intcnsc jcalOusv at the sight Of 
ncý tv% U, together, as vV ell as Cyn-cmc anger at his success. 
\ further characteristic of bodily feelings is that they tend to prop ide a g( d inclicatiuin Of 
the inrcnsitt ()f all cm()ticou. . 
Altimut; h specific h dilv feelings may n()t be correlated u 
,, pccific cnuiti(ms, their appearance tends to justify the claim that the cmc>tiuns arc mire 
intense. If vti c take the example of fear, then feelings which include the sensations of nlý 
hand, trembling and im accelerated heart rate just couldn't reflect a mild fear (d rain 
dlisrulpting a casual tennis thatch. Such changes only make sense 
in cases vv here :a 
tanclard agent (\w (here `standard' excludes exceptional cases such as pliobics) lýcrccivcs 
tic object of the fear as having ap otcutiallv, important impact, perhaps due rent danger, 
ur damage toi a vital project. 
It vV ( mid be a mistake, to assume that all extreme cnlOtiollS must hive 51 )me 
sort (A bodily feeling as a constituent part One can easily imagine Someone full opt pride 
at a particular achievement, without assuming that her heart is racing or her knees 
shaking. Similarly, (Inc might spend several hours being angry with 5Omcoonc, with the 
anger erupting frOm time to time when one thinks back to the original incident, but it 
vv uuld be unusual for one's heart to be racing for what we take to he the entire duratn)il 
of the cmuti(m. So, to describe an emotion as intense will be justified in terms of the 
strength o of the feelings of the Ic -son , \,, 1i<ý is having the em otion, but there is more v itch 
can be said here. We can explain why the feelings (and therefore the emoti(n) are meire 
intense by considering the other constituent parts of the emotion. Great fear will be 
h. tlý characterised by the bodily feelings, and partlv explained by the beliefs of the agent 
,, - ith regard to her own predicament. It is when we believe we are in great danger, <n that 
some highly valued aspect of our life is imperilled that the fear will be intctlsified. This 
means that vw. hilst the intensitv of our emotions may have powerful bo dilv feelings as 
their rnu»t emblematic feature, our svstern of beliefs and values are also central iu 
Lmdcrstancling intensity in emotion because they provide the contextual frmic\\()rk 
vv ithin vv hick \\c perceive what is to count as very important. 1f someone is panic- 
, u-ickcn : it the th()ught ()f a fall in share prices, then this heightened emi, tio)ual state 
rc lcct. a \\a\ of pcrcciv iug the vv orld, and the intensity of the emotion Onlv makes sense 
in light of a highlv personalised range of beliefs and desires related to) this cv-cntualitv. 
Intctnsitv must therefore Inc understood as <t feature of emotion which is go unlcd in, 
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anal rcv cal", the }lace which the object of the emotion has in the agcrnt's scheme of 
1)clicfs, desires and v-alucs. In stmic cases, this "vill reveal v cry little, in that man of us 
vv ill share ;t similar raue of beliefs, desires and values with regard to rctnaitlirnsg alive, and 
sh( )\\ ing intense fear in the face of great clanger will therefore rcv cal vcrv little we 
didn't 
alrcaclv Icn()vv . 
But in other cases far more will be rcv calcd. Great fear mth regard to, 
share prices falling, a particular ftx>tball team facing the prospect Of rclcgation, ()r a 
sudden upsurge in the Ix>hulatit\ of utilitau-ianistn could Onilv possible be undctst<x>cl in 
the context of the agents particular engagement with the woo c. 
II lie concept of bodilv feeling stands in marked contrast to that of 'psychic' fcclino, 
vt hielt is of crucial importance in the work of Michael Stocker. ' Stockur fc, llovv 5 
which '\,,, c feel are in the soul itself', as Descartes in describing psi chic feeling s as those 
against buclilv feelings vv laich we perceive as a condition or change in the bock . .A 
bodily 
fccling is the perception of an m crtlv physical state such as being, phv sicallv tense, 
hcrcas psychic feelings do not have this phv sical character. An example of the contrast 
comes in comparing the bodily feelings of rage with the psychic feelings of pride. File 
points at which psychic feelings are perhaps best highlighted is in the phcn menc, logv of 
arras of our liv C', such as interest, care or concern. 'These are aspects of our mental life 
vv hick can be more or less constant Ov cr long periods, with the satnc person or activ itv 
for their colbjcct, sind without necessarily including the bodil feelings which arc associated 
\\ ill) emotions such as rage or terror. I "aamplus of where such feelings are present could 
be seen ill case,, such as a novice priest who is determined to make it through his training 
in corder to, practice his vocation, or the teacher who has an ongoing pursuit of bringing 
the best out of her students. 'I'hr reason such examples are of importance is that thcv 
hint at the existence of subtle, stable and guiding feelings which contrast with those more 
p °mlincnt (Ines in our violent emotions. '1'hcy provide a background motivational force 
which can drive people forward in the pursuit of long-term projects and comniitmcnts in 
a ww av in vk hick the extrctnc, short-term fcclings of rage cannot. 
If %\c vý ish to chatactcrisc m( rc prccisclv what hs. \ chic fcclings arc, thcn I suggest that 
thcv can l>c»t l)c uiidcrst(xxl as i-)crcc})ti<ms ()f a ccrtaiii class of noi cognitiv c rncntal 
st, ttcs. ýý ith lx>Clil\ tcclitl s, C hcrccivC c)scrtlv 1)11. \ ical statcs Such as the t('nsiOOt1 ut ((Ui 
See MicIwcI Stoclker. -Psychic FceIin-s: I-heir Importance and IrreducihiIity-, in . 
lusirulu. siwi. kwri, ul 
H1 1'hili)H)/)ln 0 1. ? -26. and I a/ui/1c Lnu lions. 17-54. 
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muscle,, but vv till psychic feelings we hcrcciv c mental states such as satisf ictio ci, unease 
c>r displeasure, thOse very state vdhich we standardl. \ describe as feelings, but which ch) 
n<>t stpplv t() the kind 4 physical states which fall under the heading (d bodily fcclings. 
\n cyai1 plc vv ill help tu clarifv this. Consider a scenario in vvllich v-()Li have been vV()rking 
On a particularlv thmrnv problem in s. \ mb(Alic lOgic for several 1i urs, and \()Li find . uu are 
starting toi make sloppv mistakes vkhich are Costing vou considerable time and effort. 
)»c vvav ()f understanding the problems on are now hav itig is toi think that v <>u feel 
tired, but this s>itt Of mental tiredness contrasts sharply vvith the physical tiredness one 
feels after a running; a marathon. The perception is of a diminution in ()tic 111(, 1//irl 
capacities, including features such as an inability to concentrate and an increase in the 
lcv cl of cictcrminatain and mental effort required to perform to onc's normal standard. 
111 ()t hc- vv <orcls, \\C lbccoomc aware of what we v' (>uld tend to think of in folk 
ps_ eh()lcogical terms as a mental rather than a phcsical state, and this percept in can he 
characterised as a P' chic feeling. " WWith this v icvý of psychic feelings vve are better placed 
tu understand em oticnis such as pride, where there are not necessarily aum bodily feelings, 
but rather p' chic (Ines which reveal the way our ov, n beliefs seem to us. 
if vy c rctain the c-\a>. mplc of pride at a particularlv successful chess mm e, then the belief 
al)uut the , Iualitv of the move and the 
identity of who 1)1,, t) cd it is combined with a 
fccliii of satistactiou winch colours the beliefs. This is not the bored reflection of a 
urandmastcr who has 1)1, i\-cd a thousand such moves before, but the impression of 
sOmeonc for vv horn the achievement resonates in a particular , v-av .It 
is not simplv that 
sutncunc has piaN cd a l; tcat n1<)Vc, but that I hav c pla\ cd a ýitcr/ movc. The Satisfaction 
influences our perception of ourselves in light of the clualith of the mo>v c. Similarlv, if I 
am anurv will ,i n()11, \ nciihb<nir, the beliefs about the source of the noise and the 
clistr. >ctiýýn it is causing; is ColOured by the displeasure vvhich is combined in m. 
CO IlSCiousncss with the beliefs. In this vcav, emotions can be the result of the combined 
eI -ts ý)f mý beliefs and feelings, where the feeling is the Perception of ,i mental suite 
such : i, satisfaction (r displeasure. This means that the overall account of the nature of 
ctn()ti<, n call be retained, but ti(iw with a more fine-grained account of the kind of 
It is v orth cmphasisinýg Once more that this needn't indicate a dualist position, in that the option is 
still Open Ior the materialist to argue that this phenomenon ýN ill be fully explicable in terms of the 
Operation of the brain. 
I shall haue much more to say about the waN in which beliefs and feelings are combined in 
consciousness in the 1mal section of this chapter. 
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fccl1I12 vv hich arc im <ohvcc3 in emotions. 'l'hc feelings which arc combined in 
COflSCi()usncss with hclicfs of pcrccpticýns may be bodilv or psychic oncs, 0>r both. 
-. \ en \\ ith a clearer idea vw hat si psychic feeling is, v"c might still (lucsti()ti whether Or nOt 
it need play any sort of necessary conceptual role which could not be filled with a desire. 
With the case cif 190th the priest and the teacher, vVhv couldn't we simplv attribute curtain 
belief-, ahOut the hricsth(>od and teaching, and certain desires with respect toi potential 
achie ements. 'Miere just doesn't seem to be any pir/i/a/air need toi attribute yin\ feelings, 
cvcuhr in tliu, c nu>mcnts vv-hrrc there is a distinct emotional experience, including; a 
particular Ih()dily fueling. This sort of resh>msc bccoýrncs more attractive given that mit 
could argue tliat we ww weld often appear toi be unaware of these feelings if, as I have 
suggested thcv tni hr be present over a period of years, motivating us vý-incý, ut our 
rca>gni"ing them can each occasion. The danger is that thcv start to 1<)(>k like rather 
mm stcri(aus phcnoii ena, hidden from view in the unconscious, and invoked purclv toi 
plug a perceived conceptual gap. 
)nc response ww could be to treat this as an attempt to reduce psychic feelings to desires. 
I his cannot v), ork if one accepts the characterisation of feelings as perceptions of a 
h( dily state, in that `I feel that I am tired' cannot be analysed into `I desire that I am 
tired'. Indeed, if we try to construe the contrast between beliefs and desires along the 
line", of `direction of fit', feelings are going to come out closer to beliefs than desires, in 
that hOth an be unulurstut>d as aiming at fitting the world, rather than aiming at having 
the vVOrId fit them. ` But this doesn't get us off the hook entirely. What if instead of 
sav ing vw c can reduce psychic feelings to desires, we argue that there is nothing there too 
rculucc-ý stcýckcr's discussion deliberately provides psychic feelings with a motivational 
force in their role of caring and showing concern for persons and projects over the 
C( ii 5c of our lire,, and couldn't this role could simply be played b\ a desit-c. = Wc could 
concede that l(n ing someone o er many years does means having some bodily feelings 
laut, but then atruc that at-fill, out of love or concern rcyuires the desires that such 
feelings might p0) Okc, and it is these desires that are doing the ongoing motn atianal 
vv urk. 
I-Or a fuller discussion of this. including, qualifications on hoes useful this schema is, see Peter Goldie. 
Thc° 1-, -nnuIio1is. 24-26. 
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ß\ výa. of response, one can begin bv offering a straightforward formal argument for the 
eyistcncc of psv chic feelings. If all emotions arc partlv constituted bv feelings, and not all 
cnu>tiuns illv (>lv c Ix>clilv fcclinis, then sonic other sort of fccling must lac present in 
nu cm<>tiuns. . 
Affcctive states such as care or concern, as vvcl] as long-term cui(>ti<ms 
such As an ctidu ing love could be said to involve subtler feelings such as contentment, 
satisfacticn, refined pleasure, and these are the sorts of states which should be 
undcrst<x>d as hsý chic feelings. 
I, hc next m<>v c might Conic in the form of a limitation iii the cxplanatOrv h<>tciitial c>f 
usin) <>nh desire, in ýi thcor\ motiý ation, as against using the c<>>lccht of feeling in 
aIddition. Ihcrc is a distinction hctv, -cen `cool' desires, and `hoot' desires, or what I shall 
call desiring with fueling which can be brought out in a parallel example too the dung 
cricketer used in the hl-c\ i0>us chapter. Imagine that prior to hearing any classical music 
in t Our life, v ou hav C hccn told bv a friend that v ou would enjoy attending a hct-furmance 
13////(vj/)'. You accept this advice in a verv coolheaded manner. .A 
desire then 
t( tms to attend a future perf<u-mancc, and in order to draw maximum benefit fromi the 
cyhcricncc v O>u buv a CD and listen to the opera for the first time. You are overwhelmed 
hv the hu cr of -\x hat Vc>u hear, and the desire to see the opera conics too V(u once more. 
dust as with the cricketer's belief about the value of cricket on experiencing the high of 
succeeding at it, v our desire too see the opera may be yualitativcly different after hearing 
the (A), and the best «a' of describing the difference to focus on the contrast I)ct\x, ccii 
fccliiiglcss and feclingful desire. If vc acknovdedge that it is passible to hold the kind of 
desire 'x ith feeling that I have just described, without necessarily having any bodilv 
feelings, then ,xc 
hav ca further argument for the existence of psychic feelings. Not only 
this, but the kind of fcclingful desire described above may well hav ca greater 
nlo>tiv au<m al force than its feclingless predecessor. We might now find the desire too 
attend the opera has greater force and urgency, and that it novv, dominates other desires 
and preoccupies us too a greater degree. 
If these atgtu»cnts go through, then we are entitled toi conclude that there are such 
phenomena il, l)sv chic feelings, thc\ arc distinct from desires, thcv can collie toi influence 
desires, and thcv can do sO in a «-hich adds greater motivational force '1 his is not toi 
>aý that strý, n g cr feelings add to the strength of our motiv ation to act. ( )ne 
Co old be glOvv ing with pride, with the most intense feelings of satisfaction in ooly Cd in the 
ýx 
experience, and v ct 11,1v c no desire to , ict at all. C(mvctsclv, O>nc might hav c quite mild 
fcclin s assOciatcd with fear, and yet a strong desire to leave the area. These ccýtnclusi<ms 
arc prclimin: u-v ones, designed to set the scene of the claim that vve have 'a l)ackgrouutl 
(ddirected feeling' vvhich grounds Out desires, and which helps to cyplain w h\ we havc 
the desires we hav C. 'I his «ill be the focus of the next chapter, but I n()\', wish expand 
the account of \\ hat feelings are bv considering in greater detail the role of feelings within 
yin account of hOvV cnu)tic)ns succeed in motivating us. 
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It is, I think, unamtrm-crsial to claim that crno>tions can m otivatc us to act, but we flovv 
need toi get clearer about the tOlc of belief, desire and feeling within the mc)tivati(>nal 
st(, rv «c are going to tell about ctnt>tions. When vti, c have statements such as 'I prop()sccl 
because I lm-c her, 'I hit hire because I was angry with him', or 'I ran because I xxas 
scared', \x C sec clamhlcs of actions which tmc might sav are actions 'taut of' l(we, anger 
and fear. But what cyacrlv do vvc mean vvhcn we sav v,, -c acted 'out of the ClIm ioil In 
these sorts of descriptions, I suggest we describe an action, and in referring to the 
emo do n in this vxav we are rationalising; that Ictl()Ii, h\ -\Xhick I mean we are staring the 
rcasun for it. ', Suhlxn-t for this s()rt of view can be given bv o>hserv ink; that if we ask an 
agent \\h\ she performed a particular action and she offers the kind of answer set out 
abm c, «c take this to cyplain ww-hv she acted as she (lid - she has given a reason which 
alluni, us to make sense of the acticni. 
\-()\\ 
, 
hOv can this sort of 1)a\ idsonian account of reasons and actions be applied to this 
tlicc>rv of the ctn<)tioll Davidson argues that having a reason is a combination of 
hav iug a belief and a Pro attitude, vVith a pro attitude comprising a vti-iclc rangc of attitudes 
such as 'desires, vvantings, urges, promptings, and a great v, arictv of moral vic, \v s, aesthetic 
principles, eCOnOmic prejudices, social com-cutions, and Public and private goals and 
values in so fair as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed towards 
acriOn,, of a certain kind. In this sort of scheme, vvc might sav that emotions are 
cyaniplc,, of pro attitudes, and this mav v,, -cll he hat Davidson thought, as he included 
I u: c tlk . tmc tutmulation , ts that 
linuui in Pctcr Girlie. 7bß I: nnO/iuii.,, ')--4-. 
I hi; i, the it till ns d In I)ouald I)avirlsom in '. Action, Rc, i oil and Cýtu. c4', T h" 
Ibirl_ (, em. 
() 
'l<ov c OI children' as one example of "hat a pro attitude might bc. 
" But this vVOUld sit 
unc(>n>f(rtahlv vv ith the V-icvv that emotions are partly a>nstitutcd 1)v 
beliefs, in that it 
lo>(>ks as We same beliefs may come up tvV, icc in the explanation of a htrticular action. 
In a statements such as 'I proposed because I love hcr', the account of the emotions as 
complex phcu(mlciia partly constituted by beliefs -\,, -o>uld mean that the love miglit 
inv Ole c beliefs such as 'she is the kind of person I would like No marry', or 
'she is just the 
sort \\ ith vw h(>m any nun in his right mind would like to spend the rest of 
his life'. Ifv, c 
then mm c to our explanation of why -ýw e acted, and vv c take the emotion t<> be the pro 
attitude, výc must find the beliefs which combine vkith the pro attitude to provide the 
reason for proposing Those beliefs vvould surely be just those which we have alreaclv 
identified as hart of the utnotiOn. 
In light Of this, the rri()st plausible account is one in which we , cc cmý>ti<>ns as 
hhunumcna vdhich ittv ()I\-c pro (()r COO) attitudes. Fear involves a con attitude toi the 
Ol)juct of out- fear, Im ca In() attitude to the object of our lov c, jO>v a pro attitude to the 
object of our jo>v , and st> on. 
This much seems clear from the ways in which we might 
(lcscribc vvhat such emotions involve when we speak of them, such gis when we sav 
Amy 
1Ov c im ok-cs a longing to be with her' or 'm fear of heights im olv cs a dislike of going; 
ins «hcrc ncar cliffs and o thcr high places. 
II lie yucstio, n ilovv becomes how pro attitudes relate ttt beliefs and feelings within the 
cmuti()n. I he ans, ver toi this emerges výhcn «-c take account of certain properties ()f 
feelings cvcu fccling has the pro)pertv of being either pleasant or unpleasant, 
' which is 
surclv a sufficient condition to generate the pro or con attitude which is also a part of the 
Oiicc again, this receives support from some common sense cohscrv ations 
alxOut such ctn<>tioiis, such as vt, heii vV-c talk of the torment of jcalOUsv or the vV()ndcr Of 
]eire (iv en the hrcmiscs that all emotions involve feelings, all feelings are sufficient toi 
pro, clucc pr() or coin attitudes, and that all such attitudes are capable ()f prnmmhtilig action, 
then ()lie can argue that all em( tiO>ns are reasons for acti(m. hike Davidson, I take reason 
it thuufh vvr ýpc, tk ()t 'iccliii ttl inditfcrcncc', it iä mislcaýüu think t>f thcýc N it tic Lo rtI tculiii s. It 
ntat ntcau \\ c ICR nu tcclii1 ; (1x001 ; ((Muthin ttt 10111(2011C, in \\ hich ca'c it i, nut that \\ c tun ca ucuual 
tcclin;;, Cl) lthat there Is no tcclinl ttt he plcasitnt or unhlcstsitnt. i'hc alternative is that vchcn vxc ;. n vt-c IN 
lIIt Itlu tont to "(ma-nc it i. t euphemism for sm fing, vvc "Co-, them its I)cimk, , t> to , peak, hCiovv tic i, ulat 
5)lii( 11 l)irI<s ul) thine \\ It() count it is All insult. 
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0iV ül cýhlanaticros as a spccics of causal cxplanari<m, and vVC can thcrcforc add that 
umul1( )1 cause the actions for which thcv arc rcasons. 
I lie pro)blcm %%ith a claim oof this force is that there is an obi ious counter claim that xvc 
nlav vV ell cyhcricncc an emotion, but not act out of it, acid even claim that we 
had no 
reason to act. If I recognise in myself an m-crvvhelming desire to acyuitr as much money 
as I can, and I kno that m arrying the woman I love will result 
in m heim; \,, -rittcn out 
( mv rich grandfather's vvill, then I ma\ 
decide that lm-c is not a reason f>r nie to act (in 
the form of marry itig hur) in these circumstances. But toi say that I have not acted o>ut of 
Im c clo>cs nmt nican that the Im c had no motivational force, <n- that 
it Could not li c 
been a ruts<>ti t<)r action under other- circumstances. On the contrary, once some(>nc 
states that she is experiencing an cni( tion, then vVc gcncrallv assume that this 
is st fairly 
staildarcl m(>tm c to act, and we \v-<>uld accept this as an c. \hlauat(>rv rcas<m 
for an 
cnsuiug;, relevant action. In cases where we don't act out of the emotion, this must 
be 
because there are other- reasons which hav c outweighed the motivational force of the 
cnu>tio>u in this instance. In light of this, we simply need to yualif- the stronger claim 
that all em(>ti( ns are reasons for Ictl()n, such that the claim becomes; all em> t1 )lls are 
tea. s> als for action, but reasons which may he outweighed by other reasons where there 
arc overriding desires or other pro attitudes which have stronger pull than the emotion in 
this instance. " llavidson makes a similar p(>int with regard to the mcýmaticmal f )roc of 
desires; 
Am serious thane for predicting action can the basis of reasons must find a Nvav 
of cv iluation o the relative force of desires and beliefs in the matrix of decision; 
it cannot take as its starting point the refinement of what is toi be expected from a 
, üýýlc ýlcsirc. 
II lhi, cý, u1ntitý me tu vvhott I take to be the stancl. trcl I lumcan IHR that Al dcsirc, (mca! titng) pin attitudes in 
this c()111( \I can I, c rc. i. )i to, r action, and earn onh fail tii mutierte u, it there arc suOn"ct I(aaOIl l)ullillp 
ti in 'tditlcr(utclircrtiun. 
I)on, ilcl D)ivtd on, , \ctiuti, I uou>, and (. ýtuscs', 17, r /oura, 1/0/ Pbllo. o/il)), 190i, (, h)-. It 
is hcrhaps 
\\(, I-ih puin(inL out ihm ouc Could accc})t phis UXhlauati(>n of -11(m cmutious mtiý. tft (is without 'IcccplIw)' 
Ill( 1,11 l)uIic( cicsirr staOunt ut mOtiVatiun. Onc might vvish to argue it is at tumntrc of emotion, 
litt 
ih(\ "cncrauc desire. (schere tliia is taken in the vcrv genera scu, c (>t a pro attitude), and 
HIM crouiiorns 
nýý, ti5. uc is .i result opt Ihc 
desires thcv giVr rise to, but this clots utit indicate that actions nut out 0! 
niutio, n tlicrcl((rc tcyuirc clcýires is hurt otthe explanation of vvhv the agciu acted. 
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l here is a further point worth raising at this stage. AV'c need to be clear about the 
clistinctiOn lhetxx can actin; out of emotion, 
" vchich I am discussing here, and acting Y(w 
tlic sake of an ýtnc, ti<>n. Acting out of love will mean that I 
have a series c>f clispOsiti()11s, 
fcclimtgs, c>>nccrns, thoughts etc vvhich mean I am directly concerned vVith the object of 
mv iov c. I o> act for the sake of lm-c vVill mean that I am 
dircctlv concerned not fror the 
o bject of mv log c, laut for the love itself. Where this 
is important is that one might act 
fut the sake of IM C, such as in cases where the love has gone (lead and ,xc are ttv 
ing too 
rc\ i0 c it, but nut hay c the disp)sitions, c ncerns, thoughts etc characteristic of those 
vv h>> are acting out of lug c. 't'his means that although there ma\ 
he dcsctiptic>05 of 
specific acti<ms which could he similar when 
it comes to acting for the sake Of an 
em>>t0>0 and out ()f emoti(m, there will be points of 
fundamental divergence in the 
1ý1>cný>mcn<>lc> ý Of the agent Manv of the thoughts, feelings and intentions ()1 the 
agents vvill differ markedly, and this is precisely because they are not experiencing the 
same pI cm>mcnun. This will be of crucial importance later on, in that I shall 
be claitniing; 
that the yin ions agent is one who acts mit of compassion. That is to sa\ she is sc>uic(me 
ho has a direct concern ý, xith regard to addressing the needs of others as rcv calcd 
thr()ugl> their suffering, and acts out of that concern. When asked w h\ she acted as she 
did, slic will gig c as her reason that it was the compassionate thin; too do, and this v, 
ill 
rationalise the acti(>n. This will ultimatelv pros idc us with an account of 
how it is vV-c 
conic too he nu>tiv atccl within the moral domain, but it is now necessary to 
fill out in 
greater detail the description of the nature of feeling by considering to what cytent we arc 
sm arc of these perceptions. 
1 /1' 
.I )1' /1 rrn_r. n/ 
I ýýrlrýtý 
I havc argucol that fccling is a pcrccption of the statu of onc's bodv, laut there is .t scrics 
Ot yucstio, ns v\, hich uccd to be ttKwcrcd with rcgatd toi the relationship 
bctvVcun 
cyhcricllcing a fccling, and being a«-arc of that cxhcricncc. Conisidcr 
for example the 
case of a schlier who has been shot in the arm, but continues to fight and 
later saes that 
he vv a, unaware of the' outid , it the timt, or of an athlete vk hog struggles 
for the finishint 
lime and claims nl>t too Imv c felt anv cyhaustion despite the intense phv sical demands of 
the race. I ct u, sa. \ that xx c observed curtain changes at times when thcv- claimed not to 
hav c the feelings vVc nýn-mallv Isso ciatc vvith such behaviour, such as the soldier using the 
ur .i lull cIiý'cu"aiom "1 1111" 
discussion, scc Michael Jmith, '1 he I'ussil>ility oot the Phili)sO1 hv ul . 
Actlull , 
42 
arm in which he has bccn shot less than before, or the ithlctc sl(>win ; 
dO n. In either 
casc, is he fccling somcthing, and if so, is he a" arc of this 
fcclingr 
'I lie line vw hich I shall take is that we need a a>ncchtiO>n of fcclin& which 
is as hr ad as 
that o>tlicr perceptual facultics such as sight or 
hearing. There arc cases v, here vVc vVOulcl 
normsill\ cý})uct to sec 5O)mcthillg, bUt fail to 1)ccausc we arc 
distracted, or else we 
sOrnctinncs sue things vvithout 'attending to' thorn. 
I shall try to sho that the same is true 
Of fcclirn. 1n aclcliti<m, awarcncss of what vVC 
fccl nccds to be thought of as a statc vv hick 
admits (>f degrees, s() that vVC can be aware of an object «-itimut 
l)cing wilco (mc night 
vv am tu call `fully avvarc' Or `fully Co lisci))us' of it. In cach case, 
behag iou al chat Ucs v Al 
hell) us to attribute feeling <or av, -arunuss from the third person hurshccti%-c, even 
hct-C 
the first person perspective indicates the subject is not fully aware of what she is fueling. 
As a starting; point, lets us pursue the sulalOgv vvith visual perception. 
AV'c s<nnctitncs 
travel home bv car and realise we have arrived without having concentrated oil the 
jý, urncý, usually because it is such a familiar route. Nevertheless, we vV. -()ulc] acknowledge 
that vic certainly saw the red light at which we stopped, and then the green 
light which 
p0)1l ýicd us to accelerate away, and we could justify this claim with reference to out 
l)chav i( ur. If one day we failed to slow down at the red light and crashed into, the car 
in 
front, then we might plausibly explain this with reference tot certain mental states v,, -1liclt 
prevented us from seeing the light, such as our preoccupation whilst driving with a vv(wk 
related issue. In other words, our mental focus can prcv ent perception 
in cases where 
this' Oulcl tt<n-mallv Occur. 
I he arnaloi v with fcclinl; s now starts to become clear. If we take the case Of the soldier, 
his level Of concentration on slaughtering the enemy in front Of him has prevented him 
frurn feeling the injury sustained its a result Of the bullet w\. 'o>und. Once the distraction is 
rcuIov col, he vw ill begin to feel pain as a result Of the inijury toi perceive the state Of 
his 
h )dv. But \\ hat Of the observation that the soldier 
had started toi p0)tect the vvoundcd 
arm, or that the athlete had slowed dovvn% Don't such observations suggest that thcv 
must have been feeling the pain, or else they vVOuld have continued on as before I (]()it'( 
l)clicv c this ff, llcovw s. I drexv a distinction at the beginning Of this chapter 
between bodily 
changes and bodily, fcclings. Although feelings will be perceptions of changes 
in the 
rcýýrinIcd in Ii iii c11 . ind ( Uv pcr. (: Lls. 
f Iiimali Ihlioit. I) /i/)rrzNlon and (. /1/c/Iinu. 21 26 
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hodv, not (l//changes in the body will be felt. In cases such as those uuclcr cOnsidcration 
here, the body may respond without our deciding it, just as in cases vkhcrc all illness 
results in lack of hunger. \Vc may not feel constantly sated, or even be aware of the fact 
that vý c haven't eaten for twcntv -four hours, N ct the behaviour could he identical with 
tlhat of someone who does feel sated, and is full\ avarc of this. I cclings cannot simhlý 
he read off from behaviour, but need to be attributed after considering hchav tour as but 
unc criterion for signalling their possible presence. If this is right, it also means that 
feeling is It cc )nsci<aus state, which brings with it a conceptual rc luircmcnt that there be at 
least somc levcl of awareness of it, even if we are unable to recall it afterwards. On this 
vicvv, tu sav that vwc could not be in pain and be unaware of it is simply otnc example of 
not being able to feel something without beim; aware of it. 
This in turn requires us to consider a feeling as one of many perceptions we mav he 
hav in. ir the same time, all of which will command our attention, but toi greater or lesser 
degrees In the case of the driver who returns home 'on autopilot', we must surclv 
attribute at least a loxv- level of attention to his visual perceptions on the grounds that lie 
taust be able to interpret what it means for the lights to change in order to produce the 
ahlýrý>hciatc lýchaýiour '1'cß but it another , xaý, he must not only sec rho lights turn, but 
also be marc of what this sii nifics in order to slow down and speed up. But this 
contrasts sharply with the thought which ma well Come toi him as he hits the back of the 
car iii front, looks up at the lights, and thinks to himself 'My God, the lights are reel! ', 
hcrc the level of attention to the perception will be extremely high, as his concentration 
5vý itches dramatically from work issues to the redness of the traffic light. 
I I)clicv c it is slhhrýýhriatc to acknowledge a similarly broad range of levels of attention to 
()ui- fccliugs. WC can be vaguclv annoyed at a dripping tap, or else find ourselves uttcrlv 
dominated by feelings of irritation which X VC try to suppress but which continually fight 
their vvav to the fc>rcfr()nt of our minds. In order to elucidate these last pOints, I shall use 
two extracts from \1ichacl Ondaatjc's The I ; u, /i. r! P<</i(vl. 11hc first extract describes a 
cncc, untcr bctw ccii hathrinc Clifton and . 
Almasv, who are shortly to embark up )tl a 
pas; i()uate and tragic affair. '[hc second extract is one of -Ahnasy's rcflcctu)ns about the 
tclatiunshlip itself. Clifton is hathrinc's husband; 
vi-act I 
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She had c(>nsumcd all her reading and asked me f n- l(x)ks. I had nothing, 
but 
"'That h )ok v cýu lcxok at in the evenings%" "I lci-()dotLi.,,,. 
\1111. 
maps ýý ith Inc. 
Yom wallt that" "I don't presume. If it is private. " "I have my n()tcs within 
it. 
And cuttings. I need it with mc. " "lt was forward of me, excuse mc. 
" "\\ heu I 
return I shall she) it to v()u. It is unusual for me toi travel v,, 
ithOUt it. " 
All this (occurred with much grace and a>urtcsv. I explained 
it was more 
a commonplace boxok, and she bowed to that. I was able to 
leave V, itllo>ut feeling 
in any way selfish. I acknowledged her graciOusncss. Clifton vas not there. 
AV'c 
were alone. I had been packing in my tent vchen she 
had appr(), tched inc. I am a 
man \ý h<ý has turned m\ back oil much of the social world, but sometimes 
appreciate the delicacy of manner. 
'- 
I 
. yt1 ict 
She had been part of the expedition for alma st a scar. IS vV- hur, 
c<anv crscd with her. We had each been continually in the presence of the other. 
Lat(r, yVhctl \k c vV crc avv-arc of mutual desire, these previous moinciits 
flooded 
1) Ick into) the heart, now suggestive, that nervous grip of an arm on a cliff, 
looks 
that had been missed or misinterpreted. " 
I suggest the recognition of the feelings which had been present 
for sonic time ýtiOV toi 
\lmasý's acknomlccif; cmcnt of his intense desire for Kathriuc is typical of the way 
in 
vv hieb feelings can erupt in such a way which highlights their 
forcing their ww-, t\ to the 
tOrctrunt of our minds. It is not that there w-, -crc no feelings present 
before, but that they 
arc nuvv strc>n cr and demand greater , ittenti(mn. 
T\ Meal cXamhles of how this occurs in 
, rdiiiarv life could he irritation at a neighbour with whom \\c 
have always felt 
c<, nstraincd to he polite, or anger at having constantly missed out on a promotion which 
c hclicv c should hav c been ours, or, as in the case of . 
Almasv 
, 
feelings of lcov-c which 
. seem at odds with the \\-idcr range of yualitics which v, c perceive ourselves as 
hav Ill, y 
huch feelings could he either bodily, Or psychic, Or both. In the case ()f . 
Almasv, I suggest 
that the combination of intense romantic and sexual desire, coupled v ith the 
ýýtra<>rýünarý break vV ith the rest ()f his life, constitutes the 
kind ()f cmc)ti(m al experience 
''Cd 
in the cmuti()Ial which (WIL. 1ic describes as one in which `1>lur entire b ()d\ 
is eng 'U r 
MichacI Ondaajtc. 117c' English Maic'iIi. 23I 
iL 
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czhcricucc, and all the feelings are "united in co nsci<)usucss" 
in being directed towards 
its ool)lcct: united "hOdv and soul", "heart and mind. ""', 
Much of this su")csts that when we talk of awareness ()f our 
feelings, this must be 
unclcrsiOO l as P )tcntiallv inv-<olv inl; much mo rc than simply registering their presence. 
Oimcc f cclings are , icknuvy-Icdgcd in the way described 
in the second extract, feelings 
, \w laich \\-Clc held 
before can l l()\\ be better understood. When . 
Altnasv sav s that 1)1-( '\ 
mOmcnts `floode l hack into, the lheart, now suggestiv-c', WC can 
interpret hitn as 110w% 
being alhlc to explain nwmclts such as the discomfort he 
felt during the exchange o cl 
I Icrco(lutus as the uasccnt feelings which would ultimately dcvclOp 
into the intense 
r>>mancc he %v,, is later to, experience. This is not to say that 
he can loxok lack and noýw- 
sai he was in luve with her at that mcm ent, which would he a much more controversial 
claim. But it would he possible to understand the feelings of discomfort as the onset of a 
shift in his pct-ccpti(n of himself, caused by hathritic, which challenged the 
detached 
view of himself he prcv it>usly hide, and signalled the move t(>vv-ards the 
intense desire 
hich would conic to charactcrisc his attitude towards her later can. 
if this is correct, them awareness of feelings can involve Coming to an understanding of 
feelings which ww e now see in a different light, or else a sudden and blinding 
rcc<ig; lilt icon <>f feelings which w ere present before, but of which we are ()Iilv 
fully aware 
nOvV. A further possibility would be one in which the initial feelings between . 
Almasv and 
F, atlurinc did not erupt into a passionate affair, but developed gradually Ov cr the course 
of m,, im con ersatioons ()I, encounters during which a range of 
different shared interests 
and pursuits brought them a steadily growing awareness of increasing attracti(in. In such 
circunistamccs it would be misleading to limit oneself to the simple categories ()f 
feeling 
g so methinl and Bein vaguely aware of it, and feeling something and ncýrhin feelin 
l)cing fully aware of it. 'I here may w ell be many degrees of awareness through which w'.: -c 
lass before we can sav vvc . u-c fully aware of feelings associated with lo c. 
\ m( we difficult question is how we would describe a situation in vw-hich the 
feelings were 
lilies Of vvhich neither hrutagonist was ever fully aware. 
Let us sav that thcv had bOth 
been killed after the scene described in the first cytracr. Could we then say that they 
v crc attracrccl toi OOnc anOthcr, or that thcv ,,, -crc in 
h)v c% It is not clcar to me that tlicrc 
"' peter Goldic. Pic l: mn[iuns. 55 
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could l)c a C(l1fidcnt ansvcCr to this clucstion. '1'hc uncoýmfortablc wa) in which : 
Almasv 
addresses hathrinc, and the understated reflection about appreciating the delicacy- of 
manner indicate his disco mfo rt, but is this enough for us to attribute a full-hi( n 
cnu)ti<in predicate such as `in 1ov-c' OF cv cn a more modest one such as `attracted ti>'. 1 
am inclined toi sav it is not, on the grounds that we require a greater degree of uvvarencss 
I 
()f mir feelings, and inure c\-tclcticc in terms of our bchaý iýtural responses hcf ire \\c caii 
use such predicates. But I ýý ould also concede that other people's intuitions mav run in 
the ýý1ýp site direction, and it may he the case that feeling and em))iit>tn auncchts just 
aren't firne grained enough to deal vý ith these sorts of borderline cases. 
I his list p )int brings is to the difficulty in describing feelings. "There may he instances 
vv hure I can specifv a particular time at Mich my fear started, and this might be taken as 
the I Oinr at vv hich my heart started beating on hcrcci\-i ig some imminent danger. But if 
\x c are discussing the more subtle cases of psychic feelings im-()I\-cd in more c<)rnpley 
emotional states such as love then it is n-uch more difficult to talk in such precise terms. 
Discussion is further hampered by the fact that we hai e such a limited cýcabularý . 
AV'c 
can pick out certain properties of tnam of our feelings such as pleasant or satisfv ing, laut 
these provide little more than the barest of descriptions, and we are 
better ()ff turning to 
literature to gain clearer insights here. 
\cv crthclcss, we can certainly gain a much a clcarcr picture of the role feelin s plat iu 
emotions, and one of the crucial aspects of this account, which is also imlx>rtant if the 
references to levels of a,, warcucss are too count, is that there is an increasing reliance on 
the concept of `fouling towards'. If there is to be an anal( gv between decisions which I 
talc without concentrating which guide m' driving, and feelings I have without attending 
to them which guide ire behaviour, then it must be shoxvn that the feelings are directed 
towards the vv<>rlcl in an analogl)us w a\ to the one in vv-hich jucll; crncnts are 
rchrescutati(Ins of the vti<orld. . 
Although I have defended the idea of the intcntioonalitt of 
elm)ti<ýns, the intctitionality of feelings is a distinct issue which rcyuires suhhurt if the 
()tlier arguments ()ffercd here are to stand up. This is Of }articular importance in the 
co, ittcyt (d- 111c, tlIcý, rv :u .a vvlt<>lc, in that I hope too slto, vv drat it is our feelings to vvard,, the 
Orld vv hielt go uud our meaningful commitments and rclati<>nshihs, including our moral 
c(ýmntitnlcnts. But if this is the case, then it will first he necessarv to establish that 
feelin s can havc the stability and consistency vvhich vvmild allmv them toi lplav this 1-()le. 
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)nc ( )t tltc claims v-ý hich I have defended thrc>u h<, ut this chapter anal the 
last, is that 
feelings are ncccssarv constituents of emo tioons. I have argued that in cases such as 
here vvc believe sumconc is dangerous, and desire toi escape him, this does not entail 
fear a feeling must also be present. ( )nc problem vdhich emerges from this is just 
liuvV 
v. care too deal vw ith statements such as `I have been in love with my wife 
ff>1 tvv ctlty v ears' 
or `1 had an argument with m brother last vvcck and I have 
been align with him ever 
since. ' These are the kind of statements about emotions which X VC tend cntirclv 
acceptable in ordinary usage, but then should v,,, c accommodate the claim that 
einuti(, us Wulst hav c feelings It seems vVc must either argue that the man who 
is in Im c 
ith his v, ifc has had a constant feeling for twenty v cars, or else the feelings have conic 
and gone, and each option presents serious difficulties. to the man who claims to 
hav c 
had ac )tstant feeling of 1<ov-c over the entire periood, ww c might ask if he felt love wk hilc he 
\\: I,,, storming, out of the hoousc after a furious argument, or if he 11,1d 
feelings Of lov c 
vv lbile he \x as aslccl). Too the person who has been angry for a vti-cclc, vt h<> contends that 
the feelings ins <>lv, ccl have come and gone, we might ask whcthet this is one episode of 
angel, or whether or not he should say not that he had been angry for a \X eck, laut that 
he 
had been angrv on the different occasions when the feelings had come to him. 
shall lm>k at these alternative pO>sitiOns and reject hoch in favour of a p<)sition in WMelt 
references to endurint emotions need be seen as cntailinl; neither the claim that the 
feelings \\ crc pcrmanctirly present, nor that vk-c decd tct dispense «-irh the idea of lm, (,, 
tertn cnic)ricýns , iltogether. 
1nsteid, «-c need to think of enduring emotions as ones in 
vv flieh vv c have feelings which may vvax and wane, and of which we may be more or less 
; t\\ , 11, c M cl' time. 
.1 here may even be points when -\X c might think of the feelings as 
clisahhcatin altogether, , is in cases where we fall out of love with someone 
for at hcri(>cl, 
laut \X C can still justify the claim that people experience emotions m cl, mangy .\ 
cars bv 
thinking of curtain feelings as having been present, and having been sufficiently strong 
and enduring to charactcriSc our attitudes to arcs a particular individual or cv cnr, and 
thereb all(ca u. toi speak of loving a person or beim; angrv with st)mco>tnc 0v cr a peri<, cl 
of v cats. 
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. I'lie idea that feelings cannot possibly be present at all times during an cnu>ti<ffl is an 
o>bn his conclusion which fO>lk>v-, -s from the fact that we refer to periods 
during which we 
claim to hav c enioticros which extend w ell beyond the periods during which \,, -c "Irc 
cOnsci<>us Of ha\ iug feelings related to those utnu>ticnts. '1 c> take the example of the anger 
vv hick lasts a vv eck, the tv pical phctu>menologv of such a statu vy ould he an intense pcrio )d 
at the lhctinning where vvc might combine bodily and psychic feelings, and during which 
Mut th>>ughts mav vv ell be utterly dominated by our anger towards the person who 
has 
; uttag(>uiscd us. This trnav be f<>llovVcd hv a period of 
hours vdicn we still feel on edge, 
and \x c uftcn return to the central issue and the words xhich xk crc exchanged. . 
After this, 
vv c may graduallv , perhaps Ov cr a period of 
days, think of the incident less and less, and 
, tllOM other topics to concern us. Yet even in this final, more sedate phase, we might 
well still describe ourselves as angry, despite the feelings being fully conscit>uslv presctit 
()ilk into-mittcntlv and to a much weaker degree. 
In light of this, we could claim either that the feelings are 
dispositional, or that it is 
sufficient for the feelings to be present oiii intcrtnittcntlv in order for us toi have the 
eflv)ti< n. ý" An cyhlanati<m along the lines of the feelings being dispositicnial has the 
attractiOfl of allovv111g us to cypiain how it is the feelings can erupt from time to time, 
\dteilst Bein apparctitl. absent for long periods, an account which corresponds to the 
description of a typical state of enduring anger vdhich I described above. A\, 'c could argue 
that the initial stimulus arouses the feelings in the first instance, and that until time or an 
aho1 )gv has dissolved the anger, we are still liable to further arousal cv en at the thc)ught 
of what had happened earlier. This provides an account which allows us toi explain the 
lx>ienriallv extended duration of emotions, as well as the absence of conscious feelings at 
all stages. 
I he pr )l)Ietu (t such an accO>unt is the conceptual gal-) betvyeen dispcositu)nal states anal 
C )tistatnt states. If mý feelings arc dispositiotls, then this suggests that during, the periods 
hetvv ccn \\ hich mm anger is triggered, I am not angry. A\ (Mlieim denies this in defending 
the h( siti()ii that if I am disposed to become angrv if stimulated, then I am angrv. But 
tlii, surclv rcvcal a vvidcr po)hlem %ýith am acc )unt <>f enduring elm)tiOns which seeks 
to describe them as dish<ositi<m;, in that we Iosc sight of the crucial distinction betvv ccu 
Richard \k ollheim favours the idea of emotions generally as dispositional states. See Chapter One of 
The L/i wioli. ti. Peter Goldie holds that feelings need only be present on occasion during the emotion. 
See The Liiu iiom. 69. 
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1>cii1 clisl)O Cdl toi angcr to)v, arils sotncouc, which inulicatcs a c()nstant pol«///irr/ f( )i angcr, 
and l>cin") angrv vvith SOIIIa)nc for a 1()n(, hcriod of timc, xhich itidicatcs a co nstarnt . i/il/ 
of an"cr. '1licrc is a crucial cliffcruticc hctvvccn statcnuut,, such as `I t ct antrv cvcrv timc 
I scc . 
A1art, arct 'I hatcher on I'V' , and 
`I'v c been angry with f\Iargarct I hatcher cv cr sii1cc 
she toOk 1p( \v cr'. 'I he continuity of the em oticonal state in the second statement is lost if 
wc treat this as a disht)sitiOnal statt. 
(; OIdic Offer,, a different (and I think better) Opti()n in ww-hic li he distinguishes l)cnv ccn 
cmutio IIS , inc] v' liar he calls `cm<, ticýnal cpIsO ]cs'. In the aCCOunt of anger I offered 
al)Mc, the chic<>dcs would be the m()mcnts v"hen the feelings conic to the forefront of 
III(" mirndl, and \x C arc, as it vv crc, consumed by the cmoti<m. C; coldic states his r )siti<m as 
fOIlO\'s; 
I1I think is it reasonable to sav that, v ithttut at Icast episodes of such fccling, Of 
which v 011 can be more or less aware, an experience cannot he an emo ti(mal One. 
But once the distincti(m between an cm<)ti()li and an cnu>ticmal chis()dc is clear, I 
do not need to insist, for example, that my enduring 1()\-c for her (the cmn, titin) 
need inv-()I\-c feelings at all times, even when I am play inl; fo )tlhaall, , altli nigh it 
\v ill he true that rm emotion at that time inv-()]N-cs various dispositions to hav c 
1i)v ink; thoughts and feelings towards her. So, looking back, I can trulv sav `1 
hav c lm cd her for twcutv ý cars, N\-ith<out ceasing to do so for a second'. " 
The attraction of such an account is the reconciliation of the duration of the emotion 
vý ith the al)scncc of feelings m er the same period of time, whilst Ov crcoming the 
p )l>lems clic(>untcrcd -, x-ith \\'ollhcitn, -where we struggle to distinguish hetwccn purclv 
dislx)sitiOnal states and Constant ones. When vV-c describe so inco ric as a jcali>us t. \ pc, 
then this is different to dcscribinl; him as someone Who has been jealous of his brother 
four years. 1'hc f=irst usage indicates that this is a person whop is more likely than most to 
beCO e jealous oil seeing his vw-ifc chatting with another tnan, of ', t eoIIeatuc who ("cts a 
hromuti( ii, Or a neighbour with a faster car. This indicates that this person vv ill tend to 
llav c m. ui\ different and distinct cypcricnccs of jealousy. But this tlcccln't cyh, uist \\ liat 
vvc can do vdhcn vvc ittrilbutc a disposition to someone vvith regard to their ciao tioals. 
\\ ith the case of the man vVhlo is jealous of his brother, vv-c can understand this to mean 




that he tends to construe situations im Oh ink; his brOthcr as ()ncs in vVhich he wishcs lie 
coýuld be. The first case involves a disposition to react in a consistent vva to st wide 
range <ot different stimuli, výhilst the second Involves a clishcýýition to react iii a C()nsistcut 
av t the same aimulus. When we talk of the dispOSitiOns im o, 1v cd in l( ing s(mIc(mc 
toor Years it is surclv dispositions of this second categOrv which arc Inv ()l\ cd. The 
cOllsi; tel c-v in the výav «c react to a particular individual does the vv-()rk of justifying; the 
AIIIIi that it is the same enu>ti(>n. 
1'his line ()I argument can be supplemented by taking; a slit litlv mOrc liberal apprOach toi 
the role of feelings within emOtio ris than the one which suggests feelings must alwavs be 
hrescnt. III mane cases, our on going crnoýti<ms may , x, cll guide our behaviour even vdicn 
wc are not full\ aware of feelings. AN, 'hen deciding who to exclude from the (; hristmas 
list, N\ c might just unthinkingly cross off the brother with whom we argued last 
( . hristtiias. tiiulilarlý 
, \x c might sue the person we 
lcov-c comic home exhausted, and just 
prepare a meal and when a bottle c>fwine. Neither of these acts noel be accompanied bv 
dinv surge of feeling, vet the actions suggest a vyav of construing situations which rcv cal 
feelin s that c nditicýn our responses towards that person. AV'hctn such behaviour is 
c'nsistcnt m er time, and there are periodic moments of greater av. -arcness of onu- 
feclings, '\, c describe such cases as a single emotion. Such a view allows us t( make rcxom 
for feelings axing and waning, and of our being sometimes unaware of them, but 
retains the picture of a coherence and consistency in our emotional life Nvhich is true to 
o>ur hhun()mcn<olcog . 
Taken together, it is the consistent behaviour which we take to 
rcv cal our feelings by revealing the way in which we construe the siruatio>n, combined 
with the periodic a'a arcncss of those feelings, which will justifv the claim of having 
cypcricnccd the cmoýtion. 
I'Iicrc will still he difficult bordcrlincs cases, such as those v-, -hctc we hear statements like 
`I l(n cd her but I didn't realise it until she was gone, and I kncývc I didn't 1>chav c like it at 
tile tune', laut these just an, complex cases, and anvý satisfacto rv account ()f our cmmmms 
must make ro l>m fier the sort of distortion or clarification of our past feelings v, hich mav 
Occur. hut on balance, the justification of the claim to, have experienced an cnlOti( i1 
Perhaps the most famous discussion of this phenomenon is Hume's discussion of the 'calm passions 
in Section IV of Book II ofthe Treatise. His description ofa passion becoming -settled principle of 
action, is similar to the line I shall be developing in the next chapter ýsith regard to how emotions can 
euide our behag our vv ithout being constantlv at the forefront of Our minds. 
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(, v cr longill he one based on consistent bchaý i<ýtir, and feelings of sufficient 
strcnf; tl1 and ciurati<>n, that takcn together they come to charactcrisc the výaý we vicwv the 
pel lOdl in yucstiun. 
'Illcte is (, rte further argument which can he offered in favour of this vicww, to the effect 
that there are other , u-cas of out phciiotncn()logv- which d(m't re 1uirc us to be in a 
analogOU5 constant state in order to attribute constancy to us. Gilbert RN-lc makes All 
j)Oint vvlion attacking cpistcrnuOiOgists vdho argue that believing or knOwving are `cmc- 
pAlcrn intellectual }ýt<ýccsscs in which these cognitive disp()siticons are actualisccl. 
" As 
PO IC j)Oints Mit, even if people constantly repeated what they claim to know, this w-c, uld 
11 t be eii( )ugh to satisfy us that they really did know something. We would have to see 
tlieni inferring, imagining, saying and doing things in <n-dcr to he convinced. 'Similarlv 
ith cnic>tiOlis, \\ c don't have toi sec people constantly affirming thcv are angry to decide 
that thcv are. dust as we can attribute to pcoplc the belief that the earth is round ý, vithout 
them comstatitly affirming it, we can attribute an emotion to someone without their 
co)itstantly fcclino it. The attribution of an emotion to someone depends of a range of 
criteria, of which awareness of feelings is only one. 
'1 y/'/i "I O)hn-(L5 
\Lui of the arguments set out sty far in this chapter have referred to the concept of 
`feeling tumards' without setting out precisely what is meant by it. As this w ill play a 
crucial role in the work to come, it is worth taking some time to address this point now. 
In the first instance, it appears odd to describe a feeling as a perception of the inner state 
Of One's hO dV, incücatiut that the feeling is something internal to us, and then to talk in 
terms Of feeling towards someone else - someone external to us. In trying tu explain 
this concept, I shall cl<osclv follo the ideas of G<oidic" in setting Out ilovV our feelings 
can he said toi have an object, and thereby explaining ho it is we can talk of fccliiit 
s()mcrhing ` ll) >ut the \\ <>rl(l', as against feeling something within our bmlN . 
(lýýlclic's first ntOv c is to ackri nvlcclgc that our feelings lack anv direct intcnti> mnality . \, OI. 
can fcclin"s, as I hav c alrcadlv discusscd, rcv cal vvhat a spccific cmc)ti(>n is. Instcad, lic 
(iiIhcrt RN Ic. The Con, -c/)! o/ Alincl. 44-45. 
ýý Peter (ioldie. [lie L, noi uns. 58-62. 
ýý 
bO11OvVs I torn fr()m \V'illiarrn James, and argues that vvc must understand feelings as 
boll, c()cnl) lied in a, usci<Ousncss' with the object Of an crnOOtiO>n. There is an 
a, s<ýciatioll Of ideas vvhich connect our thumping heart with the charging elephant, 
pon idiitg ()if feeling) with a 'hOrrcovVed intentionality'. This means that the object oof ()ur 
feeling is n() I(>ngcr a psychcol( gical (t bodily- state, laut a feature Of the external v,, ( rldl 
alx, ut which \x c tn0>\w have `feelings toýv ards', which is captured in the concept of 
`thinking of with feeling'. 
'I his cOnccptualisatioon cstn he brought out «-hcn we consider certain haradwm: atic 
examples of ccmling to think of things differently because the thought is now infused 
with fccliii in the way I described earlier with the example of desiring to sec Abelal , 
I akc the example of the child who has been told that fire is dangerous, and 
has accepted this as true, but whose curiosity nevertheless leads hur to plunge her hand 
ink the flames. the upshot vciIl he a way of thinking, about the danger of fire which will 
differ from that which preceded the experience. "' Thc sensation of the scaring pain, the 
feeling Of sh(>ck, acid the association of these let na with the fire will enliven the 
tl1( sight of the danger in comparison to the more coldlv formal knowledge the child held 
pre i(msly. the c()ntent of the thought will be different, and this difference is that the 
thought is novi held with a /iT/ii of fear, as against a fcclingiess belief about clanger. 
furtlicr anýll<>g v is the difference bctwecti when a colour blind pcrs<)fl vvith a reliable 
uuidc utters the \\o>rds `"That rose is red', and when a normally- sighted pei S(n utters the 
sanlc \,, orris. the language 
is the, same, but the concept each person uses is different in 
the two cases, i)ecausc the normally sighted person is seeing the rose as red. 's .A similar 
distinction hOids l)ctwwccn thinking of something as beim; dangerous in a cold, fornmal 
sense, and thinking of it as being dangerous in fcnlingful sense one which implies fear. 
If thcsc atumcnts arc correct, then vV-c have the conceptual framework in place toi 
c<oml)inc the adv antes of the Co nitivist theories which I discussed in the last chapter 
'v ith the arrumcrnts to the effect that emotions must contain feelings. '1 he conclusion 
ýýhich cmc1,;; c, from these thOughts is that we have found the means to acc(>uut fo i- he 
See pace 38 above. 
Cf StocLer. I 'uluing [, moliaus, 47. 
2I take this example from Peter Goldie, The Emolions, 60. 
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intcnti(>nalitv and the Cognitive content of the emotions on the (mc hand, with the 
feeling, On the ether. "I he beliefs and desires vVhich partly constitute our elm)ticns are, 
nu>rcý, ý cr, n>, t distinct elements from the feelings, but suffused with than in such a vvav 
that the beliefs and desires are filled with the feelings v,, -Inch make the overall cypcricilcc 
di,, tinctlv that OI having an cmoAiun. It is in this wav that cm>>tio, ns can contain beliefs 
and desires "ith<>ut ever being reducible to than. 
I here arc, hOývV cv cr, a number of other central claims which I have made here vv hick vv ill 
l)e part (>f Ilie tOundatiun o>f what I shall be sitt; uing for whet II c)III c to lcx>k at the 
rclati>anshih hetvv ccn emotion and moral value. "I lie most important of these is that ()UI 
fcclin s tov"aids the «(n-ld represent a stable, and often subtle backdrop toi our general 
pcrspcctiv e. I have tried to shoe- that we often have ()Illy limited 1-\"-"Ileness ()f c>ut 
feelings, and that the existence of stable feelings is the most C()11\-incing \v Iv of explaining 
the stabilit. \ if a wide range of attitudes and commitments which arc often retained o cr 
extended pctinx]s. I shall be arguing that this `background of directed fueling' is what 
po idc, the f )uildati<>n Of judgemctits of value, and it is when these feelings erupt intO 
the open in the form of emotion that vac become fully aware of prccisclv which 
cli-cctiuws uur feelings ruts in. fhc purpose of the next chapter will he toi flesh ()ut 
cyactlv h()\\ it is that c)ur feelings acyuirC a particular direction in the first place. 
'` For a full account of this sort Of "concept dualism and the use mention distinction, see David 
Papineau. IlimAi/i 
. 
lboul C'onscious»es. c. 
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3. Belief and the Direction of Feeling 
1 /17/Yk//lal0l! 
I concluded the last chapter by saving that -\,, c have a background of directed fcclin 
kv hick explains the consistcncv and coherence vV-c have in our emotional lives, as v, ell as 
in Amur hcrso>nal ccýtntnitmcnts and projects. I also claimed that it is v,, -hcn the ctn<ýtio>ns 
arc ar(mused that the precise direction and character of this feeling is rc\ calccl. 'I he aim Of 
this chapter v611 be toi elucidate this claim by setting out a conceptual scllcnlc which 
d escril)c, h()\\ it is that feelings come toi he directed in one way rather than another. '1'hc 
main thrust xvill he that we can understand our emotional development in ways broadly 
analO,, (pus to the development of mir thought, and I shall be adapting the ideas ()f 
1)m aid Davidson with a view to establishing this. I shall then goy on to support the 
cm miicchtual framework laid out here by drawing on some relevant findings in child 
psv chmmlc, gý . 
What will emerge is far from a llavidsonian theory of the el mtioils', but I 
, hall nevertheless try t<t show that his theory of how thought develops can he uscfullv 
cu-()Iptcd into the project of understanding how emotions develop. 
I shall ;ilsc he revisiting the issue of what is meant by saving that em()ti()>ls are partly- 
Co llstitutcd by beliefs or perceptions. If the material from child psi chcýlc>w is to be 
aicceptcd, then v), c can attribute emotions to infants who are only a few w,, -ccks old. If this 
is the case then it follows that if we hold that cmotions require beliefs, and that it is 
hOssil>lc to hold beliefs prior toi acquiring a language, this would mean that beliefs need 
scot have hrý>jxýsitiýmal content. This areas of the thesis therefore requires elucidation, 
and I shall argue that the intentional states which partly constitute emotions must be 
lOCatcd across a broad shuctrutn, starting from simple representations which c(>ntrihutc 
to an infant fearing an unfamiliar person, to more complicated construals such as those 
itnv ()I\ cd in a c(>mpanv executive fearing the possible outcome of a restructuring ()f the 
Firm. It is in allowing; this broad range of intentional status that we can attribute 
cmýýtiý, ns to both infants and certain animals whom we might wish toi describe as 
frightened Or sad, as vv ell as to sOphisticated adult humans. 
I have alrcady criticised Davidson's specific ideas in this area. See the chapter 'Emotion and 
Cownition' above. 
55 
further kcv issue 1 shall be looking at is the unusual wav in which a broad degree of 
similarity in cmoitic>nal responses across different cultures appears to Co -exist with a vide 
degree of diu crsitv in the object of cm(>tiolls. Research from within social anthr(ipol g 
and C\ IiiUti(, narv thcut\ appears to shOvV that hCOplc from cultures radically different to 
<, ur (n often respond cmo>tionallv in the same wwav we might judge appropriate 
<, ursch cs, but react vcrv differcutlv in other cases. '111c emotional lives of those Ill 
different cultures appears to arg, more widclvý than our physical make-up, but less w,, idclv 
than language. In c, rdcr to address this I shall look at the sociýil constructionist 
vievv point, and I shall tc- to show that we need a picture of ()III- cnio ti m al dc v c1op iicnt 
in which \\C start with curtain capacities, naturallv occurring in humans, vvhieb arc 
dev clopmcntallv opcl , such that 
different cultural norms will result in people's emotions 
heim; - shaped in different xv av s. This will be of crucial importance in later chapters when 
it conics toI explaining variations in Moral outlooks within and across cultures, and the 
arguments set out here will complete the groundwork for the discussion of the 
relationship lbctvv ccu emotions and moral value which is to follow. But in the first 
itnstancc it vkill be helpful toi try and clarify how it is that we conic to feel toxvards 
different harts of the world in the v, av we do. 
/tlll0/1 /'/7', ///()// 
What is required is an understanding of how it is that we come toi feel a particular 
tO, vv ards some objects, and diffcrcntlv towards others. In certain cases, the features of 
the (, hjcct in yucsti()n can provide much of the explanatory force, as in the example 
William James offered of an elephant charging towards us. ý 1 he pro perties of tile 
char ging elephant appear to make it ideally suited to arousing fear vvhcn combined with 
certain straightforward perceptions. A relativ cl. \ crude understanding of the 
possible impact of an elephant and its direction of travel would be sufficient to arouse 
feelings of fear. I xcn this assumpti(, n , kill turn out toi be more c<nnplcx than one might 
at first think, but vv c need a tauch wider theory than this in any case. If we accept that 
there is nothing inherently more dangerous about a spieler than a csit, them vdhv d() mml-\ 
pof it, fear the fo>tmcr rather than the latter= We need an accO>unt Of 11M\ it IS that 
objects in the vv oýrld come toi be seen as bearing c\-aluativ c properties vvhich can poi <ikc 
wiIIiani . 1aincs, What 
is an Emotion? ', I find 9,191. 
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particular cm<>riOns - tc> understand hOw it is that a spider can aumc to 
he seen as fearful 
inch a car as curc. 
I the m( )dCl vV hihi I shall suggest to explain this is based upon DDav idlsc, n's concept (>f 
triatn tilation, which he uses to explain the emergence of thought. ' l)av ids<on describes 
his Imsic thesis as follows; 
. I'lHe basic situation is 01k that involves two or nunc creatures sitnultancOuslv in 
interaction v%ith each other and the world they share; it is what I call //'m// /ANioii. 
lt is tlic result of it threefold interaction, an interaction Mich is twofold from the 
pint of view of each of the two agents: each is interacting simultaneously with 
the %vorld and with the other agent to put this in it slightly 
different way-, each 
creature learns toi correlate the reactions of other creatures with changes or 
objects in the ww orld too \% hich it also reacts. ý 
( )ncc the initial correlations have been established, then each of the subjects is in a 
position toi expect the other to respond in a certain way towards the relevant stimulus. 
In the case of a table, an infant will expect a parent to use the world `table' when 
referring to a particular class Of objects, and v,, ill expect certain responses when she 
cumcs to use the word herself. The correlations are set up in the first place by reheated, 
clmsistent responses to the same stimulus, and when the child first experiments with the 
reshunsc herself she is rc,,,, -arded, thereby cementing the link. ' All Of this tcyuires certain 
f undamcntal similarities between us. `'1'o understand the speech of another, I must be 
able toI think of the same things she does; I must share her world. '`' 
Hic yucsttou 110 1000mlcs to What cxtcnt this serves as a useful Model four 
un(lcrstancling; our emotional development. One initial objection might be that whereas 
\x c can 1)Oitit tu a range of relevant physical objects and say the word `reel', there are It() 
physical Objects which provide us with instances of `fearful' \\-here the physical objects 
carrv quite Soy much of the burden of explaining how we come to understand \k hat the 
c(mccpt means. Surely wart of the account of the perception of redness will come in the 





form (of the phy sical properties of light-sensitive atncs in the retina, and their tcnclcncv 
to he eycited hv the different light wav clengthsý What analogous properties can we point 
to) in spiders to, explain their tcndencv to arouse fear, which we vý-cýulcl point toi in the 
(iiincsc flag to explain its tendcncv to elicit the experience of seeing reds The spider 
seems to) lack the properties which elicit fear in the direct vav in ' hitch a flag can elicit 
the seeing of red. There is a sort of shapelessness to the class of fearful objects, insofar 
as wc canno )t pinpoint the sort of common properties which are easier toi identify 
in the 
class of red colbjects. 
All obvious initial response is that this is scarcely an issue confined to explaining our 
cnloti(aial dcv clOpmcnt. When we learn our language, we may w ell start by associating 
`mama, and `dada' with certain specific shatiotemporal objects, but X VC cV cntuallv break 
through into> speaking of a world Of unObsct\ alles, abstract objects, imaginary objects, 
and s( <>n. hut to offer this response is already to concede more than one needs toi in 
()rdcr to defend the relevance of triangulation. Daniel Hutto has pointed out that there 
are considerable problems in arguing for mind-independent features of the world which 
correlate ncatlv with the colours we pcrccive. 
" I do not wish to go into the technicalities 
of this debate, but simply to highlight the pitfalls of assuming ostensive definition of 
Colours piov ides a clear-cut contrast to learning what is fearful. Whilst it mav he true 
that the objects different People Fuld fearful may lack the obvious core of essential 
pr()hcrtics that unite the objects seen as red, we need a much richer theory of how we 
learn cconccpts than one which runs along the lines that vc sitnhlv learn what red is by 
hay ing someone point to an example and say `red'. How do we know cyactlv which 
hrý, hcrtý is Bein picked out% How do xx-c know how to identifv objects as red in cases 
where no one is pointing it out to us? I Iow ate we learn that different shades can count 
as being shades of the same colour= This is one of the issues raised by AV'ittgcnstcin in 
his discussion of what happens when we teach people concepts by means of examples. 
After a vthilc, yc reach the stage where we give examples and there is an 'and so on' 
'v hick `points hcv ond' the examples. The vvav in which this works cannot be explained 
lhid. 10ý. 
For a fuller discussion ol'this, see WV Quine, 'Speaking of Objects, in Oniological Refa/li ill. and 
Daniel I Iutto, - Ihe World is not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds in Peter Goldie. ed. 
( IOCTAI an(linng LIIIwiOn. i- I find a/ Id Ponds. 
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1)v the }(, intro, and saving the word at the samc firne, as it is prcciscly this bcvond to 
Much vVC arc nco-ýw pointing. 
Onc ww a\ f<>rýý and ctncr cs when vv c consider ()tic of the cO (u_icnts III 1)avidso n's 
discussion of triangulation - rcv, -ard. .A crucial 
factor in how it is that the child comes toi 
correlate succcssfullv words with ol)Jccts is vvhcn the other person 
in the trtanglc rewards 
her with hraisc Oil hearing the appr00priatc term. But how is it that the child pcrcciv cs 
this as rcvvard rather than punishment 00r indiffcrcnccr '1'hc reward 
is claimed through 
u-cc( gniticun of certain facial cxpressioons and tone of v-()ice, as well as 
bchavi<>ural 
resh(inscs characteristic of praise. 1'hc reward takes the form of excitement III resp u_isc 
to these perceived mcssagcs. ", 
lutto describes this as `the intcrsubjcctivc dimension of experiential concept lcarning'. 
' 
crucial part of vv-hat is going on in the triangle concerns the bchavic)ur can the patt of 
the carer and the child, and the impact this has on the child. l'or example, 1)otlI must 
focus on the target object and cross-check that the other is doing the same. '111c 
respOn; c inv O1v cd will be both `intentional and experiential', in that «-c must not onl\ 
f(cus on a specific object, but experience it in roughly the same way both teacher and 
learner Hurst focus on a reel object, and both must sec it as red. Were this not the case, it 
would be impossible to triangulate I would never know if ý ou were seeing the same 
object as me. We must assume a `broad common ground' bctwcctu us in order to 
learn 
common concepts of experience and objects. 
\n crimple of this may help to bring out the key points. The child approaches the fire, 
and the carer's face is transformed in a particular way-, just as the cry of 'Stop! ' is uttered 
in a particular tune. The event is repeated on several occasions with the same response, 
and the unpleasant feelings elicited in the child by the carer are ones which the child 
c(mmc, to associate with the fire. She comes to `feel tc>wvards' the fire in .1 particular ýý ay 
under direction fr<)m the carer. - she comes toi 
fear it. As she grows older, she learns that 
the range (>f ()bjects she has been taught to fear are called dangerous. The triangulati» 
C(>nics in the form (>f the child and the carer each being avv arc that the other is svv itching 
I. ud is \VittI-1 enstein, l'1>ilusu/>hicul lnreslýc, ruliuns. 9 208. 
CI ibid. 'I do it. lie does it after me: and I influence hing by expressions of agreement, rejection, 
cypectation. encouragement. I let him ego on his ýya'.. or hold him back; and so on. ' 
lI ibid 
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ittcntic>>i back and forth 1)Ct-xxccn the other })( 0l and the fire. The child starts w ith si 
capacity to perceive and respond to certain stimuli (in this case the cypressio ii of 
concern), as well as the ability to associate the concern With the Fire. The result is that 
the child av Oids the fire. 'I lie al)ilitv tu learn in this way is part <d what it is t(> share the 
sailic vv'Orlcl. 
'phis schcma is ncccssarilyý brumd, but it is <mlv intended to capturc the funclamcntal 
hr<ýccss ti 1Ou h vdhich \VC come to sec objects or events as fearful, di, tu, tint. výOrthv of 
anLcr, and 5O can. 'l'hc process is <>nl; oiu g, played out through numerous transactions, 
car after 
_\ 
car, hemccii child and carer. This continuous process results in the 
acLlui,, itioýn of a background of directed feeling which orients us towards the \v()rld. After 
a vv Bile, \\, c n0> 1<hugcr need the constant input of the carer, because we have now Cl )mc to 
feel a particular way towards particular states, objects and activities. The learning hr()ccss 
inculcates habit, vVhick means that lessons learned can continue tu guide us with but the 
csurcr prescnt. 
It also provides us with a starting }x)int for understanding ýv by it is that v, c have a degree 
it consistency in the emotional lives of people across different cultures, coupled '. vith a 
iclc plc ree ()f clip ersitz .I 
hay c suggested that all of us have the capacity to express and 
perceive feelings in the face sind v vice of another, and that there will be certain objects 
vx hich are more suited as candidates for certain emotions rather than others. To) take an 
obv iiius example, the consistcntlv harmful potential of tire, coupled with the tendency of 
parents to care il)Out the welfare of their children will result in the greater likelihood of 
children across different cultures learning to fear fire though the process I have 
suggested this also leaves space for a wide degree of variation in what we learn to feel 
])()ill vi thin and across different cultures, which reflects the more culturally specific 
nature of certain fears which we have. We can imagine entire generations of English 
children being brought up toi fear the abominable snowman, whilst no)Oe ()f their I : skimoý 
c(>untcrparts are even taught what this is. Similarly, (Inc might have either a wwho)llv 
Christian culture with different denomninatioýns, some of v h<m teach children a deep 
seated fear of the cl-()s, whilst others teach them to associate it with love and happiness. 
SOciu-cultural no rnis thereby Co me to) be transmitted through the educati()n Of tltc 
( 111OTl( )tP. 
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ýlaný Of the ideas set out here can be giv en direct support from research cat-ricd out its 
the field oof child hsvcho logv. ' Specialists in this field describe a ht-o>cess called `S(>ctal 
referencing', in x" hick infants respond directly toi the facial expressI()ns and tone ()f 
of their carcglv cr, by treating (objects with greater \w-airiness oc enthusiasm depending oil 
the cue tilcv rccciv C. When presented -with an unfamiliar object, they will (dtctt turn toi 
the carc>iv cr, \\ hose rcactiOn will shape the response of the infant. 
\ further aspect Of infant cmOticmal lbchaV, i<Our is the habit of comforting Or hurting, 
others. lial>ics cif up 1<o tvvch c tnc)nths of , igc may become distressed on perceiving the 
distress of someone else, and ()\-cr the follmving year many will develop the habit Of 
uctiv elv trv ink, to comfort or c\-cn protect ax ictirn. .A corn crsc pattern of 
behaviour is 
cv idcnt \\ lien it armes to hurting others. Ifa baby has caused distress in a c>unger 
sibling, the most common response is toi hurt them cv-cn more, and many infants cv cn 
use strategies cunningly designee] to distress the sibling. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
babies most likclv to cause deliberate distress are least likely to comfort, but vvhý should 
some people comme to be moved by the distress of others whilst some deliberately cause 
it% 
In cases v,, -hcrc one child has hurt another and the mother explains that this is wr<ng and 
connfc)rrs the victim herself, the wrongdoer vv-ill tend to dev-clop into a comforter. In 
cases \\-Iicrc children have not been exposed to this sort of example, and especially where 
thcv hav c been v ictitns of abuse, they will tend toi become either indifferent to the 
perception of distress in others, or even respond with hostility. It seems that what we 
might ccýnv cntionallv term a sympathetic response is one vhich we learn, and y ari<ýus 
factors will influence the extent to which vvc dcv clop this characteristic. boor example, 
children w,, -ho e parents talk about their feelings will go on to be more adept at describing 
not <onlv their own emotions, but recognising emotions in others. 
1 " 
In s11c, rt vV c hav c ccrtain shared abilities vvIiich are Open to being dcv cIOpcd in different 
dirccti(ns, and arc thcrcfo c susccl)tiblc to cultural variation. 1'hc direction vxhich our 
tccliii ýirc iN cil vv ill (-(mic in the shape Of massiVc input frOm thc>sc arOund us, which 
I or a fiill sunimarv and discussion of the research in this area. see Paul I. I larris, C'hilclrc'n 117d 
Linolioii. 
See Dunn. Broýsn and Beardsall. 'Family Talk about Feeling States and Children's Later 
t nderstandin, -, of C)thers' 
Emotions', in Jenkins, Oatley and Stein eds, Ilim mi Emniions:. 1 Reader. 
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v% ill fo, 11ovv sct hattcrns. A\%c will tcnd to he discouraged from approaching tire, and (one 
vV Oulcl hohe) euc()uragc(l to be sympathetic to siblings, praised for what is taken to he 
(, O()d I)chav iOur. In this «av vV-c come to hav c what I have described as a background of 
directed feeling. hic input vVc receive Covers much of the world around us, which is 
now enlivened by the feelings «-c have towards it. Curtain classes of objects arc 
hcrcciv cd vtiitll fear, s(Inlc with disgust, others with delight. '1'hc world is now `alive' as a 
resulr c, t the ftcliii -ladcn bclicfs and E)crccptloons which , vc 
havc accquirccl. 
'l his raiscs the yucstit, n as to vVhcthct- Or not our cmotit>ns might not he undcrsttxxl 
ciitircly as cultural phenomena, rather than the social development of certain shared 
characteristics, as I hav c suggested. It is this aspect of our cmononal development which 
has po) idcd the focus for one of the approaches to the subject over the last twenty 
\ Gll'S. 
S 0»71i/ i, Uli. i/171c'l/O/// /// 
"t he social C( >nstructi(>tu st theory of the emotions claims that 'emotions are 
characterised by attitudes such as beliefs, judgements and desires, the contents of vvhich 
arc not natural, but arc determined by the systems of cultural belief, value and moral 
value of particular conninunitics'. '' The social constructionist begins from two points, 
the first of which is the intentionality of the emotions, which I have already discussed. 
"` 
The second point is the diversity of emotions which one finds across different cultures, 
which is present in two different forms. firstly, people in different cultures have 
different emotional responses to the same stimulus. japaticse people tend to feel disgust 
at someone sneezing in public, and shame at the thought of doing it themselves, whereas 
British people "ould tend toi be rather more sympathetic or indifferent. Secondly, there 
is research vv hick suggests that different cultures develop distinct emotions. To stay for a 
t nomlcnt v ith the Japancsc, thcv are said to experience an emotion of dim ! >, 
' which is 
argued toi be untranslatable, but which broadly corresponds to presuming upon anothet's 
kindness Or basking in another's indulgence. . 
Bind- is attributed both p<ositiv clv and 
ncgativ eh, and examples of when it might be felt would he vv-hen av ou»g man IS looked 
Sec 71w Soc"iul ('on. s[ruction 0/ the Emo[ions, ed. Rom I larr . 
Claire Armon-. loves. 'I lie I hesis of Construction ism', ihid 32-57. 
See Emotion and Cognition' above. 
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öfter bv his m(>thcr prior to marrying, or c\-cti in tcachcr-pupil rclatiýýns. 'l he range of 
different circumstances x,, -hcn the Japanese arc said to experience Mumie, and the mo>>ncnts 
at vvhich it is considered appropriate Or inapprcýpriatc appear toi indicate that it is t1uitc 
distinct fl-()Ill any emotion which people from other cultures have. 
.I he social ccmnstructicniist argues that the intcntionalitv' ()f the ctno>tioils coupled vvith 
their cultural diversity supports the claim that emotions arc culturally constructed. The 
the )i v allOvvs for Sonic uuivcrsal emotions of a particularly crude phv sit)lOglcal character, 
laut the cultural production Of emotion means that `the bulk of mankind live within 
sv stems Of th( sight and feeling that bear little but suhcrtict. il resctnblanccs toi one 
anOthcr. 'ý" 't'he stcduisiti()n of emotions entails learning cultural norms, standards and 
principles, and all undcrstancding of what is appropriate in which circumstatnces. 
I ': motions themselves are to be explained in terms of their functional role in the 
maintenance of the community, a role they accomplish by inducing individuals to retrain 
frý>m «hat is deemed undesirable behaviour and promoting desirable actions and 
attituclcs. ''' 
Bcffre considering sinne responses to this position, it is perhaps worth Irving to specify 
more hrcci, cl. vv hat a socially constructed emotion would he. I larr earns against 
hit lie calls the `outologic ll illusion' of assuming that there is something there, of which 
the emo do n ýýo)rd is a mere representation. He argues that it is wrong toi be misled by 
phi siolo ical changes in the body, which are simply- `incidental effects' of the emotion. 
I he emotion itself has to he understood as existing `only in the reciprocal exchanges of a 
social cncc>untcr'. "" But perhaps the key ccnnmctnt which enables to see cxactlv how the 
social contructionist understands what an emotion is conics vVhcn I larr- states that the 
y a\ to av()icl the ()nrological illusion is opened uh by the `linguistic turn'. 
'' It seems that 
emotions are to he understood as deriving their existence from within our language and 
(air exchanges with other members of cur community with whom we develop our 
utnclcr, tainding ()f 1l(A the world is. I": mo)tio : notions can be seen in the same light as values and 
Sec II Morsbach and w' J F\ ler. 'A Japanese Emotion: Amae*. in The Social (onstruclinn ()J i/ic 
Lnu)ii"uN. cd. Rom I larr---. 289-307. 
Sec Rom i larr _ -An 
Outline ofthe Social Constructionist Viewpoint', ibid. 
Claire Arnion-Jones, 'I lie Thesis oI'Construction isill ', ibid. 33-34. 
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l)clicfs v, hich bind comtnuiiitics tof; cthcr, and v hich derive their meaning) from the 
, "()Cl() linguistic hraCticcs out u>f which thcý' havc cmcr ccl. Oncc we rcc<tgnisc this, vVC 
MV immun(' ft-()Ill the illusion of thcrc bciug a place bcvt)nd latiguagc vdicrc we find the 
rcal cmOtlO11 
Rather than dealing with the issues surrounding the linguistic turn generally, I shall focus 
on social cc)nstructi(nism's specific contribution to the(ir. \ of the emOtioms. 'I'hc central 
pro)hlcm with the thesis seems to be, as Peter Go ldie has phrased it, that it represents a 
`siunificant o erstatctncnt'. 1'o, begin with, erne can accept the premises of the 
ar(Yumcnt which centre on massive cultural variation, without this justifying the 
cimclusicon of there being no natural basis to our emotions, in that there can be natural 
traits which are shaped by environmental circumstances. ( )ur learned eating habits in 
early v cars can have a considerable impact on the ýýay in which we develop physically, v'ct 
vw OUld nut want t(1 say that the body is entirely scýciallv constructed. Tv'() further 
counter-arguments also semi to 1)<°sc problems for the social constructionist position. 
'I iie first is that there is evidence to suggest that the degree of cultural diversity in the 
emotions is more limited than one would expect if emotions were developed exclusively 
within individual cultures. 'There is, for example, research which appears toi pn ve that 
the facial expressions related to the expression of particular emotions is similar even 
between cultures \k here we are aware of no way 
iu which they could have influenced one 
am)thct. If the emotions were as influenced by culture as the constructionist would 
hav'c us believe, there is no reason why- the expressions of emotion in different cultures 
should resemble each other any more than languages do. 
.A second argument which weighs 
hcavilv' against the constructionist thesis is the role of 
h )dilV feeling in C11 OtiUUn. The problem this poses is expressed by Claire . 
Arrnon _JOnes: 
According toi Cc)nstructiOiiism, a s()ci()culturall. \ constituted emotion is an 
acyuircd response. This rcyuires that the clctncnts constitutiVc of the cmo>tiO fl 
arc ýýncs ýý hieb arc capable of being acquired by the agent. Conscyucntlv , 
it is 
II /hip/. I or the clarion call ofthe linguistic turn, see Richard Rorty, 'Metaphilosophical Difficultics of 
I. iu"uistic Philosophy', and for a brief summary of his reasons For moderating his position, see 
l ssens live Years Later. both in Richard Rorty ed. ilk' Linguistic Turn. 
Peter (oldie. ilk' !: motions, 92. 
Sec P 1Ikman and WV Friesen. 'Constants across Culture in the Face and Emotion', reprinted in 
. 
IenLiim. Oatlcv and Stein cd. liumun Emotions: .1 Reader, 63-73. 
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essential tu cunstructlullism that an aca>unt t>f ctnotl( t1 he L tv un in vchich 
ctnOticýtis arc neither ldefltifiablc with, nur have the same <unto>Iutical status , ts, 
hihcnomcna such as sensation and perception. This is so because, although 
perceptual skills, for instance can be acquired, vVc also have rcas()ti toi believe that 
percepric)ti and sensation arc not essentially skills acquired bV training but arc 
natural phenomena which exist prior to the acquisition of any sociocultural frame 
ut reference within which we might want to explain them:: 
I he prOhlcm then lhcamlcs hovV (>nc deals with the feeling of my body tensing up as I 
scc a cu- mounting the pavement and heading towards mc, and an African tribesman 
czhcricincing the same feeling as he perceives a tiger racing toxkards him. If one accepts, 
gis . 
Arnun-J(, ncs does, that feeling is part of emotion, and that physical tension is an 
example of a bodily feeling, then there appears to be reason to believe that the emotions 
Of hcuhlc fu>ni radically different cultures have some sort of shared natural dimension to 
them. . 
Arim)n _Jones' response is to resort to what she sees as a 
\Vittgenstcinian position 
in vvhich she argues that feelings can be understood as `relevant emotion attitudes'. 
'' Iii-it 
this seems like a desperate num-c to avoid the choice which the constructionist must face 
she Must either eNcluclc feelings from the concept of emotion and thereby c(>ufr<, nt all 
the pu)l)lcros faced by cognitiv ist accounts, or else include feelings and allow in the 
common physiological features of emotions -which suggests the kind of `naturalism' she 
has spurned in favour of social construction. 
\V'hcrc I think the constructionist thcsis goes wrong is xv-ith its approach to jiltclltl()il. lllt\ 
I have argued that emotions must have . Ili Object, 
but the constructionist wishcs toi go 
(mc stage further and argue that all emotion is defined by the objects it has. This 
means that fear is not partly- constituted simply by having an object, but by haying a class 
of sI)ccific objects which arouse it. As such, the class of objects which members of one 
c<)mmunitv fear vv(>uld define «hat fear is there, and the class of objects vVhich pe pIc 
tear in ýt different Community would define what is to Count as fear there. In that it is 
logically possible that the two of classes may share none of the same objects, one can then 
concluClc that use of the concept Meat-' toi clun<)tc a single emotion across all cultures is 
I Claire Armors-Jones. 'The Thesis of Constructionism' 43, in Rom Harr ed. Ihr Social 
( HI1s/ -uclion (1/ Liriotions. 
/did. 48 
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mislcaclinIt is this vicwv vtiinch opens the door to an emphasis on the 5( ciocultural 
influences, and which leads to the conclusion that fear of the stock market falling; is seen 
as a different cmn)tiO11 to fear of censure by the shaman, as against the same ctnn, tt(m 
with ýt different object. But even if these arguments expose deep flavv s in the 
constructionist thesis, thcv also bring toi the fore precisely the issues which this thesis 
sechs toi highlight. 'I'hc cro ss-cultural similarities in the expression of cmoýtiolis, and the 
common tcttclcnc\ tovv ards bodily feelings cannot obscure the fact that the cultural 
atriatiuns VI laich the co iistructi<ýnist has focused on require an c-vphmatIOti which 
ins')1v es an apparcntlv natural capacity which is ( pen to significant cultural influence. It 
seems vvc need an explanatory framework ýý hach falls between those we muht uses to 
cyplain a1 Limv crsal physiological feature such as a reflex on the one hand, and a cultural 
pIwuOmcn( ii such as a particular language on the o thcr. I suggest that triangulstticm 
prm ides us with just such a framework. 
13('1n-/ dnnl I ; 111o/ioll 
)nc of the conceptual issues which emerges from the overall account I have so far 
DVov idled is how we arc toi understand what a belief is in the context of our emotional 
lives. I have argued throughout that our emotions are complex plicnomciia partly 
COnstitutcd by beliefs or perceptions, and this is brought out when we try to explain 
sOmething like (pur fear of our fox>tball team being rclcgated. Such a fear will be 
characterised hv beliefs about the league tables and the quality of our players which are 
held ýmth feeling. But this raises clear problems with regard to attributing emotions toi 
infants or, as ',, -c might ww-cll do, to animals. If I snatch the dumme out of my baby's 
mouth, and he then contorts his face in a certain way, starts crying, and violently wi-,. i\es 
his arms and legs up and down, we would describe this as anger. If I leave the house, 
and I hear m\ faithful (>1d dog scratching at the acct, and then %ýýhinllýcring as I \alle 
do 11 the garden path, it is cyually appropriate to describe him as sad. 
' 
I am inclined to say that the attribution of emotion in both cases is appropriate, but this 
rcquirc. clariticati<>n Of what COllCCpt O belief is hörig used in the Ov crall account c>t 
Perhaps the quickest and easiest response to this line of argument is simply to point out that there is a 
single class of the objects of fear, and that class contains all fearful objects. 
Ior detailed discussions of emotions in both animals and infants, see Martha Nussbaum's I phcavals 
(1/ l Nought. chapters mo and tour. 
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what cnu)ticns arc. If ctnotic>ns are partly-constituted by hclicfs, and certain non-human 
animals and prc-linguistic infants can experience emotions, then it cannot be the case 
that beliefs must have propositional content. I'. vcn the most ardent dog lover would 
surelv not say that the dOt thinks to himself, `mv master is lcavin ; '. This is a separate 
challenge to the one I examined earlier, 
'` in that the question no longer turns on whether 
or not ctno>ttoms can be reduced to propositions, but on ww-hetllcr or not the beliefs which 
hard. -constitute emotions rcyuirc pr<>}xýsiti<ýnal content 
( )nc could hold this, as ww ell as 
I>clicv ing that feelings must also he present. 
. this debate is vast and complex, and there is not space here to do it full justice, laut 
shall set out some of the objections to the concept of a belief which my thesis commits 
inc to, and then offer a characterisation of what belief is which both meets the needs of 
this thesis and attempts to explicate our ascription of belief in relevant cases. 1'hc 
difficulty for those who would argue against the possibility Of thought without language 
conics in the celebrated example offered by Norman 
Malcolm. "' Imagine )ur cl()(, is 
chasing; the neiglhbour's cat, which races towards a convenient oak true, but, unseen by 
the d()g, svw e ves at the last moment and races up a nearby tnaple. the clog runs uh to 
the oak, rears up, paws at it, and barks excitedly at the branches above. Surcl\ we could 
say the c]<>g is barking up the w-, -tong true because he thinks the cat is up there. 
l)a\ iLIso)t1'S resh(>ilsc to this is to tr\ to throw into 
doubt our intuitive practice of 
attributing beliefs and desires in such cases. 
''' If we say the dog bulicv-c(i the cat was up 
the coati tree, could we say- that the dog believed the cat vvcnt up the oldest oak tree in the 
g irdcný If not, then 110 can we distinguish bet-wecn quite different things which the 
d()L might have belic\-ca, sonic of which might be true, and others false It seems we 
need sonic sort of (7« a« description -\vhich suits the dog in this scenario, such as the clog 
thought 'thc cat ran up that particular tree. But this simply isn't possible unless we 
aasýutnc implausibly that the dog has other beliefs about trees. This objection obviously 
spring. from 1)av 1LISOn's xv-ider theory of what it required for us to hav ca thought `\V'c 
iCIcntifv thoughts, distinguish anion, then, describe them for what they are, only as thev 
See -[: motion and Coýnition' above. 
Norman Malcolm. 'i howýhtless Brutes'. in Proceedings und'Adc rc. 1s 0J 117c, 1171crican Philosophical 
I. tisoc"iulioii, 46 (19-2--3). 
See [Donald Davidson. 'Rational Animals', in Suhjeciive, /niersuhjective, Objcctivc, 95-107 
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can be locatcd within a ulcti c nctwotk of rclatcd belief" 
1 In addition, cach thought 
(1cpcnds can a scntcncc through vdhich it is cX}-)resscd. Such a v-icv,, - nicans that 
if we start 
ascribing indý idual bdiicfs toi dogs or infants, then we find <oursclv-c,,,, having to explain 
ho>vw thcv could have the many others rcyuired for the first toi make sense, as v. -cl] as 
ait ril)utin language to diem. 
Daniel Ucnnctt has offered One immediate response to what he secs as the practice of 
rcrluiring all creatures to have available toi them the sort of tine-grained distinctions in 
thought which we call make through language and the propositional content it provides 
us wwith. ý' I)eilnett argues that we don't need to know exactly the way in which an agent 
c<rncciv cs cif his task we <mlv need a rough knowledge of what the object of concern is, 
such as food or cats. I luman language just cuts too fine for its distinctions toi he 
available to a dog, but the dog nevertheless has its own ways of discriminating things 
which we can learn about if Nvc assume the 'intentional stance' (to which I shall return to 
a mx)ntcnt). In short, one can argue that we just don't need the degree of sophistication 
po)vic. 1cdd by a complex language. If nom-human creatures can be seen to be 
discrüninatinl; in a systematic way betXx-ccu different objects, and behaving systematically 
in response then this could be taken as evidence for beliefs about those objects. 
A further issue we encounter if wti e follow Davidson's line is that we are required to 
explain the transition which ww°c apparently make from having no thought or language, toi 
having ,t `dense network' of beliefs, desires and intentions. Davidson recognises the 
difficulty here, and yucstions vv-hcthcr or not v,, c inight ever be able to give a satisfactory 
description Of `half-formed minds'. He nevertheless attempts to offer some ideas on the 
`prclintuistic, precognitive' states -which must precede and prepare the ground for 
thought, and it is here that he introduces the concept of triangulation. 
" This' means that 
if there is too be a convincing alternative to Davidson's view- of belief as necessarily being 
an attitude to ards a proposition, it is perhaps to be found in a state which we might 
arcs v, ith I)av idso, n toi he prulinguistic, but not necessaril. preco nitive. 
lhicl. 98. 
Sec [)anfiel I)ennett. /rock o/, 11incls, Chapter Two. 
See ý, 6-62 above. 
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'l his is, hrcýadlv- shcakuig, the position taken up by Jonathan Bennctt. '' heunett offers 
Olilv a partial characterisation of what a tun-linguistic thought is, but his approach 
is 
Huse that if \\c use 'normal, rcaso uabic, cvcrv cday standards', we can justifv attributing 
Relicts tO infants and certain animals. If vvc take the cxamplc of a hair loping across the 
ice tovv ards what 1m )ks like a seal, but is really a rock, we can reasonably attribute thought 
iii the fc>llovving v"av. '1'hc hear has certain goals, such as eating food to stav alive. The 
bear `registers' certain aspects of its envir(mment, and 5v'stutnaticalh- responds by running 
alter, running avvaý, watching, and s<o can. hider certain circumstances, the bear hchav es 
in \X-, I\ S which indicate it has the capacity to makes errors, such as mistaking a rock for a 
seal. This means vc can present a theory concerning the pear's goals, which is supported 
with reference to certain environmental stimuli such as seals and rocks which look like 
sails, and also by certain behaviour, such as running towards such objects and eating 
them vw hen thcv are seals. 
This mcans that the c<mccht of 'registering' is anchored `on the one siele in chistcmic 
input and (>n the other in behavioural output'. " Bennett emphasises that the conditions 
%x hieb are sufficient for us to attribute thought for 'cv eryday' purposes voll not be Io, i e/h' 
sufficient for attributing thought, but he claims to have provided a coherent means of 
attributing thought to languagelcss creatures which at least meets the standards tcyuirccd 
of our coninion practice in this domain. 
I his position partiallv resembles the more prominent ideas set out by Rennett when he 
discusses `the intentional stancc'. '' This is defined as `It]hc strategy of interpreting the 
hclia\ tour of an cntttv (person, animal, artifact, vvhatcv-er) by treating it as i/' it were a 
rational agent gon creed by its "choice" of action by a "consideration" of its "beliefs" and 
"desires"'. ' The scare quotes are intended to alert us that we are using these terms in 
what might initially seem to be an inappropriate manner, in that these terms are not 
cncra11ý used vv ith rcgard to single-cell organisms, vacuum cleaners, or icc-flocs, all of 
VJhieb %V )ulcl fall under the usa c set out here. \'cn briefly, this usage is defended with 
re aril to aiiimatc objects on the grounds that our evolutionary heritage has provided us 
a11, anu)cl)as sirntl hutnatls alike, with survival and repro)ducti<)n-drivcn goals with n gardl 
Jonathan 13cnnett. Li17, iýui. oIic' Pi uclice. 
lhicl, 33. 
I shall be looking at the presentation of this view as set out in Chapter Two of hinds ?t /in /s. 
lhid. 3 5. 
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to v, 'hich it makes scusc to describe us as choosing, believing, desiring ctc. to achieve the 
0c>als vý c "11111 at. iAlachincs are given goals by humans, and therefore call also) he 
mcaningfulh described as choosing certain options, as, for example, when a computer 
cho ooscs to) scan the hard disk when it has not been shut do n hrchcrl-\ . 
Withirn the 
context of this theory, thinking; basically comes out as processing information for the 
purpO5c5 of achieving goals. 
( )nc tact()1 which makcs the debate particularly difficult is that tlicrc is a tciidcncv for the 
diffcrctnt sides in the discussion to talk past each other. Davidson offers an account of 
hat a belief is. Bennett offers a defence of attributing beliefs for the pragmatic 
purposes of predicting and understanding behaviour, and bases it on certain common 
practices. l)cutnutt appears to use the samt common sense approach as Bennett when 
ascribing beliefs, but then offers an account of what believing is which flies in the fact of 
our CO m<, n sense intuitic)tis about human thought being distinctively rich and complex 
in c( niparison to the thought of other animals and machines. 
Whcn (, nc conics to cOýnsidcr thcsc rival arguments with regard toi a the rý of the 
cnuori(ns, we arc facet] xxith either letting too much in under the guise of belief, or else 
leav in, too much out vVhcn it emits to cmc)tiOns. If belief is simply 'registering' or 
`pr()ccssing inf(>rmamm', then what separates human beings from guided missiles, ý'vhere 
such terms can surely be used to describe whar they dog If we rcyuire all beliefs to have 
content, then hoer can «-c attribute emotions to infants and animals if 
thalsc crnl>ti(HIS contain bclicfsý 
In order to chart a passage between the conceptual rocks, we can start by observing that 
there is slightly less at stake when addressing this problem in the contest of a theory of 
the emotions in comparison toi what the discussion of what a belief is /orr/ (oil/. 'l focus 
for a nnumcnt on Bcnnett's view, we saw that one of the drawbacks conics in the form of 
our being able accurately to describe guided missiles as 'registering' objects and making 
predictions About their behaviour which includes reference to goals and the possibility of 
ei ir. '111 1s c()nflicts %vith what I take to he the 'l (irmal, reasonable, cvervdav' 
um-Icrsta»ding of what believing is, which tells us that machines don't do it. But there is 
a. safeguard within the theory of the emotions which prc\cnts the problem from 
spreading in this wav . 
We can surely avoid any move from machines being able to think, 
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to machines being able toi hav c emotions, and this conclusion is blocked by stipulating, 
that fcclings arc ncccssarv cotlstitucnts of ally crfOtiOn. This means that C\-cn if we grant 
machines the p er Of registering features of the external wworlcl, this is insufficient to 
grant them an emotional life. Guided missiles mav process information and make 
mistakes, but they certainly don't experience feelings of depression if they miss their 
target. 
If this im) c is , Icccl)tablc, then 
it reduces some of the pressure on how,, - broad a concept 
'%c can permit to fulfil the role of the intentional statu which partly Constitutes aufm 
cmýýri(ui. Wc can allow beliefs to be simpler in character than a llavids<ýnian would 
wish to allo , and yet avoid 
having to accept the more tuiv, -clcome consequences which 
may foll<ovw if ww c are concerned solely with beliefs. I accept that this simply side-steps 
the conceptual differences between Davidson and Bennett, but my min is solely to 
hrm, lcic a bette- understanding of the role of belief in emotion, not a full-blcow), -n account 
of what belief is. 
Hic ncst step is to clarify what is required of belief in the overall theory of emotion 
ww hich is bcül developed. This is best understood as the key to the intcntionalM of the 
emotions, in that it is our representations of objects and c\-cnts which come toi be 
feeling-laden. It is our beliefs which are `combined in consciousness' with our feelings in 
such a v%, IN that we come to have `fcclini. s towards' certain features of the world. '1'hc 
ducstiou We can now Dish is how complex these status must be in order for them to 
combine \x ith feelings in such a way that they create what we would wish to call an 
emotion, and this will provide the outline for our understanding of the relevant 
irntcnti<mal states in this contest. 
If vVc USC our cv crvdav ascription of emotion as a guide in ansvv cring this clucstitm, then 
výc need st vvidc range of intentional states. In order to highlight this, consider tlhc 
follows in() two examples. .A 
four-month old child is passed by his tntthcr to another 
pets( >n. the child smiles broadly, waves its arms about, and issues a series of sounds 
hich vk c generally take too indicate satisfaction. Wc earn contrast this with a bond dealer 
stariu at a screen, vv ht> smiles broadlv and hunches the air on reading a particular set of 
numbers and letters which flash before him. If, v-c take both cases to be expressions of 
delight, then this seems to inv. olv-c a simpler perception on the part of the child, and a 
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much more highlv. a>m})lcX interpretation on the hart of the bond dealer concerning 
vdhat the Eiures and letters represent, and the likely conscyucnccs of this information. I 
suTtest that the rata('c of intentional states which we need to justtfv the attribution of 
cm<>tic>ns such as fear, disgust, happiness and so ()n to both infants and adults must be 
extremely broad if xe arc to justify this practice. In the case of infants and certain 
animals, rclativ clv simple perceptions of changes in the immediate environment or their 
lx>dv must be conceptually sufficient to count as One such state. (; oii -crsclhý, the range 
and sophistication of our emotional life can increase immensely as we acquire language 
and the `dense network' of beliefs, desires and intentions on which so rauch emphasis is 
placed 1) 1)av ids()ii. 
I su; gcsr that the best v ay f<umard is to acknov. ledge that the intcnti<>nal states ins-()lvcd 
in cmoti(>ns must cover a broad spectrum. This includes simple perceptions on one end, 
which are rca>gnitio>nal states of objects in the immediate cuv ironment, to complex 
co>nstruals it the other end which involve sophisticated interpretation of symbols within 
a richl\ cc, mhlcy vV-ch of understanding. They will share a direction of fit, in that all 
beliefs vv ill be representations of the way the ý-, -c>rld is, but the can he distinguished in 
terms ()f the way in which they represent their object. The simple recognitional states 
ill hay c the `target' of the perception as the object of the emoticnl, which is to say that 
the ol)jcct of a baby's fear will tend to be the object she is looking at. With more 
complex beliefs, the target of perception may well be different from the object of the 
fear, for instance \x hen the red numbers which a bond dealer perceives on the screen (the 
target of the hcrceptio>n) represent a potentially catastrophic fall in the value of his 
purchases (the ol)iect of his fear). Crucially, both the simple perceptions it 1 the 
complex comstruals have the potential to be combined in consciousness with feelings, 
such that they can partly constitute an emotional state. 
'I he l)cst wa. \ tu capture this broad spectrum of status Which arc iOVOIVcd in cm( ricons is 
to sav that feelings must he cOmbinuci v,, -ith cithur pcrccptio)ns, which might be vcrv 
simhlc rccoguiti(mal states, or beliefs, which will takes us as far as Comhlcx irnagiticd 
scun: uru)s available <mlv to> th<, sc with a 5Ophisticatcd language '1 his solution leaves <opcii 
the clucstiOn of cyactly what a belief is and xvhcthcr it must have propositional content, 
laut this is a virtue rather than a vice in this ccoiitcxt. It means that a Iýaý iclsuniaiý Could 
accept this line, and argue that animals and infants have cmOtiOms which tnv<d c 
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l)CFCCI)ti()iis laut ascot bclicfs, but it also means that a I)cnncttiaii could c(1ually accept it 
with the caveat that the creatures without language wh<) experience ctn( dons clo so partly 
in virtue Of their bclicfs about the world. 
When vVc sm that an infant was sad when her mother left the room, výc attribute to the 
infant the perception of the mother leaving the room which is combined in her 
co nscio usness with the perception of the state of her laxly. We don't assume language, 
laut simply the ca})acith t<t discriminate between different states of affairs, and the 
capacity to have feelings which emerges as a result of perceiving things to be t>nc way 
rather than another. When vVc come to describe the development of our emotional lives 
the accluisitiom of language v ill come to have a central role in helping us to explain cases 
such as the bond dealer. Language helps us to conceive of objects which are beyond 
simple sense perception, and to describe those objects in such ways that they can elicit 
feeling's in us. It also helps us acquire a better understanding of the emotional lives t, f 
others by allo ing us access to emotional states which can be more fully and precisely 
expressed through language than thev could be merely through facial expressu)fls or 
()ther forms of behaviour. This sort of approach is the one which I take Nussbaum toi 
be arguing for when she claims that what we need is 'a multifaceted notion of cognitive 
interpretation or sccing-as, accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality that allows 
its to ascribe tct a creature more or less precise, v agucr or more demarcated, ways of 
intending an object and marking it as salient'., 
There is a further aspect of our emotional &N-clcohmcnt which relates back to the earlier 
discussi(in of triangulation. " If the way in which we come to feel towards the wý, <ttld is 
indeed captured in this model, then the fccling-laden content of our perception of fire 
which vvc acyuirc through social referencing vß-i11 colour the N,, -()rd `fire' ()r `cross' when we 
come toi learn it. '1 he experiments into social referencing start with infants of as v<)unU 
as twelve months of age, who respond `with a fearful face' vv hen percciv ing, a similar 
expression on the face ()f the nmther. 
" If we accept the evidence of social referencing, 
then surck the more plausible model on which to understand htýv,, it is that emotions 
develop once children hav c the use ()f language is that previously inarticulate perceptions 
and cm( )tiOnal states arc now expressible through language. This suggests that the world 
Martha Nussbaum. Upheavals u/ Thou geht, 129. 
See 56-62 above. 
Sec Paul L1 larris, Children and Emotion, 20-23. 
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is alrcad\ `aliv c' for us by the time we start to acyuirc language, which extends the range 
of m)ur ct11 Oti()nal svV CCp into) the realms of the abstract and the physically remote, as v, ý ell 
ýs declýcnin ()U1 understanding of others' ctnc)tions. '' 
I'lic scheme I have set out here requires that cur emotions inittallv ins oh c simpler 
perceptions Of the , vorld, our understanding of which come to 
be enriched and extended 
Once wc acquire language. Ihcsc simpler perceptions demonstrate a capacit to 
discriminate between different , rates Of affairs, and form the basis Of consistent 
resp nscs to the same stimulus. I suggest this characterisation Of the rcprescntaticmal 
states }resent in cmotums, and their relationship to language, pro ides an explanat<)tv 
framcvwork within vvhich we can address two Of the issues confronted in this chapter. 
I'irsrlv, it helps to explain how we might justify our practice Of attributing emotions more 
widely than to humans \\ 110 have acquired language. Secondly, it elaborates On the view 
Of cm<)riuns as natural capacities which are Open to significant 
influence from our 
culture. ( )n the picture painted here, we can explain why it is that infants will experience 
emuti(nis from an early age, and then go on to deepen their emotional lives in adulthood 
as language enables them to express and understand better their own emotions and those 
Of Others. ' It also helps to clarify how it is that the world comes to `seem' one way to us 
rather than another, as vw c learn to respond in v,. av s which reflect the standards Of the 
wider culture. 
I also think this would be compatible with a llavidsonian position, as even he 
, icl: no. ý 
lc(Ig es that v, -hcn it comes to explaining what lies `in I)ctvV-cctn' prelinguistic mental 
states and thought, attributing) intentions and desires is a means in which `Iwlc have no 
better w"l too explain what they do. ''' In this, I agree with him, and when taken with 
lBctnnctt's arguments, it seems to present a reasonable case for justifving our attribution 
<>f cmc>tlOns to sonic languar; clcss creatures. 
'I Perhaps one "a, of bringing this out is to adapt one of the passages from Wittgenstein. 'I Iow does a 
human being lawn the meaning of the names of emotions (sensations in the original)?....... adults talk 
to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. 'They- teach the child new emotion behaviour. ' 
I. udww ig "'it t0 enstei 1. Philosophical IIirestiga[ions, 244. 
11 Sec Dunn. I rovvn and E3eardsalL. 'Family Talk about Feeling States and Children's Later 
I ndcrstanding of (them' Emotions, in Jenkins. Oatlev and Stein edd, Human Emotions:. I Keaelen 
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the COncchtual scheme I have set out here represents the gro>undv, oork for the ethical 
theory vv hick is to foýllo .I 
11', I\ C suggested that our capacity for fccling to\\,, irds tile 
w('rid is (>pell to development in a range of different v, av s vVhich cone to given specific 
dirccticin vvitliin (>ur immediate environment and also by our wider culture. It is clear 
that this has significant hearing on our ethical life, given that there are distinctly ethical 
cm()ticons such as shame and guilt But there arc major conceptual hurdles which still 
have to> be crossed in order to move from the general comments on the existence of a 
lmckgr(Mnd of directed feeling, to the nunc specific domain of the ethical. I low do we 
comic to distinguish between ethical and non-ethical feelings and ctn<ýtioonsP I do we 
move frc, ni certain apparcntlY primitively ethical emotions such as an infant being) moved 
by the distress of another person, to moral concepts? It is to this which I shall now turn. 
Donald Davidson. ' the Emergence of'ihought', in SuNec/ivc, lirtersuhjeciive, Ohjecliv , 
128. 
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4. The Moral Perspective 
i/U"oI//(/ion 
the aitu Of the first three chapters -\x-, is to set out an account of the nature of emotion which vvill 
iuk, rm the ui a-al thcoorv which is to follow. '1'hc aim from now on is to clcfencl the broad claim that 
()Lit' mural lives arc a function of our emotional dcvelcopment, and more specifically that compassion 
and reason are jointly necessary and sufficient fot vv-hat I shall describe as a proper morality. In the 
first iii tancc, there is a need to demonstrate the relationship between our emOtiOnal dcv clcopmcnt 
and the ethical domain. We need to come to a clearer view as to how it is that our emotions make 
morality p)ssiblc, and what we mean by morality when we commit ourselves to this sort of 
scntitncntailist )OSiti(un. 
In light Of this, the specific aim Of this chapter will be tct provide an account Of what it is to have a 
moral 1)crsl)cctiv c which follows from the earlier account Of the nature of e moticon. The key 
C( nccpt I shall cnihlooY in to explain the idea ()f i moral perspective is that of the 'internalised Other', 
v hieb I shall discuss in detail in the next section. This should be understood as the shaping Of OOur 
pcts()nal identity by the needs of others, a process which I shall demonstrate is a part Of our 
ctn(>tic)nal dcv-cl<>1pmcnt. 
1'« I ulc/-uhrl1. d )/l ci 
In <urdcr tu establish what the moral perspective is, and how it dev-clops, I shall clra-\w- on the material 
used by a number o>fwriters with regard to the emergence of shame. Nlv airn is Flut to provide an 
in-depth analysis cif that emotion, but merely tu use discussion Of it as a vehicle tu understand cur 
I1 ral dcv clOpmcnt. 13v shame, I shall understand an crnotiun vv-hich is characterised by a number 
of different features. It is icncrally ulken to be a response tu status Of character, such as shame at 
being a cu at-a. It is usual] indicates a sense of failure, particularly falling below a public standard. 
It u>ftcn im ulvcs the sense of being revealed, and the typical response on the part of the person 
cxhcricncin" shame is cu>nccalmcnt '1 he metaphorical image which is often used to express it is the 
"a/c of ano)thcr who looks on with disdain or disgust. 
' 
\\ c arc torccd t( ards the conceptual tool of the intcrnalisccl other by a combination of clcrnciits 
VAICh 111tlv ccýnstitutc our c<ýnccpt of shamc. In the first place, an emotion vdhich is a resjoiisc to 
' I=or detailed philosophical discussions of shame, see Bernard Williams, Shcu»e am! ec"e. sarii. Gabrielle Taylor, 
I'riclcr, Shame and Guile. For detailed discussion of shame from the perspective of psychology and social 
anthropoloey. see Paul (filbert and Bernice Andrews eds, S'hcune; Intery)ei o/Ial 13ehcn"ioui', INvchopu/hulogi- amid 
('tibiae. 
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beint revealed, indicates that there must be someone or Somcthin to whom we are rcv calcd, a 
hc>int vv hieb is a ilcccssarv condition for shame to dcv-clc>[) in the first instance according to the 
empirical cv idcncc to be cam assed below. If we tend toi perceive, even if only mctaphon-icallv, the 
disdainful ()a/c, then there must someone whop is mctaphoricallý l a/tu upon us. And cruciallN, 
(11v cn that \\ c can experience shame on our own, without the belief that the object of our shame is 
likely toi be disco cred, then a real external person cannot answer the conceptual requirements 
raised by these first two p(ints. As such, we need the idea of a gaze v hich has been internalisco. l, 
and has thcrel) become a part of who we are and a part of our understanding of 
both ourselves and 
the vVurld . n)uiul us, at least insofar as we are talking of instances of ; panic. The concept of the 
internalised other answers these conceptual needs. 
It will useful to i iv-c a clearer- account of What is to be meant bv internalised other. By internalised, I 
shall mean that certain standards and ideals have become part of our identity. This means that 
vv hun \\C come to evaluate an action or a state, we do so from a perspective which is partlv 
coOStitutcd by standards and ideals which we have acquired from those around us, and which have 
become part of our vv av of understanding the world. As the term suggests, this means that these 
ideals are initiallv cytcrnal to us, and come to be part of who we are. The 'otherness' indicates a 
contrast with what I shall label personal desires, which I shall use in a very broad sense toi morn the 
hurclv Self SCI-v'itlg goals \ VC strive for. The contrast comes when the external ideals which have 
been incc)rhOrated into our perspective come into conflict with those desires. The 'other' is a 
metaphorical term for an influence vx-hich is initially that of a real person, but which comes to 
be 
part of us cv cn v lieu that person is no longer present. I do not wish to suggest that what we 
internalise becomes a rigid and unchanging aspect of who we are, and I shall indicate l)elovv how the 
content of the internalised other can alter. Rather than this, I am suggesting a source of influence 
\\ hich is initiallv external but which comes to shape the vcaV we respond tct the world around us. 
Some care needs to be taken here. In particular, I am not suggesting a simple coppositi()0 lhctwý, ccn 
startint; out %%ith the internal and the selfish on the one hand, and , icyuit-ing what is initially external 
and mo>rallv ideal on the other. There are such things as external non-moral ideals. In cases vchctc 
we see materialism as mt>rallv vvrong, and we come enjoy the feel Of purchasing; endless items of 
designer clh, tliing to the point when we simply can't go out unless we atc covered in trcticl. \ labels, 
there is an ()hv. i()us case to the effect that we have internalised certain non-moral ideals which %,, c 
ooursclv c; v (>uld acknowledge to be selfish <mcs. Ncv-crthclcss, the internalised other indicates the 
hrc'scncc of at least some specifically moral ideals which contrast vVith personal desires. When \\C 
feel shame, we have often fallen short of the moral ideals which have become part of (>tu- 
I)crsl)CCtiv-c. 
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At this stage, let me pause to consider- briefly tvvo alternative explanatory accounts to the One I have 
Offered. In the first place, what is the difference between the account I 
have Offered and I'reud's 
description Of the super-ego In i , cud's account, similar in many respects to the One I have Offered 
here, the stilt t-cssiv c tendencies Of the child are directed back towards the cgt>. There it is taken o cr 
by a lx>rti()n Of the ego, `which sets itself Over and against the ego as super-egos, and which now: -, in 
the form ()f 'conscience', is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness 
that the C ,O výmild have like toi satisfy upon Other, extraneous inch iduals. 
" llow does the 
intctnaliscd Other differ frone the suflcr-ego The most prominent way lies in the fact that Freud 
cannot be taken tt) Offer a hurclv developmental aca)wlt Of hovV guilt Or shame conic into 
existence. I eis theory offers an entirely reductive vice Of such emotions, vv-hoýsc PurPOsc is to 
inhibit aggressiv mess so that civilisation can persist more effectively. Nothing in what I have said 
commits me toi such a reductive theory of ethics, and it is difficult to see a theory as I reudian if it is 
denied ultimate recourse to certain non-moral basic drives such as Gros cat- the death instinct. In 
practice, this means that I rcudian shame and guilt are means tct certain ncnl-moral ends, whereas 
the intetnalisccl other has been introduced purely as an account of how wider moral standards 
become part Of our identity. 1lorcovcr, the forms of behaviour which elicit responses in Others are 
much Wider than a ; ('resslon. .Aw,, -idc range Of 
different attitudes and bcham tours will elicit responses 
hich ,w ill shape cur later attitudes and 
beliefs. A further distinction to the Freudian approach, one 
which will Llcv elcp ed at length in chapter seven, is that I shall suggest that the content Of the 
itntcrnaliscd other is subject to change through reason. We can learn facts that change what we feel, 
and \\c can reason about the nature of what we find shameful in ways which do much more than 
idctltif\ the causes Of Shame. In short, reason can do more than simphY diagnose and reveal, it can 
also alter and improve, where this might mean altering the content of our beliefs tot make them 
more internally coherent, Or so that our perspective coheres more closely with the facts concerning 
the vx<ýrld around us. 
second p()ssihlc OI)Jcctit>n is whether or not the intcrnaliscd other could not be explained away as 
an imagined ether. Rather than complicating the picture by arguing that our identity is altered, 
could we not offer a simpler acc<ýutu along the lines that constant expOsurc to someone who 
hrýýý iýlcs a model for our own behaviour, also creates an ongoing witness whose presence we 
imagine ci cn when she is not there This would mean that role of the internalised other Could be 
adejuatclv cyhlained bv the sort of thought present to us in the ducsticýn, 'What would people say- if 
they Could see 111C tlov. -='. 
It is difficult to defeat this claim straight off, in that the possible range of circumstances in which 
the intcrnaliscd other is present is co>-extensive with the that of an imagined other. If it is a real 
Siegmund I rcud, 'Oriýcin of the Sense of Guilt', reprinted in Guill und , S7wmc', I lerbert Morris ed, 54-58. 78 
hcts()n Who ) htov ides us with standards we conic to internalise, then the first hcrsOn whose 
standards influence us could ahvays be the erne lvc imagine. I"; Xcn in circutnstanccs where there 
is 
no actual 1mssihility of their discovering my shameful state, it is logically possible for me to imagine 
their reaction if thcv slid. 1 he first response to this is simply to raise the yucstic, n as toi vvhcther or 
n0, t we rcallv plc) imagine someone else looking on whenever we fuel shame, and this just doesn't 
seem to be the case. AC'c Often feel shame without imagining any one else seeing us, and even if the 
th<, u ; ht of vV hat an imp ortatnt other vVO1-11d say may comic toi us, this surely represents an additional 
burden xv hich the shank brings, rather than a necessary and sufficient condition. 
\ thither argument against such all account Conics when we turn to the empirical evidence of how 
our cmotio>ts come to he shaped by those around us. I have already indicated how- the primarv 
carer comes to influence the emotional dcv-clopmcnt of a child, ' and a similar process can explain 
ho\\ the ideals related to shame emerge. Such an account just fits better with the view that our 
idcntitv is indeed altered, rather than with one which suggests we are simply susceptible too thoughts 
of what others think of us. An imagined other suggests the image of someone whose opini(>n might 
he of importance to us, but w,, -ho> is external. This just docsn t cut deep enough to describe the 
l occss of vv hat occurs when our emotions are shaped. It is our identity which is altered and 
which from a part of g shaped through this process, and it is crucial to sec the results as somethin 
what wc become - something internal to the self. 
Perhaps the hest in which we can capture the Sense of the internalised other is to say, that it 
hartlv cyplains the development of our dispositions of character. By a disposition of character, I 
shall mean a rclýttiv-ch enduring disposition to respond reliably in a certain way when an appropriate 
situation presents itself. This means that when we say- someone is of a Compassionate disposition, 
výc hclicv c that she can be relied upon to have a particular set of thoughts and fcclings when 
perceiving the suffering of another, and will be motivated to act to alleviate the suffering as a result 
of those thoughts and feelings. To say that the internalised other partly explains such dispositions 
means that the cyhlauati(n of why some People conic to be compassionate and others don't is 
dependent upon the ways in which our emotional de clcopmcnt has been shaped bv thosc around 
us. The compassionate Person is someone whose emotions have been educated such that she 
perceives suffering in a particular light, and this education has been such that the disposition is 
reliable diel enduring. ' 
\\ ith this in place, let tile fOvV return to the concept of shame. 'I his emotion differs from certain 
ýýncýcs iii that it there is ýýidesjýrcaa agrccmcnt among empirical psychologists that it is first seen at a 
See paces 56-62 above. 
;1I . 01- a brief account of the concept of dispositions of character, see Peter GoIdie's On Pcr. sonulrii". 
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later stagc than emotions such as fear or disgust. ' Opinions vary as to why this might be the case, 
one l Ossibilitv being that shame requires cognitive capacities which develop later thaii these needed 
for vv hat are (, ftcn Libelled `basic emotions ', and another being that shame requires a sense of self, 
vý hich is crniv aicquircd during the course of the second year. I shall not he concerned here with 
try III, () to resolve this particular issue, but instead shall be focussing 011 ho' it is that we Come to 
experience shame. 
Allan N Schore' argucs that shame begins to emerge when an infant bchavcs in a particular vvaý, 
and looks tcývvards the carer for the po>sitiv-c, affective response which she is accustomed to 
receiving. Instead, the look she receives is one of disgust, witch the parents are apparentl\ often 
unavvarc of thcrosclv cs. This means that the positive, Jov ful expectation of the child is met with the 
`other's unexpected refusal to co crcatc an attachment bond that allows for the dv adic regulation of 
the cmutiýýn'. I veil at this stage, v,, -c sec the dcVel<)ptnunt of an cm<>tiOn which cruciallv involves 
the clisapp ointnncnr with regard to cs})cctatioon, apprehended visually in the look of an important 
ether. SchOre argues that by the time we reach the end of late infancy, `the elicitation of this affect 
clOes n(t rcduirc the presence of an external person', claiming that we have 'internalised... the cvc of 
the self axillg in«ard'. 
Hic model which I have already proposed suggests that the input from the carer, -\a hich Cv cntuallv 
conics to be internalisccl, will be systematic not only in terms of the manner of responding, but also 
in terms of the forms of behaviour which elicit the response. The same activities vvill be traut vaith 
the same look of disgust or disdain time and again, resulting in our feelings towards curtain states 
and actin nies being shaped in accordance v, -ith the response of an important other. In shame, we 
sense the l )k of disgust or disdain initially in the face of the carer, and subsequently in the feelings 
vý c have which va oulcl have been those of that person. Of course it would be ludicrous toi suggest 
v, c aIvv at s imagine another person seeing the activities of which we are ashamed, but as Bernard 
-illiams points out, the internalised other `is potentially somebody rather than nobody'. " This 
follows empirically from the obscivation that our feelings have been shaped hv somebody rather 
rhan no>bodv, and it is therefore the responses of particular indiv iduals who will influence what \x c 
cumc to see as shameful. 
1 or discussion of this see LCNa is ci at. 'Self Development and Self-conscious Emotions'. reprinted in Jenkins, 
Oatlev and Stein eds. 1/iuuaii Emotions: .I Reader. 158-68, and 
Allan N Schore. 'Earl} Shame Lyperiences and 
1111,1111t Brain Development', ill Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews eds. Shame: lniemper. sonal Behaviour: 
Ps. chopatholo, t'i and ('allure, 57-78. 
See op cii. 
ibid 65. 
ibic168. 
Bernard WiII lams, Shaine wut ,A eee, ssili'. 
84. 
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Thcre are ()[]let- elements of the psychological material which are also 
instt-uctivc in terms of 
understanding the development of shame. Firstly, the idea of disapp ointment. The approval 01 
support ()I - the other is something «-c ccnnc to expect, and refusal of this can be crushing. ( )nc of 
the standard responses in shame is to look d<ývvmvards away from the ga/c where we had hoped 
toi find reward, but instead find disgust. Oncc this gaze has been internalised then we arc nog longer 
di", appuirltinl sOme()Ile else, but disappointing an aspect of the self. Both Bernard \V'illiams and 
(1; 11)ricllc I su Iwr talk of how shame induces a sense of powerlessness, which can he seen as 
stcmmüig fr()Iu the itiabilitv to escape the `inward gaze'. In falling short of ýt standard which we 
wish toi achieve, wc are less than we want to he, and once this inward gaze leas become h,, irt of \\h(> 
\\C arc, we are powerless both in the sense of being unable to escape it, and in the sense of feeling 
less than the person we wish to be. The gaze that we have intcrnalisccl conflicts with what we 
want, but in such a way that it not only clashes with, but judges the desires in question. 1O fall 
short Of the standard is not to disagree or dispute it, it is to fail toi be worse. 
Hits raises the further important point that the 1oxok of disgust which cv cntualk comes too be 
intcrnaliscd is encountered in oppositi011 to our personal desires. The infant who meets with this 
iOOk in his nu, thcr does sty vyteilst enjoying a particular activity, and in the hope and expectation of 
rcvv ard. 'I'hc response she receives (nu/lids with what is enjoyed and what is expected. o ncc again, 
the structure Of these responses in the earliest stages mirrors what we see later on. The , Spartan 
man feels shame at being a coward experiences a conflict between his personal desire not too 
fight, and his attitude towards what is expected of him as a Spartan. In such cases v, ýc see not only 
how shame reflects a conflict between personal desires and the internalised other, but also how the 
latter can come to embody what are not simply the expectations of the primary carer, but whit we 
tend too think of as shared ideals. It is to this aspect of shame which I shall now turn. 
Sl1(1/I/, ýutrl .SL, ýýý, 
d l rlcd/S 
I have claimed that the v-icwis of those around us, principally the hrimarv carer vVill influence the 
dicv c]()lpmcflt of our emotional lives, which will include shaping which states and activities we come 
iii , cc as sh, imcful. phis means that if the carer's attitudes reflect those of the iti idcr co>uitnulitv , %" c 
ni>t o>ulv comme to feel shame at activities vvihich are disapproved of hv those who bring us uh, but 
also to participate in a `wider'hoýnoýur code'. ''' lo> be honourable will be to meet the standards vvhich 
arc cyhcctcd (if us, and which are no a part (if our overall perspective in the form cif the 
intcrn: aliscd other. 1'() he shameful %,, -ill be to fall short of those standards, and vvc mav cyhcricncc 
this either puhlick- or 1)11\-atelv . _Although the standards may 
have been cyternal to us in the first 
1, I he use Ot thi, torn is nut inicikdcd t(i imhh a rigid or cu(liticcl set of rule,, hill is usccd in ýt hi'oidcr sense ol ,t sci of 
Worin, in(lic, itini vyh, it is tu 100001 , t5 
IiOmnoural)lc sind shameful. 
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instance, once vVc havc intcrnaliscd them we no longer need a public in order to feel judged 
aCCOF lieg, to tlicm. 
This means that oncc we have acquired a sense of shame which reflects the attitudes of those 
an )und us in the wider aommunity, We are hound to each other in a deeply hcrsý>aaliscd way. Wc 
expect certain forms of hehaviour from one another, and arc united in our opposition to othcr 
forms of behaviour. AVc judge ourselves and one another according to standards which we each 
accept as meml)ers of a group vv ht) share not simpl\ beliefs, but a deeper cmc)tional ccýmtnitnicut to 
curtain states and activ. itics. I fuel not only disgust at myself or at you when one of us engages in a 
shameful act, laut at ally one "k-ho Ibchav-us in such a way. It is partly by v irtuc of the fact that we 
share 1l1csc sorts of Commitments that we sec oursch-cs as members of what we think of as a group, 
rather than si collection of disparate individuals. Should I find myself , mio ngst people who have 
radically different views on vkliat is shameful or honourable, thug it will place a so-ure restriction on 
the extent toi which we can commune with one another. 
S() shame hinds us within a ccommunitv, but does so in a way which is dependent upon the v-crv 
concept of community. I have argued that shame develops when our personal desires are met with 
disgust or disdain in the face of an important other whose gaze we conic to internalise. It follows 
that shame could not develop -without that initially external gaze. \Vithout this, there is no 
()pp ositio>n to personal desires, except conflicting desires. AV'c v\, o>uld only have preferences to be 
gauged accc)rding to vv hat brings greatest satisfaction, without the possibility of an external standard 
against v,. -hich to incasure them. But is it not conceptually possible that someone should establish 
personal standards to which she wishes toi adhere at all times, and then feel shame at times when 
she falls hehle thcm-ý 
The ans'11-cr to this, -\ti-ill dcpcnd on how cztrcmc the example is. If we are to focus on a case of 
sOmc(>uc Weht) has had nO Contact with human society-, then the answer must he no. In the first 
place, an absence of contact with any other human beings will bring into plan standard 
Wirtgcnstciniatt Concerns abtut how public language makes possible our ability to identify an inner 
state such as shame. AV'ith<out the language which a Community makes p ssihlc, c\-un formulating 
thotu has alb>>ut standards to he maintained becomes unimaginable. Adam Smith presents this point 
tnOi C pr()saically. 
\\ crc it p( ssiblc that a human crcaturc could gtOvV up to manhood in s()nic solitary place, 
«-it1i out am communication with his mvn s)ccics, he could no Hutre think of his own 
character, of the pr(yricty or demerit of his ()\\-n scntiments and conduct, of the bcauty or 
clcfc>rrnitv of his own mind, than of the bcautv or dcfttrmitv of his own face. . 
A11 these arc 
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()bjccts which he caiino>t easily scc, which naturally he does not 1cxok at, and with regard toi 
vV blich lie is hr()\-idcd with no mirror which can present them toi his view. Bring hing into 
so>cicrv , and 
he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. '' 
I liar c suggested that shame must be sccu as necessarily social, in that it is ()nlv (mcc vvc engage 
with oilier hcrsýms that the structural re 1uircuunts become available. " It is not clear to Inc that 
vw hei-c\ er there is a community there must be shame, in that Olle can imagine a possible world in 
which iio -()nc c\-cr shc)wcd disdain for anything another person did, or another in which disdain 
vvas sco trbitrar. \ that we could not come to sec particular states or actions as shameful. 
Ne crthclcss, the widespread presence of shame across different cultures"' suggests that it is a likely 
coýnscclucncc of the human condition that where cultures emerge there is likely to be i sense of 
shame vw hich de cl()ps with them. 
With regard tu the nation of shame binding us within a culture, Bernard Williams offers a similar 
argument in . 
S/i uii and elaborates on it with reference to the fate of , 
Ajax. '' Infuriated 
after . 
Achillcs' arms are given to Odysseus instead of himself, Ajax decides to kill the heads of the 
arm__, hur is rendered mad bv . 
Athenc before he can do so. In his state of insanity, he slaughters 
sheep and cattle in the belief they are other Greek soldiers. On awakiu the folio ink mornin his 
mind has been restored and he now has a vivid memory of what he has done. The realisation of 
what has befallen him inspires a sense of shame so powerful that he commits suicide. "1'hc language 
used in sopho>clcs' description of the event reflects the nature of shame as alread discussed. When 
considering his ])light, he says, 
\ý'hat c untcnancc can I show my father I clamonr 
I 1(, 'y will he hear the sight of me 
If I come bctt)rc him naked, without t; 1or\, '' 
It is the ga/c of his father which torments him, with the image of his nakedness symbolic of the way 
in which his character is cshc>scc3 in such a way that he is seen having lost his hootnonir. But an 
undcrstailc]ing of vvhv the shamc is so intcnsc, or c\-cn ýý he there is any shame at all, rcyuires an 
apprcciati<, n of the standards of honour which have become part of . 
Ajax's understanding of vV h<) 
Adam Smith. 7hL' 77n'urv n/ Alurul Semimews, in DD Raphael cd. British Ilorulisi. s /650-15100, vol I. -88OI. 
Althou-h I have spoken in terms of communities and societies, there is no reason why the groups involved need 
bv anv unreater than txso on the account I am offering. 
For specific discussions of shame in different cultures see 'Gender, Shame and Culture: An Anthropological 
Perspective', by Nancv Lindisfarne, and 'The Sacred and the Social: Cultures of Honour and Violence', by Cohen. 
Vandella and Rantilla, both reprinted in Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews eds. Shame: lntei7)er. sonul lie/iavioul., 
l's1 cl>O/), ///1( - curd ('nl1ure. 
The Iullowine summan is derived from chapters three and Ibur. 
F' Quoted from Bernard Williams, Shame und. Nec"essitt". 85. 
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he is. 'Flic intcrtialiscd other requires him to live in a certain xvav, and to meet certain standards Of 
conduct. In Williams' words, `the interlocked expectations bctxvccn himself and the wo>t-]d are of 
course hcculiarlv connected with his status as an heroic warrior, and that is , 
in his case, his 
g fOtcsyuclk- unsuccessful and ridiculous attempt counts for so tauch. "' "1'o have internalised the 
standards as-, ociated with being an heroic warrior involves the , tcyuisititm a particular- vvav Of 
InIcrprctill" Oac's ()\\ 11 actions. . 
Ajax's sense of honour and worth are intimately tied up vkith these 
standard', and to fall 51) far bolo them means he simply cannot but sec himself as shamed and 
dishOn(>urcd. 
\ liat emerges from this example is the vvav in vvhich public ideals conic to partly amstitutc vvho wc 
are thr(>ugh the internalised other. '1 he I Iomcric world had certain ideas of vdhat was required ()fl 
hero, and . 
Ajas came to em body these ideals. With this process comes both a way in which he 
interpreted himself, but also a wav in which the world saw him and understood him. As such, he 
was imnmersed in culture in Which he both sav, - and was seen in a }articular light, and where he bOtlh 
expected himself, and v-\. -as expected by others, to achieve certain standards. The internalised other 
huuud him to the world around him by tying his ()\,. ii vvav of being to the way in which others relate 
to the wwOrlcl which he shared with them. 
I hav c ffcuccl can \V'illiatns, discussion of \jaN's shame, but I suggest that the key arguments he 
adv anccs there generalise. The development and structure of shame which put forward here offer a 
Coýntcyt in v hich v. -c can understand the plight of : 
Ajax, and the specific example is one which 
illuminates ho>,, w- not only the ideals of Grcck nobility, but a ý-arictv of shared ideals can come toi be 
hart of the hcrshcctiv c of indiv iduals who are raised within a communit\ .( 
)ncc certain ideals are 
present, thc. \- vVill COilStitutc the standards vVc come to internalise, such that those standards become 
part of us. The way v\, c interpret the world, and the , vati others interpret us are now hound up with 
()ne another. There are shared standards which establish the possibility of m\ feeling shame at 
bong rcv calcd as a coward, and others seeing me as shameful for my coNk ardicc. The existence of 
these shared standards is the condition for the possibility of shame. 
No"N, these hints Concerning the dcvc1ohmctit of shame reveal a number of issues of much wider 
sit nihcancc. I -irstIv, thcv provide an account of h(>v, - it is that the values of others can come to 
"habe our ()\\ 11 pcrshcctiv c cm the vVOrld. I, ro>m an early age, ýw-c begin responding to the behaviour 
of other. in vv av s vv hich lead to our coming to respond to the world in vvav s shaped 1)v their 
intlucncc o er us. lspccts of this behaviour fall into vý hat we intuitiv-cly' think of as the moral 
domain, and Svc therefore hav c an indication of how we ought argue that moral values arc 
transmitted. What is MAX orcyuircd is ýl broadening of the discussion, so that we expand ()It the 
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discussion of the dCv clOpmCilt of the intcrnaliscd other with regard to shame, and focus on it, 
rclev ailcc to, the idea of a wider moral perspecti\vc. 
I l(1/// /1)« l irlý ý ýtýrlý ý ýýd O/Ghr 
I Iiav c argucd throughout that our cnlt)tiofls are cicvclc, hmctitally ()hcn, to the cxrcnt that the 
objects to v, dhich vVC tCS Ond arc t>hcn to influence by those around us, a hhen()mcu<m Which is 
particularly important in explaining our elm)tional development at very early stages in our lives. '1'hc 
vv, n in which this operates is that facial expressi<nis, tone of voice and other forms of hchav i( ur are 
such that vv(., grasp the attitude Of the other. But consider once again the term used by I)avidso>>i 
hen eypIaining hOvv- it is vV c Come toi learn the names of objects. When we get something right, we 
receive a `reward'. Re and is not somethin that can be reduced to an articulation of `that is correct' 
or `that is accurate'. To be rcvvardcd is not simply to he acknowledged as being correct or accurate, 
it is he 
, tcknc>vx lcclgc(i as having done something which is bcllci'. 'I he response we receive is a 
ýýc>süiý e unc, and as such it expresses a form of endorsement. Similarly, a wide range of other 
reactions vV hich vVc grasp have evaluative dimensions buried within them. If a parent shows anger, 
\"c grasp not simply displeasure but also a sense that this activity is 21o/: (. 11anY standard responses 
\x ()rk in this vvav, shaping our feelings towards certain states and activities as a result of our grasping 
that they elicit reward or punishment (which I shall use in the same metaphorical sense in which 
Davids on uses the concept of reward) from those whose responses have no importance for us. 
Iii a large class of cascs we arc rc-wardcd or punished for activities which we come to understand arc 
of l)cncflt roe us pcrsonallv. "1 he horror or anger at a tendency- to flirt with danger is s<ýtncthing vVc 
conic to recognise as a resp<msc guided by questions of vV-hat is in our own self-interest. We conic 
toi intcrnalisc the fear of certain objects in light of the responses from those around us, but this is a 
fear vv hich relates to our oven interests. 
\Iai1N of the rcvvards and punishnicnts %,, -c receive relate toi a domain of interest vvFuich can only be 
uu(. lcrstoý<. c3 as standing in contradistinction to self interest. We are re w-alyded for activities which we 
cannOt understand as Icing necessary for us to flourish at a purely personal level, and we are 
punished her actions vv hich do> not harm us in any vVVav . 
This means our background of directed 
fcclint comes to ooricllt us to vvards a wider ýý-orlcl than that of self-interest. We reach a stage where 
cc , cc fire as dangerous, clot hccausc Of a recurring thought about the properties of fire oon each 
<>ccasic, n, laut through habit as a result of receiving the same response time and again when we 
approach it. ' "Similarly, there are certain activities and states for which we are consistently punished 
\c('dIcs. iu . av, jUt Un; tl UN U 1cncc call also shape our fcdings, in that the chill vVho has hccii harnt hu tic i, , ti IC; ut Itkclv I() `sec it t dail"cr<>us a, the uuc vvhu hasn't. 
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Or rcvv arulcdl, v,. hick else shahs the vVav vcc see the wo ld, but vvhich are not comprehensible in tcrtns 
<, f vv hat benefits us in v av s reducible toi self-interest. It is this second dcýniain which I characterised 
gis the `intcrnaliscd othcr', and it is within this domain that we find the cthical. " 
)n this acc>unt, an ethical outlook is to be understood as an orientation towards the world vy hick 
ýtanclý in cunnast to that determined by self interest. It is vi-hen our aggressiv-c actions meet vvith a 
look ()f disgust and anger, and our compassionate ones are met with encouragement and enthusiasm 
that v'c conic to , cc aggression, suffcrint and compassion in a particular vxav. We are no longer 
simplv Cusp neunt; toi the suffering Of another on a purely hctscýnal impulse, Svc act fl-0111 a 
disposition \\ hich reflects the influence Of those around us. ,A response Of Compassion 
is tu>w tiOt 
simplv a personal response to suffering but otnc which Finds fan tour with the internalised other, one 
which reflects the way we have learned toi feel about the world. It is this second dimension which 
brings it within the domain Of the moral. Only the feelings we have internalised make possible the 
relevant ncvv beliefs about such actions, in that they ma\ now he perceived from a pershcctiv'c 
v'liich has been broadened bv the presence Of the internalised other. From the wider perspcctiv c Of 
1i w others sec us, which has now comic to be hart Of our own, there is an alternative to our 
pcrsonal desires. Running miav is no longer just saving oneself, but letting others down. Self 
prescrv aticm novv has a rival in the farm of wider expectations Of how to behave, and it is from 
vx ithül this wider perspective that fleeing can he an action vx hick wc sec as co,,,, -,, iidly . 
In short, the moral perspective involves acquiring; as a Part of our personal idcnritv a recognition of 
the claims of others. This is a function of our emotional development, and it means that we come 
to feel a certain way towards others, ensuring that their interests weigh in the balance when we 
come to, consider the world around us. These claims stand in contrast to those of personal self 
interest, and thev conic to be a part of us as a result of constant interaction with others around us 
and the impact this has on our emotional dcv cloptncnt. It follows that insofar as we could imagine 
someone «hose emotions lhav e not been shaped by those around her, this person could not have a 
Moral hcrspectiv C. (l1v-cn the claims in chapter one concerning the irreducibility of em(otio)ns to 
coognitiv c states, it also follows that all cognitiy ist theories of ethics , are wrong insofar as they take 
the mural perspective to be one xi hich involves non-feeling laden beliefs about the world. 
II he charactcris. atuui of the moral pcrshcctiv c v. -hich I havc ooffcrcd is that it is the rccoogniti. o>n of the 
claim- (A uthcrs xv hich arc part of our pcrsonal iclcntirv , and vdhi. ch can 
he undcrsto Ocl in 
c<>ntraclistincti()Il to the goals of personal sclfintcrest This j)crsl)cctiv-c is accjuircd as a part o>f wear 
cmOticonal dcv-cl<>}mlcnt and partly-determines the výav xe pcrccivc the world around us. On this 
I "t% the ctlI1(Il is `vvithin' the dollmiu of the intcrnalisccl (>thcr r, ithcr than `cyuivalcnt NN)' t0 010' mi0it vvili to ugu( 
ih. II the '()[It(( i1 . hU llK1K juclgcnunt n A., O lo itcd hcrc. 
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account, there could be a wide range of different sorts of content which v,, -could sattsfx the criteria 
for a moral hcrshcctiv-c as I have defined it. Christian asceticism, Greek heroic values, liberal 
individualism and st ranke Of other such sets of values could all provide the basis for inculcating in 
us a rccognitiOtn of the claims of the wider- community, and in each case the person who expresses 
views in line with these values has a moral perspective. This also indicates how and wvhv there is the 
pc, ssihilitV of moral conflict and amoral dilemtnas. If the content of morality is contingent in the vva_ 
suggested here then it is to he expected that there will be different moral perspectives both between 
anal across cc, mmLill itics. There is also an indication of how inner conflict could occur. Most 
if personal desire and the internalised other are defined in contradistinction toi one 
another, then there is possil)ilitv of an opposition between what we want and what we ought to do - 
lbctv', 'ccn personal desires and the claims of others which are now }gart of our own identity. It is this 
sort of conflict which is captured in terms of the debate over selfish and selfless behag iour, and the 
accOuilt offered hure indicates this is probably an inescapable part of our moral development. I,, vcn 
the person ill whom morality always wins out is likely to feel the pull personal desire oil some 
occasi<itls vv hen such desires conflict with their view of what they ought to do. 
\ further p )tcntial for inner conflict emerges given the dependence coQ wider cultural influences in 
the dlcv cluhtucnt of the moral perspective as I have characterised it here. There just may not be a 
Lilly consistent sct of claims which conic to shape our identity. The general complexities of any 
hutmal culture mean that we may find ourselves reflecting sets of values which lack a fully internal 
consistency, or else which fail to correspond to all the facts we find before us. In such 
circumstances, the need for some sort of adjustment in the content of our moral views will press in 
(Al us. In 1)(rth the sorts of cases set out above we sec the potential for disagreement with the 
internalised other, and through this either a threat to our moral outlook, or a need toi adapt it. What 
we need to hook at now is whether or not we can demonstrate whether or not there is a certain 
COntcnt our moral outlook ought to have, and thereby move towards at ]cast the possibility of 
greater internal consistencv , and consistency with the world around us. 
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5. Moral Content 
1 rt/radix linst 
II, he previous chapter provided a formal description of what is it to have a moral perspective, one 
v, hich relics upon the metaphor of the intcrnaliscd other, and vv-hich demonstrates how it is that our 
moral dcrclopmcnt is dependent upon our emotional development. 'I'hc aim of this chapter will be 
to extend the discussion into the area of moral content, and more specifically to try to determine the 
kind of content the internalised other ought to have - to specify the content of the judgements 
hich v, c ought to form from the moral perspective. The problem with such an endeavour is in 
trying to justify claims along; the lines that being kind or sympathetic arc examples of goodness, 
vý ithout relying at least implicitly on a moral theory which already has such claims among its 
})remises. 'I he clanger of making claims such as we ought to be kind because it is good to be kind', 
is that we can simply he accused of begging the question, and we therefore have a reason to offer a 
further line of argument to defend this sort of claim. In order to highlight the nature of this 
problem, I shall begin by looking at the arguments set out by Schopenhauer in defence of the claim 
that compassion is the basis of morality. I shall suggest that his claims, similar in many respects to 
those set out by I lumc in his defence of an ethics based on the sentiment of hcncv olence, are 
vulnerable as they stand to a series of telling counter-argunictlts. 
I lie min of the Second half of this chapter will be to supplcment the sentimentalist lint in such a 
vVa% that it can overcame these responses, and this will lay the groundwork for the claim that 
COMpassion and reason are the basis of a proper morality. The way in which I shall trv to justify 
this position is by appealing to a naturalistic psychology. I shall show that once one takes account 
of certain features of the way humans are - our need for others and our capacity to respond to 
others' needs, then a morality based around compassion is one that makes sense in the light of such 
considerations. This v,, -ill provide the further line of defence against the counter arguments to 
scntinlcntalism which I shall suggest pose a considerable threat to such a moral thcorv. To bring 
this out, let tts consider one classic example of a sentimentalist, ethical position. 
Onc ýý aý of addressing this issue is to ask vv-hcthcr or not compassion could account for the whole 
Ot lilOFalitv . 
'I his is the position takcn up by Schcýpcuhaucr in his argument for an alternativ c to 
kantian moral phil<, scýphv. ' I Ic argues that `It is simply and solely this compassion that is the real 
1)asis Of all rolüulan) and loving-kindness. Only insofar as an action has sprung from 
88 
c( iI issi(>n does it have moral value; and every action resulting from Other motives has ncýnc. " 
The two italicised vVOrds are to emphasise that vx-e are only considering actions which we intend, as 
a aiusr those Which foýrtuitOuslv result in the alleviation of soýmcotic's suffering, and that we are only 
interested in rhOsc actions \"-here concern for someone else's `veal or woc" dominates, as against a 
desire to appear concerned by such issues. 1 Ic identifies three sources which account for our entire 
range Of motivations. The first is egoism, which is defined as a desire for One's own well-being. 
The second is malice, \N-hich is the desire for the pain of another, but without any hcnefit for 
<oursch-C',. And the third is compassion, which is the desire for another's vv-cll-hcing. 
It is claimed that Compassion is aroused by the suffering of others, and relates to others' happiness 
oilly because `the nature of satisfaction, enjoyment, and happiness consists solely in the removal of a 
privation, the stilling of a pain; and so these have a negative effect. " The reason that Svc are ascot 
im v cd by the 'fortunate and co ntentcd man' is that the absence of `pain, want and distress' leaves 
nothing to streust our compassion. Compassion therefore works in two vvavs, motivating me to 
help pothers who are in difficulty, and preventing in bringing about suffering. With these two 
foundation stouts in place, Schopenhaucr is able too set out what he considers to be the `supreme 
principle of ethics', which is `, V////, M'/Il lacd1", in/o o/Iel/CS, gridut/r/Il lot's, jiiru. n The sight of someone 
else suffering can move me to help thetas, but the thought of illy causing suffering is also sufficient 
to counteract malicious or egoistic drives, and to prevent me from inflicting suffering on others. 
\V'hcrc compassion prevents me from injuring others, we see the basis of justice and the duties of 
law which stem from it. Where compassion troves me to help others we see the basis of 
hhilanthrohv, and the duties of virtue which stern from it. Both parts of this twofold division can 
be traced back to compassion. 
'Not O11i justicc and virtue, but also right and wrong; are defined with regard to compassion `the 
coýncchrs of xam, and iz, h/ are svn<ýnv moýus with doing harm and not doing harm, and to the latter 
bc1oligs also the vvaiding off of injury'. AV'hcn vVC talk of evil, it is to be undcrstood in tcrms of 
causing grcatur harm, With the greatest cv-il beim; those actions vV hich dcllbcratclv- cause the greatest 
degree of suffering. 
hcsc m-c littlc more than the hate bones of a rich and powerfully argued piccc, but the vý av in 
vvhich ()nc might ccrostruct a %%icier thcor\ of nloralitv on the foundations of compassion is set out 
in ýý \%M vv hich <)ftcn achicv cs immense intuitive appeal. \V c have a `natural c<m1}ýassi<ui' ýý hick 
Arthur Schopenhauer. 011 ! hc Basis uj Alora/iii. 
/hiul. 144 
Where the characterisation of compassion set out earlier differs from Schopenhauer's is that I do not think that 
'vNcal' is necessarv here. 
ibid. 146. 
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mcaus %%c are inOved ITV the suffering of others, and ni cd to avoid causing suffcrin g. We arc 
P° )Vidcd \X-ith an account Of the psychology- Of the virtuous agent as soýmcoýnc who is disposed to 
help others and to avoid harming them, and with an explanation Of hoývc Other moral c(mcchts such 
as dut_ and justice emerge out Of compassionate natures. 'I he fact that compassion is present in all 
Of us also explains the vý idespread presence Of motalitv . 
There is one further point here which vvill 
Inc Of central importance to the defence which I shall be mounting later for what is, hrcadl. \ 
shcakin Ili(, arguments set Out hv Schopenhauer. Suffering reveals need, and compassion is a 
response to need. (; <mlhassion Would he less important if we were always or even usuallv capahlc 
Of ending our Ovvn suffering, but this is Often not the case. In mane Of the cases when we suffer, výc 
do SO in \\ 'Iv s vdhitch are typical 
for any human being - physical }gain, grief, disappointment, loss - 
these are all typical aspects Of what we must endure, and a compassionate response is therefore One 
which is called forth by the kind Of creatures we are, and by the kind Of needs we typically have. 
1 oo What extent, then, call vVc accept Schopenhaucr's claim to the effect that compassion is the basis 
of our ethical life-- ( )nc vvav of addressing this is to pose the Socratic question with which Bernard 
\Villiarns opens aim/ /La' Iimi[. i o/ Philosophy. If one is to answcr the question 'how should one 
live ', could it be ansvvcred cntirclr in terms which are rooted in compassion% There are manv cases 
vx hen this is certainly true. If we take helping others who are in distress, or not causing; distress 
ooursclv cs as important ashcct,, of a moral outlook, then our concern about the suffering of others 
can pF0v ide a plausible explanation of vvhv we hold these maxims to he true. But are there not 
cases here v, c behave in a moral or immoral fashion vinch involve no harm or suffcring% If we 
take the case of a man vvho> feels guilt because he has failed to visit his mother's grave for a number 
of N cars, or a vvoman who is ashamed of herself for being too laze to attend the church fundraiser, 
are these i1 )t hcrcchti°>ns of immoral behaviour on the part of the agent which might involve 
neither harm nor suffering One could elaborate on the stories in such a way that the man imagines 
hovv Ills mother vvOulcl have responded were she alive, or the woman imagines the disappointment 
of the priest, but such addenda are certainly not necessary. Flach of them could say- quite co>hcrcntlv 
that the fiirmlv believe thcv have behaved immotalh , 
but no harm has been done. 
( )nc C( uld . treue that any failure to meet a moral standard is in some sense painful for other 
members of the community, or harmful to oneself. But this is partly circular and party -, w-roýng. If 
ira)ralitv is ultimatelv to he defined in terms of causing and alleviating suffering, then we cannot 
define instances of suffering in terms of moral failure. In any case, cv cn though seeing someone 
else's imnl()ral act mav pain us, it is surclv not wrong because it pains us - it pains us because it is 
ýýrý, n1. 
Injurc no one; on the contrary. help everyone as much as you can. ihic/ 147.90 
I he suggestion hcrc is that thcrc arc aspects of morality vvhich seem to stray outside the bounds of 
harne ()r suffcrin thcrcbv raising scrious yucstions as to Xl hcthcr Compassion can Iprc>viclc a full 
account Of morality. In order tct highlight this point, consider these two extracts from kitt(>'s 
clcscri}ýticýn ()1 lifc in Sparta. 
The Shartiarc was forbidden to engage in agriculture, trade OOt professio nal wo>t-k: lie must be 
a pro fcssiý>nal soldier. lie had his farm, worked for him by helots, lie dined in public 
`messes', to which he contributed his share from his farm: if he failed to contribute, lie 
ceased for the time being to be a full ciri/cn. Family life was sc\, crclv limited. Babies 
adjudged weak were done away with; boys lived \,, -ith their mother until they were scv cn; 
fn)m seven to thirty thcv received the appropriate kind of public military instruction and 
eycrcisc. Girls too were given careful physical training. " 
Sparta was admired for her I. //Iroii/i(a, her `state of beim; wcll-lawcd', because whctbet \-()LI 
liked her ideal or not she did through her lavv-s and institutions train her citizens in this 
ideal vvith unusual completeness: she did train citizens sclflcssly devoted to the common 
I he problem vv ith such a Picture for aus one vv ho wishes to explain morality in terms of compassion 
is that vVc arc presented with a Spartan culture which has a nOtoriouslv rigid moral code, laut one in 
vX piep it scarcclv looks as if compassion is doing a great deal of vuork in propping it up. If one were 
to single out the fundamental concepts which capture Spartan im ralm, then those which sprig; to 
mind \% Mild surclv be ones such as honour, duty, heroism, and other virtues which contributed toi 
the warrior coxlc which svmboliscd Spartan culture. If one accepts that such Concepts contributed 
to the ii rmativ c life of ordinary Spartans then there is a problem for the claim that compassion 
grounds morality , iii that thusc concepts 
just don't look as if they arc reducible to compassion. ( )nc 
can ccrtainlv acknovvledge that there tnan have been tn<n-c compassion in this community than the 
standard historical accOunts suggest, but the picture of a fearsome, warlike minority with an all- 
en-ILr. Lcinl; gun>c of the co n-iTh, 11 good imvo1 ing hideously tough military and other phv sicýll 
training si1ll1)1v doesn't took as if its morality could be understood clclusi\ ch in such terms. 
I here is a Further serious prc>Ilcm for any such thesis x,, -hcti One comes to consider the mcaniil9 of 
iii )ral C( mccpts. `sCh( pe 1 1ucr tells us that right and vVr<>ng are sv n<>nv m( us with doing harm and 
not d()inL harm, and as compassion is the basis of all morality, then one can infer that all other 
nu, cal cOncchts NX ill also be anale sable in tcrnns of harm and suffering. AIOrc spccificallv , c, <>d vv 
ill 
'-'I 11) I Kitt 0, the (; reeks. 91. 
lhid. 94. 
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he analv sccl in terms of alleviating and not causing suffering, and bad in terms Of causing or failing 
toi alleviate it. But if this is so, then propositions such as 'suffering is good' vVOuld constitute a 
l( glcal coýntraclicti<nl, and this just doesn't seem to be the case. 
hen Niictischc rails against the 'levellers' on the grounds that they `take suffering itself as 
so, nlctlting Which must be cliIIIiuhr/rd, and says that `harshness, v-icolence, enslavctncnt...... heil fiten 
the species human being", vVc may recoil, but oiic can nevertheless read into what he says a 
c(hcrcnt moral philosophy. In a later section of the same text, we arc told that 'all this \-iolence, 
arbitrariness, harslhness, horror, nonsense has turned out toi he the means by' which the I *; urohcan 
spirit was bred to be strong, ruthlessly curious, and beautifully nimble. '' Because there have been 
piotractcd periods of obedience to despotic laws, 'something emerged and emerges that makes life 
<>n earth worth living: virtue, for example, or art, music, dance, rcaso». ''" In direct (opposition to 
ScimpCilhsiucr, Nict>schc can he read as sug'gcstill" that suffering constitutes a necessary means to 
making life ýv rrhýL hilc, and must therefore be embraced rather than eliminated. i\ly point here is 
not toi defend Nietzsche, but merely toi highlight that if one accepts Nict/schc has provided an 
alternativ c moral ph il<osophy which gives suffering and harm important positive roles, it just cannot 
he true l pl/ori that suffering is bad. 
1 here is one further step which can be taken down this path. One interpretation of Nietzsche 
could be that those of a `higher nature' care nothing for the weak, and thrive on uninhibited 
expressions of the \X111-to-power through media such as art or warfare. Compassion is a restriction 
(>n the expression of the will-to-power and is therefore to be set aside in order to allow the 
unfettered release of this force. On such a reading, compassion could be presented as neither 
necessary nor sufficient for morality, but more than this, it could even be construed as a vice. 
I he prOhlcm emerges when vi-c come to consider a statement such as 'compassion is the basis of 
nuuralm', which anyone ww. ould have to defend as true in taking something like Schcýpcnhauer's line. 
If One defends this as an a pwh'17'o17' claim, then it is open to counter-examples such as the Spartan 
one - it just ISIl't the case that all instances of morality can be understood in terms of compassion. 
If one defends it as an u P/7'0/7' claim, then one can argue that the Spartans just didn't have a full 
grasp of the concept of morality and failed therefore to give ccm passion the place it deserves in 
their moral sv stem. This cognitive failure explains vdiv their morality appears twisted to those more 
attracted to Schopcnhaucr's position. But this merely invites the next problem, which is that if 
compassion is the Basts of morality' is true ýr p/rnir, then 'compassion is not the basis of iii ralih, 
I'riedrich Nietzsche. I3el ui it (jo cl and L'i"iI. 44. 
lhicl. ý, 188. 
In //) /(/ 
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vx o>ukl be neccssarilv false, and this just doesn't seem to be the case - there is no IO, r((il contradiction 
inv-()]\-ccl here. We mav recoil at the thought of a moral system which ignore; the suffering ()f 
others, but We could still recognise it as logicallv coherent example of a moral s. \ stern. 
cOmprc, misc 1>ctvvccu the tW,, -ct positions along the lines that compassion plays a major role in the 
Qu0ra1 sv stem of many cultures appears easier to defend as an empirical observation, but we novv 
encounter ereil more pr<ohlcuzs. WC flovV need an account Of what explains those features of moral 
sv stems which cannot be explained in terms of comhassit>n, and we need an account of hm". 
compassion dl()cs relate to tn<ýralitv given that it is net longer being defended as the basis of it. 
If these ai,; lumunts arc correct, any, attempt to construct an el M7.0/7 argument to the effect that all 
moral concepts dcriv-c from the meaning of compassion still needs a lot of work, and a jho., /rr-rnir 
arguments to the effect that where there is morality there is compassion at the heart of it just appear 
to be false. In light Of this, we need to be clearer abtut how compassion comes to be related to 
n1(>rality , and we must reject that claim 
that mercy by showing that compassion is naturallv 
occurring in human beings we have provided an account of ho v, morality is possible and what it is. 
I lie relationship l)etý\. een the two is just far more complex than such an account suggests. 
11'ivprr, llof., i/t/1, 
the hrc%-i( us chapter characterised the moral pcrspcctiv-c as a fcaturc of the intcrnaliscd other - the 
part of our identity which is shaped by the influence of others. i\ly claim was that we have the 
cahacitY' toi hav c our feelings towards certain status and activities shaped by those around us, and the 
orientation this pros ides us with, vchcre it is in contrast to selfinterest, includes the domain of the 
moral. So far, this is a purcly formal description of what is meant by having a moral perspectiv-c, 
and h()\%- it is that this perspective is acquircd. But we now need to give an indication that there is a 
certain sort of content that the moral perspective ought to have. The difficulty hure is Onc of trying 
toi justifv a certain sort of moral perspective without recourse to precisely the sort of moral values 
one is trv-ing toi justify-. 'I'hc stratcgv- I shall adopt is that a moral perspective xvhich is based in 
ei iml,,, si<>n can be defended from the standpoint of a naturalistic psychology. Giv-cl) the wav 
humans arc, then c<>mpassicon is the proper basis for our moralitv . 
In the first instance then, can Svc "11()\x hOvV the content of the intcrnaliscd other can be constrained 
in s<>mc vVav s() that vý hat wc think of as paradigmatically immoral Views can be cxcluclcdl- All initial 
reshc>ilse is that one explanation of the hideous atrocities vdlieh we hav cv itncsscd in human 
histc>rv is that the perpetrators were acting to achieve a moral goal. The thcorv pro>v ides an 
explanation of how such moralities, appalling as thcv may strike us, come to shape the vices of 
laic numbers of people and to provide them with the motivation to carry Out the acril>ns in 
9 
yucsti( )n. But swclv vVc want a moral theory to dc) more than this, in that we want not simpl, \ a 
description of the psv cholOOgical hr<ýccsscs involved and formal conditions, but also a normariv c 
dimension \X ,c vv ant to sec such positions which arc described as morally right by some can be 
sho>vv n toe l)c morallv ww. rcong. We want to be able toi argue that there is something at least 
ahhrcmching a proper moralirv whose content we can go some way to ards specifying. 
( )rnc limiting factor is the issue of v hat is true indcpcndcntlvv of our moral v-icvý-s. I have airgucd 
that emotions are partlv-constituted by beliefs or perceptions, and when the fccling is cc0mlbirncd 
with a belief which is false or an inaccurate perception, we judge the emotion toi Inc inappropriate. 
In a case of fear, if we v ronglv believe the snake slithering towards us is poisonous, then we have 
god cause to think fear is no longer the proper response to the situation. ''. This much is 
consistent with I lutnc's treatment of the passions. 
111t must follcow,. -, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are (r(rnn//)miff (/ 
with some judgement or opinion. : According to this principle, which is so obvious and 
natural, tis o>nlv in two senses, that any affection can he call'd unreasonable. birst, when a 
passion, such as hope or fear, grief or despair or security, is founded on the supposition 
of the existence of objects, which reallv do not exist. Secondly , when 
in exerting am 
passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in 
our judgement of causes and effects. 
\lanv of the moral ideals we vV-ish to rule out may well be vulnerable to precisely these sorts of 
attack. Ifa mOrsil outlook entailed some pseudo-scientific theory of the superiority of certain racial 
groups, it would be relatively straightforward to point out the factual mistakes on which the 
attitudes depended, with a view, to forcing a change of heart. But even if such a strategv were toi 
hav c some effect, we still need more. If, as I have suggested, the moral perspective is to he 
understood , is an orientation towards the world dependent on certain representations, then we want 
of ruling out this sort of oizt, ululiorr, as against the means on vtihich it depends for its 
sustenance. In other words, we -want to be able toi say that anti-Semitism is wrong as at pe of 
orientation, as against anti-Sctnitism is wrong because Icxi-s do not in fact have an unusualh shaped 
cranium. 
11 I'cIItip "unit yu. tlitk tI ioon i: 11-d cl here, in that thcrc 1110 Inc cOn1p1cx cases vVhcrc me hav c the an sil)piOhri, uc 
cln(fll ii ck1)itc hayin I rclcvant t; tlsc I)cliut, and all inahl)rohriatc emotion despite h, t0ing st rclcvant tiuc lmlict. It I 
ft It ill( . rn, tkc''. bite, and the , iiakc is actuallc harnilcss hut happens tO belong to sOrncw1c who) shucots all those who 
cv cr (auch . iglu <of III is treasured Pct, them there is a case for arguing that I ýtm cyhcricncing an , thpropliaic ciuotion 
despite h olcling a false belief. (: omscrsclv, it 1 am overlo, cd on recognising the snake is harmless then one could aTuc I 
am tccling the wrang cniotiuu lased Oil ;t rek ant true belic% Such canes "Al tend to cmcigc vdhcn the emotions are 
1)1'111 cunsitutccl k bclicth or peleeptions which reflect Ornk hart of it wider picture, and all absence of the full range of 
rehrv. lilt facts means all agent can havc emotions vVhidi are appropriate giccn the information a%ailable tu the agent, hill 
ýýmild Inc sccn as inaplsro priatc it all the relc%ant facts vsere known to her. 
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In order to achieve this, we need to identifv a means of specifying how the structure of the 
internalised other can itself justify the exclusion of certain attitudes, and thcrchv regulate the 
c<, ntent of moral theory in a way which clots justice to the intuition of the previous paragraph. Onc 
starting point can he found in the work of David Wiggins. '' I have suggcstcd we cannot identik- 
o our mOral resp )nscs With certain emotional responses to independently existing properties in the 
external \X ('1-1c1' but ww c can goo some way in explaining wdhv certain properties are likely- to come too 
elicit the rush<mscs which are part of the moral outlook we have within the parameters of the 
overall thesis I have set out. 
WC, can be iu with a yucsti()n %vhich \\'i, gins asks. `Is it not rather there is something in the object 
that is 111,1e1c/irr the sentiment it vV(>uld occasion in a yualificd judge, and it brings down the sentiment 
upon the object as sc> qualified "' In order to highlight this, consider the following scenario. On 
impulse. a child lashes out and strikes his mother in the face. The mother darts back a look of 
anger, and scolds the child. the same thing happens again with the same response on the part of 
the mother. The child grasps the displeasure in the nnothct's response and associates it vVlth his 
v i( lcut action. Ov er time, as similar actions receive similar responses, he comes to develop certain 
feelings t(>-\vards violent actions which guide his behaviour iu the form of inhibiting such actions in 
himself and disapproving of them when committed by others. 
In the context of the thesis set Out here, the feelings which the child has developed are part of the 
internalised other. Such an account aims to show how the response of another shapes and 
bro)aclcns our pci-cchti()n of ourselves and those around us. Phis much has already been argued for, 
but there is a further , isl)cct to the scenario which is also of importance. The reaction of the mother 
is Inne with which mOst of us could identify, and this is the case because anger at being struck is a 
response vv hich makes sense »leu /I kim! we am' This means that reactions and behaviour 
which detcrnnnc the COntunt of the internalised other v i11 bear the marks of our humanity. Wiggins 
asks us toi supp se that 
0lbjccts that rcgularlv please us or help amuse us... or harm or annoy of v-cy Us.... mu V ariOus 
ýý aý s comic to he grouped together by us under various categories or classifications to which 
we giv cv ariuus avowedly anthropocentric namcs; and suppose they conic to he grouped 
I)av id I lame. Ili o/ I liruidu . 
Ad/1///, 410. 
1)a% id \\ ig-ii 
, `. 
A Scn. ililc Suhjcctiv ism', in his 
, Arrr/. /1-nlb 1/1(/ I 
" 1hn1. P1; 194 
'I he iclc. i nI 'ww lut make,, scrn,, c to us' is ccntrstl to the arguments of . 
Alan ('il)l)arcl iii the first hart of Iii, It hoz, 
IN I rr%ürýr. 
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toi cthcr i)ecaii.; r tllcv arc such as to plcasc, hc1p, amuse us, ... or 
harm, annc>v, rcx us III 
their various ways. 
In the context (>f the ethical, the impact of this argument would he that there arc curtain properties 
()f the external world and the human organism which arc likely to produce what V 'iggins calls 
<pruhcrtv, responsc-, ' pairs in us. . 
Angcr at being struck, 'm- at being helped, suffering at seeing the 
pain of s<>mc<>nc close to us. It is these marks of the kind of creatures X VC at-c which will condition 
()ur (>vVn resp nises, and through those responses, shape our own fcclings and those of people 
around us. ( )ncc we hsivc come toi intcrnalisc the feelings of cop]) ositio>n toi causing pain, then we 
are liable tu rush(>nd in a particular vV ()rice we are aware of having caused it. Guilt becomes the 
standard response for the agent whose has come to perceive violence in av ay which is guided bv a 
background of directed feeling, which has in turn been shaped during scenarios such as the one set 
(mt above. AVhar we perceive is now laden with the feelings which are directed towards such 
specific actions, such that perception and sentiment are phunoi ienologically united. 
Nluch of the account I have Offered is consistent with what we find in I tunic, but one difficulty 
posco-1 by I lumc's account is the famous distinction he draws between reason and taste. Reason 
discm ers objects `as thcv really stand in nature', whilst taste `has a productive faculty, and gilding or 
staining all natural objects vvith the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a 
new creation'. ' T hi, would be a major hurdle in the quest to establish that ethical propositions are 
true descriptions of the "vorld, and that values are genuine properties of the v orld. But this is not 
mv aim here. I wish toi establish that there are properties in the world which elicit what ,,, -c can 
judge as appropriate responses, and that these responses in turn condition the content of the 
internalised other. In other words, there is a certain content which our ethical outlook ought to 
have given the way we are, where the ought in question is not one of morality, but one springing 
from a naturalistic psychology. There is a certain way one would expect morality to be given what 
human beings are like. 
I'ar from raising difficulties in such a yucst, Humc provides numerous examples of exactly how this 
might v ork. A\ hen it comes to judging ducstions of taste or beauty, we `feel a sentiment of 
COinplaCcncv or distrust, according to the nature of the object, and disposition of our organs' 
tiimilarly, is also toi be regarded as a virtue; since it naturally renders us agreeable toi 
others. '' This last example is ar odds with the moral theory I have presented in that I have 
suggested that such properties only come into the moral realm when judged virtuous 1) the 
I ); n-id \\ it"'gin., \ ScI Isiblc Suhjccitv ism, in : 
Ved, TI-1111i and I 
l)av id I fume, 
. 
l/1 I: nc/nüý (. olz, enin" // 1'iiaay/e n/. Alor, rlr, 88. 
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intcrnaliscd Onccr, but I Iutnc's Point is consistent with im claim in this instance. Simply by virtue 
of I)etfl{ the «"l\ výc are, there are certain properties in the world -which elicit specific responses. 
\V c prefer it wheu people are hygienic because it is mute pleasant, and when they aren't we are likely 
to rcact with disapproval. 'l }his in turn is graspcd by the pcrpctraror who comes to scc personal 
hv gicnc in a particular vav as a result of the feelings which now guide hur perception of it. 
I, AI I 
\t this stage it requires further consideration Of how we might supplement the account Of muralitv 
given by II Lime or Schohcnhaucr in favour of what I shall call for the sake Of brcv itv, conventional 
nýcýralitý. B this I shall mean the view that the moral person is one who is concerned be the needs 
and suffering of others, and the moral act is one taken out Of this sort Of concern. Is it not the case 
that the insertion Of the internalised other into the debate is simplv- a circuitous route to exactly the 
same proh1e ýI have suggested that the conventional moralist is vulnerable if she relics on the 
claim that compassion or benevolence are good, where this is taken to be an u priori claim, and one 
hOssihlc reading of I lure is that he does more or less just this. There are points when he argues 
that moralitv is to be understood broadly in the Nvay I have just described. It is hart Of our make-uh 
that we approve Of the qualities which increase happiness, and disapprove Of those which promote 
miscrv )ur moralitv is a reflection of this tcndencv , and we can see this 
is in our moral terms. 
(; metal languagc, therefore, beim; formed for general use, must be moulded on sonic more 
general v icvv s, and must affix the epithets of praise or ulamc, in conformity to the 
sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community..... and even in persons 
the most depraved and selfish..... must attach the notion of good to beneficent conduct, and 
of evil to the contrary. `' 
It is hazardous to attributc to Humc a semantic analysis of our moral amcc})ts, but one possible 
reading of the above passage combined with the one below from the same page of the I: urj»rij 
suggeýts that lie belit to be true d %ZO/'! that, te/Ci/p Al'111T promotes \veIfarc is goo 1. 
If , xc c(n1sidcr the principles of the human make, such that they appear to daily eypcricnce 
and c>bscrv-ation, \\C must, cr Piiorz, conclude it is impossible for such a creature as man to be 
tOtaillv indifferent tu the w ell or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not rcadilv of himself, 
to 1)1, ()11()uncc, m here nothing giv-cs him any particular bv ass, that v chat })r()moýtes their 
1), 1 id Il umc. Ili I // ///'/n Ills I t11Ihrplý_ý o/ . 
Hand,, 41) 
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hahhinuss is good, and what rends to their misery is evil, without any further rc and or 
aonsidcrati( n. 
'I he picture we are offered is of a hutnah beim; with the sentiment of benevolence as part of a 
natural co>nstitUtion', V. hich leads us to aluc the yualitics in people which increase happiness, and 
dislike thOsc «hicli promote misery. Our mural concepts rcflcct this underlying structure of 
th()ught and fccling. 'I he mcaiiing oof g()xi is dctcrmitud by the scfitimcnt of bciicv-<olcncc, and 
lad narurc madc no, such distinction, foundcd on the Original c<mstitutl(fl of the mind, the 
vV ()i(. Is houuiil-, ibl' and d)(lmc/i11, Iwvly and 01/OIIS, uob/e and dc., »itzrb/ , 
had never had any place in 
lange it e 
This represents an ideal solution to the relationship between ethics and the emotions, in that if it 
VV C1-C the case that 'pain 1S bad, and compassion is a response to pain' , x'crc true d pl7017, then we 
v%()ulcl have a necessarily true statement about a `natural' emotional response to certain features of 
the world, with this response being part of our moral lives. This is the position I take Flume to hold. 
It is also the position which one finds more subtly in one of the recent major works of a 
sentimentalist tendency-. Simon Blackburn asks us in the midst of his attack on intuitionism, '\\'h\ 
not instead just sec there being people -\N-ho arc motivated to care about the promotion of 
happiness, and who as a result arc motivated tows ards the act, and, eýilrüý rlriit/y, are inclined to see it 
as g)OLl 'ý' (italics added). 
There are two paths a Sell timcntalist can take at this point. 'I he first is that we iir analyse our moral 
laniuagc, and this will reveal a series of true propositions such as `what promotes welfare is good'. 
The second is that human beings are constituted in such a way that they respond positively to 
l)cliay lour vvhich promotes welfare, and negatively to behaviour which promotes miscrc. '-' ( )ur 
attitudes, as determined by these sentiments, constitute our moral liv es, and these attitudes izutno/ be 
aiiah scd. 
t is in the muv c from the concern about the welfare of others to the concept of good where the 
problem lies on cithcr intcrprctatio>n. If sic have a natural tendency to care about the plight of 
others, and this determines the content of our moral concepts, then it ought to be the case that vv c 
l b/d, 4o). 
1 /)isl. 3'I. 
Simon Blackburn, Ru/iii'/ Issrnns. 90. 
Such a Ixýsiti<ýn is nwrc ciitticult to reconcile With f Ionic, vVI1O discusses cries such its wishing misch upon out 
cncmic>. Acv crthclc's, the pell-101 clause from the luotc on the previous ]woge could he interpreted as t mean, of 
cyplairninp, lu. t "m 11 instances, tllcrclo allowtllg us ttý yualik the I)roader claim that whatcs cl prom1<otes s e1Ltrc is gm)kl, 
tnLf vvIlatcvei hrottlotc. miser is Itad, whilst rctaihiitt4; the general character of the theoýn. 
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Just have to thiul: cOmhassioou is good. On the first path, this veill be a matter Of 1Ogical necessity 
iv cii the meanings of the terms, and on the second path it v\. -ill be a matter of causal ncccssitv given 
the y aý the mind vvOrhs. But neither seems to be the case, in that there is no logical contradiction 
in the statcrncnt 'prOm<ýring human welfare is bad', nor does it seem to I )c the case that cv etw o, nc we 
consider to Inc sound of mind respOnds s. \ mpathcticallv to the misery of others. 
I'tic first parh is ()nc which I amsiclcrcd in respOnsc to Schopcnhaucr, whcrc 1 argued that the lack 
of anv logical contradiction in the claim that compassion or sv mpathv arc Vices, or that suffering is 
"()Od indicates that it cannot be the case that statements such as 'compassion is a virtue' are true a 
p/i0 ii. ( )n the second path, our morality just is our tendency to xvish to rclicv, e the suffering of 
01licrs and l)rcýmcýtc their well-l)cing, and we goy \\,. I-<mg vVhcn we look l)cv, c>uc3 this straightforward 
aspect of the human condition. iimon Blackburn presents us with such a position. 
We starr off -with something bad such as the piano being on your foot. An agent is 
c(, nccrncd about that. .A novelist might 
1cav c it there: we hav ca piece of svmpatlu and a 
right attitude, ai iodcst indication of the agent's ethics. But the philoso>phcr v°orrics that 
this is \ crv ogre attitude or emotion on the hart of the agent. '' 
Blackburn appeals to us not to look bcVOnd ccrtain attitudes to other persons for the cLplanatiý>n of 
Mir mo>ralitv , as 
it is the further attempts to look fora truth-apt ethical proposition which creates 
much of the unnecessary confusion which afflicts moral philosctphv. . 
Much of what I shall say is 
sv rnpathctic to his cxpressn ist project, but this position strikes inc as vulnerable as it currcntlv 
stallos. 
1f morality is to be understood as partly constituted by responding sympathetically to the Hain of 
(others, then hoýv are we to answer the claim that morality is partlv constituted by an unsympathetic 
attitude to the pain of others. AV'hen, for example, Nict7schc called for an end of sy mpathv for the 
surplus of deformed, sick, degencrating frail, necessarily suffering individuals', `' whom he believ cd 
had come toi dominate 1', uropean culture, how can we refute his claims to have identified a superior 
rnu, ralitv to that of Schopcnhaucr or a `flathead' like Humc_ý If Nietzsche and the conventional 
moralist agree tin what ccýnýflassion is, and on the fact that it has moral status, but then div-crgc ()n 
vJ hcthcr it ought to be deemed moral or immoral, and if all w" c have are attitudes which lie bei (>ud 
analv: i,, vWc hay( no výa\ of breaking the deadlock in favour of Conventional morality. We need a 
further argument tot get us hast the point where -wc are sitnplv sat opposite the immoralist thumping 
(pur fists oti the table as we insist that we are right, and unless the account I am offering helps to 
Simon lulacla)U1t 
, 
IZnlia" I'ýr. ý Diairr, ()I. 
i-ic(lnch \ict/ýchc, N, p)li/(, oodewd I, ril, 6-1. 
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exclude the immoralist then it will be open to the charge that it fails the normative test we would 
expect any tnc>ral theory to pass. 
\V c can start hv recalling flume's observation that `it is impossible for a creature such as man to he 
t<>tallv indifferent toi the well-being of his felloxv creatures', This View is echoed in those thinkers 
vV hOýsc Vicvý of human nature is perhaps most pessimistic. I ken Hobbes xsill allow that `( )f things 
held in pnInem Ave that are dearest to a man arc his <ow-u life, & limbs; and in the next degree 
On most incn, ) those that concern conjugall affcction'? Similarly, Nietzsche's noble class of rulers 
vv ill still have `duties towards their peers'. 
"' So Were is wider agreement on the nature of man as a 
creature vV-hO is genccalh concerned in some vvav about the welfare of at least some other persons. 
'I his nicarns the challenge is not the same as that attempted by Bernard \Villianis, for example, in 
trying toi bring into the moral realm someone for whom morality has no pull at all. '" The immoralist 
has in interest in morality, but understands moral concepts differently, applying good and bad 
inversely to the kinds of actions and states to which we might conventionally apply them. So we are 
dealing with some one who is ostensibly already within the moral realm. 
\l c can n<>\\- return toi the claim that vVc begin the journey into morality on grasping the punishment 
or reward vV-c receive for actions which do not relate to our own self-interest. AV'c see a look of 
anger or disgust which shapes our feelings about certain actions. In many cases these responses are 
directed at us personal y, but we also witness the way others are treated. The child who sees her 
mother acting ccm passionately towards her sibling Neill be influenced on seeing this, just as she will 
Oil rccciv ink; ;t compassionate response ttt her own needs. The internalised other is constructed 
initially out ()f the simplest components - cries of help, looks of anger, 
displays of care - but these 
simple components are general features of the way people are, out of which a new set of responses 
is created in opposition to self-interest. 
Mill, why should vVC give greater priority to compassionate behaviour in understanding morality- 
Why not insist on rewarding the child whop lashes out instead of punishing her, showing indifference 
to pain instead of responding in a caring wave Why should these arguments count as anythin ; more 
than a sentimental appeal for conventional tnorahtv-r It is here that the opening emerges for a more 
Compelling respoIIsc to the immoralist. If our morality reflects the way we are, then our moral 
thcOrv must take account of characteristics such as our capacity' for love and compassion. The 
challenge is too justifv the claim that it is these traits rather than indifference too them which ought to 
ýcc l' V' 8 tot reference. 
I Itonl sI IOI)l>cs, I /'idl/ou, 2( 4. 
I'riCJrich Mut/ CI1C, 13, °)a/4(, 00(1 lad I iil, § 2((). 
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shape the content of the internalised other, where the `ought' is not one rooted in the morality we 
are trv ing to justif\, but in a naturalistic psychology which the immoralist has also accepted as the 
standard by which a moral theory can he judged. Nietzsche secs psychology as a means of 
debunking traditional morality, for 'Never vet has a rte(far world of insight been (opened to bold 
travellers and acly enturers; and the psychologist who makes this kind of `sacrifice' .... may 
demand 
at (cast that p5v chol<ogv be recognised as the yucca of the sciences' 
;ý 
It is výc)rth pointing out here that any of the major, coiivcntional positions in moral philosophy will 
have their own means of confronting the immoralist, with the concerts of duty or v irtuc as t, \", () 
obvious candidates for how one might fight this battle. As I think will already be clear, the position 
I shall be defending is a form of sentimentalism akin to that of flume or Schopenhauer, and either 
one takes em( tions such as compassion and sympathy for the suffering of others as good, or else as 
the sv mhtOm of sickly modern I ; uropean man. . As I said earlier, the immoralist differs from the 
cgOtist in starting; Out With a Concern for others, but has also advanced the claim that the kind of 
beings we arc ought to determine our morality. The conclusion she derives is that the satisfaction 
of personal desires through their unfettered expression must be allowed to determine the content of 
out morahtv , 
but this is too quick. The kind of beings we are surely demands precisely the 
opposition conclusion. We prefer less pain rather than more. W'c are happier in love rather than in 
hate, in friendship rather than conflict. If someone strikes us, it would just be odd to reward the 
person who does it, Or toi punish someone for showing compassion for those we love, and a 
morality founded on such responses just seems bizarrely at odds with what We are at a profound 
level. 
At this stage, if we are toi turn to psychology 
(as Nietzsche demands), then utility is surely the better 
indication of fundamental drives than will-to-power or a striving for creative self-fulfilment Jo 
praise pity is not to endorse a disguised form of contempt. As Philippa loot says, ''t'hinking of 
cordinarv, unpretentious men and women vvho seem to find special happiness in working; for the 
relief of suffering, one must surely find Nietzsche's dismissive views on compassion rather silly-. 
"-' 
ý ; iv cn mir capacity both for love and kindness on the one hand, and for a need for others during 
our life, then a nv)rality which reflects these qualities just looks like a morality which corresponds 
more closclv to our basic needs than immoralism. The suggestion here is that utility underpins the 
Content <>Ur mOralin (although I shall suggest later that this does not lead to a reducti(n), and is 
vv c11-placed to dco this (, iv-cii our preferences for happiness over misery. "1'o) turn to I ()()t once again, 
Bur11,11 d \\ illiaui., `I .m sm and . 
Altruism', reprinted ill I1i-oh1cmr o/ /be. Se . 
A\ illiams' argument iddresses principally the 
i>suc ul vvI I ctlicr or nut vVc can use raison to con III CC SOuic() Ie for , vhom standard moral considerations hive no ti>rcc 
1() act in it moral v,, m. I shall deal with this issue the next chapter, on moral reasoning. 
Iýticclrich \ictrscI I c, B"Joild (ooel, iii/hril, § 23. 
Philippi I'u()t, os(I, ls. r, IU 
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'IllOv c and other forms of kindness are needed by cN-cr\ one of us when misfortune strikes, and ma\ 
be a in Of strength rather than weakness its those who are sorrv for us. We may rcaso>tlal)lv think, 
moreover, that charm makes for happiness in the one x,,, -ho has it, as hardness does not. " 
Pcrhaps there is a furthcr card the immoralist can play. I have suggested we are happicr in love than 
ill hate, in friendship rather than cornflict. But are there lint more salubrious sources of utllltv'? 
(ý<>rc Vidal ounce remarked 'every time one of my contemporaries succeeds, ,i piece of tile dies. ' Is 
there not a sense in which sentiments such as this or si/hadivilivIlde reveal a darker side of human 
conduct which may also constitute elements Of ýi happier life: ' If utility is to underpin mm)ralitv and 
such res1) 11 Cs arc S LIICCS Of utility-, then Wllý - should thcv not count as Virtuous tho>ughtsý 
I'hc aulswcr to this resides in the conceptual structure of the internalised other, which is not simply 
a metaphor for a rccoýgniticn of the presence of others, or for the uscfulncss of others in providing 
a happier life for mc. It can best be understood as standing in for the cluzid.; of others which come 
to h. irtlv constitute our own identity. In the scenario used earlier of the mother who darts back the 
look of anger at the child v, het strikes her, it is her claim not to be harmed which will come to shape 
the ititcrnalised other of the child, and these arc the claims of a loving, caring, suffering being - 
Someone tvpicalh human. Sentimcnts such as jcalc>usv or . schuclc1111-tw1 , 
just couldn't be ones which 
match uh to the needs of those who arc the objects of such emotions, and a full account would 
locate them in the realm of personal desires, perhaps ones which arc shaped by the wider 
Coln mLill itv , 
but not distinctive of the demands of those around us which determine the content of 
what could count as a moral response in the way I have characterised such responses here. The key 
point will be that once we characterise morality as a phcnc>tnunon which is rooted in the claims of 
others, then what others arc will place a conceptual limit on what could count as being a moral 
response. Compassion is a response to the need of another person. 5£/)( rleir/nnýlr' has another 
person as its object, but clots not constitute a response to their claims or needs, and reflects 
pritnarik the content of our self-interested view on the world, where others may play an 
instrumental role in satisfying our desires of the world being the way we , cant it to be. 
l, hc ininuoralist starts with a concern for others, but then demands that this concern be restricted in 
such a vvav that aspects of v ho and what are we traust be suppressed. I lumc's naturalists is not <ml. \ 
more attractiv c from the standpoint of conventional morality, but also thcorcticallv more 
satisfactory than \ictzschc's because it relies on a more rounded account of výhat we are, and is 
therefore more defensible according to the standards of a naturalistic Psychology. I also hope to 
have undercut the line that nm appeal to utility' is itself a product of the morality I am defending. 
This is the scort of lint Nietzsche presented when he argued, 'The force of moral prejudices has 
ibid. 108 
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reached far into the most spiritual world, a world apparently cold and without premise and it has 
o>hv iouslv had a harmful, inhibiting, blinding distorting effect. 
"-' Hobbes held a similar view of the 
ultimately bleak nature of human character, 't'he Passions that cnclinc men to Peace, are Keare of 
Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodius living; and a h(>pc by their industry to 
obtain them. ", But if the empirical evidence on compassiom is right, '' then these claims seem 
ulrnurahlc, and it is C()11\-cntic>nal morality which can draw can psvchol )gv to justify itself as the 
most appo>priatc way for humans to live, given the vvav we are. Compassion is a natural potential 
in all of us, and not an invention of the weak to surreptitiously- ()\-crcome those who are naturally 
str()Iigcr than thcv are. 
This lilic of argument also provides an account of how the defender of conventional morality will 
characterise the immoralist The cony national moralist will pcrceivc the world in a way which is 
conditioned by her capacity for compassion and benevolence. Whcrc the immoralist differs is not 
solclh On a theoretical point, but also on a perceptual one. To see pain as good is to see the moral 
world dliffcrcntlv. There is an awareness of the moral relevance, but a lack of feelings with regard to 
pain which condition the Perceptions of the agent whose morality is in line the psychological 
rcduircmcnts that the immoralist herself accepts as the criteria for judging the validitv of the 
position. This position can he justified in terms of our psv'chologv , 
but not if we see compassion as 
Igood prr- ±z,, for then vv-c are Vulnerable to the counter claim that we arc simply in thrall to traditional 
nuýralitv, and if our attitudes are all we have to fall back on then there is no means bv- which to 
shOvv our attitudes arc more vvorthv Of being deemed moral then those of the immoralist I". v-cn the 
deep-r > tcd preferences I referred to earlier can be cast as the bleating of a modern I'; urohcan herd 
animal. But the internalised other places a different challenge before the immoralist I have 
suggested that emotions such as compassion, sympathy and pith are not exclusively the products Of 
mo)ralitv, but emotions which are naturally occurring; in us. AX'c start out with these elements, as 
against ace1uiring them as a mutation of our hatred of the strong. 
If thcsc arguments go through, then the conclusion that sympathy and compassion, rather than sclf- 
sissertio l provide a m()rc appropriate content for the internalised other fo11()«-s from this, for it is 
these capacities which best meet the various challenges I have set out. 'I-hcv giv c Content to a 
cOneon for others vv-hich is characteristic of the moral, and they do justice toi the intuition that there 
arc certain tnu)ral positions which simply have to be ruled out in the name of a proper morality. 
II hc\ also reflect at a deep level the kind of creatures we are, providing explanatory force as to 
htccisclv wVhv such e1ualitics should come to dominate our nu0tal lives. Oncc we accept the claims 
1-1. icdiich \iC / CIIc, /3, ')0nrl (1oo(/ 'ou1I 23. 
t 1101I IS 11Ol)l)c,, -3. 
This cýidence ýNill be set out in detail in the next chapter. 
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that sv mpatll and compassion arc part of what we arc, and that such dualities contribute toi 
rclatiOflshih; such as friendship <n love in which we are more likely to find happy and fulfilling than 
hatred and enmity, then a moralirr based on such yualitics is one which we can defend as something 
which cmcr gcs mit of our humanit . 
\t this point, it is worth emphasising that I have focused the discussion purely at the most basic 
level of which sorts of responses shape our feelings when we begin to enter the moral tcalm. Ntmc 
of this should be taken to suggest a reduction of morality to the simple categories of pain and 
pleasure. Ah- ; tim is simply to sketch in the broadest outline the amcchtual 1 anlcters of the 
internalised other as it first forms in us. I am claiming; that a rounded view of what we are vvill 
ine itablý undercut the immoralist's views, whom I have described as lost in the moral world by 
virtue of a failure to icquirc the feelings which guide the properly moral person. The violent action 
t( wards these an uttd her have never been sufficiently checked by the look of anger, or she has 
ncv-(, iintcrnalisucl the model of care and compassion which leads one to concern about the pain or 
suffering of another. She has, in other words, only partially crossed the initial threshold of the 
moral realm, and the admiration of a world in which suffering is good or indifferent is not an 
alternative moral vice-, but the v icw of someone standing on the fringes of morality v', -hose 
percchttons arc restricted in virtue of her distorted emotional development. 
In light of these claims, consider Nietzschc's yearning for an `extra-moral' stage in human history 
where the vvill-to>-pm%er vVill no longer be inhibited by the pity with which Christianity has 
emasculated it, and new leaders `under whose new hammer and pressure the conscience would be 
transformed into steel, the heart into bronze'. He demands a suppression of the very emotional 
responses which I have characterised as fundamental to a proper morality. The responses from 
important others, responses which are characteristic of any 
human being would be repressed in 
order to toughen the conscience into steel, and the heart into bronze. On the account I have 
offered, he is demanding a suppression of certain aspects of what we are so that the strongest can 
rise to dominate. AS such, he demands a shaping of the structures -which constitute the internalised 
other in the wa\ s which ignore fundamental tendencies both to need others and to respond caringly 
to their need of us. In the final analysis, Nietzsche's naturalism opposes the very elements of our 
natural make-up which Ilumc and Schopenhauer condone, the ones which make our morality 
reflective of <>ur humanity. 
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I have characterised morality as the positive construction of an intcrnaliscd other built Out Of certain 
natural capacities which carne to restrict others. The impulse Of a wider concern for Others is set 
against the satisfaction of self-interested desires. The idea of the internalised Other enables us better 
to defend much Of the intuitive appeal in a sentimentalist account of ethics with regard to 
co mpassi(m as the basis Of our moral lives. As they stand, I have suggested that the accounts 
Offered Inc I lerne and Schopcnhaucr are open to the criticism that there is a conceptual step missing 
in the m<)\-(: frOm1 benevolence or compassion to our moral concepts. 't'his means that au opponent 
can either i ant out there is no> logical contradiction in the claim that these sentiments are bad, Or 
else claim that we should just see these as a set of attitudes which many see as good, but ought not 
to. In either case, we need a further argument to defeat the immoralist My claim is that b 
f( casing On what kind Of beings we are, and a wide range Of natural impulses such as caring for 
others and the wish to , lv Old pain, we can see that an internalised Other who embodies these 
impulses in tile form of value is closer to what we are. 
'I hese arguments indicate that a proper morality is one which is consistent , ith the kind of beings 
vvc are, and this means a morality which involves a concern for the claims of others which form part 
of our perspective on the v odd. AV'hcn we talk of the claims of others, this means what they need 
and what we can do in response to those needs. It is compassion which constitutes the capacity in 
us to respond in these circumstances. .A 
legitimate response to the need of another person must 
take account of what that person is, and her status as caring, suffering, loving being. Any morality 
which fails to conceive of persons in this light cannot be one which provides responses to needs, 
and therefore cannot be a proper morality. There arc further obvious hro>hlums vvhich arise at this 
stage, which will he the subject of the next three chapters, but which need to be signalled nom'. 
irstly 
, we need to 
he able to say what counts as a need which we can press legitimately as a claim 
oil others. secondly , 
how far must we go in responding to the needs of others in order toi satisfy 
the demands of moralityr Both of these questions require response which require a fuller account 
of the nature of compassion, an indication of how reason he used to understand the limits of our 
legitimate needs and obligations, and ho v, - justice can regulate the extent of each in light of our 
c<)nclusi<on" to these questions. 
hcrc is, hOvv-cvcr, one further point of kc\ importance which emerges at this stage. If this thc<ýrv is 
right, then morality must he seen as irreducible. The internalised other is an aspect of our identity 
vvhich is constructed out of simpler elements, but one cannot arrive at an understanding of the 
moral self b breaking dOvcn this aspect of our identity into its constitutive parts. If one is within 
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the moral realm, then one's view of the world is already shaped by the claims of others which have 
become part of what we are. Insofar as oiic could imagine someone whose identity contains no 
trace of the claims of others, they simply could not have any understanding of what it is toi arrive at 
a moral judgement. '1-here could be no more than an awareness of certain behaviours and 
dispositions in others, but no understanding of what is like to hold one of the judgements from 
which this behaviour stems - they would not have acyuircd the concepts which arc made available 
only once we have the perspective of the internalised other. They would know how people behave 
when they are being; vchat is called 'moral', but they would not know what it is like to sue the world 
in a moral light. To characterise the moral perspective as one which is dependent upon the claims 
of others, is to characterise it as a perspective which is other regarding, and we thereby obstruct any 
rinn c to reduce it ultimately toi yucstioms of self-interest. l tility, as I have suggested, shapes what 
the internalised other may become, but it is not identical with morality. It is our preference for 
utility and our capacity for our feelings to be shaped by others which co n-ibinc toi make the 
intctnalised other and moral identity possible. In other words, the moral self is soll ething 
distinctive which is born out of what we are. Curiously, we find some support for such a view cvcn 
in the thinker to vv-horn I have been most opposed in this chapter. F, \ cn for Nietischc, it is because 
of the constraints which morality places can us that `something emerged, and emerges that makes life 
on earth worth living; '. 




'I he conclusion of the last chapter was that the view that compassion is the basis of a 
proper morality is one which can he defended in light of certain key considerations about 
the nature of human beings. In particular, the need we have of others which is rev calcd 
through suffering and our capacity to respond toi such needs when others express them, 
su i est that cumhassiou is a basis fora morality which makes sense in light of the kind 
of being's we are. I have also suggested that the moral perspective is one which is 11 
irreducible, in that it involves the acquisition of a distinct range of concepts which 
become available only by means of the development of what I have called the 
internalised other. To have acquired a moral perspective in this wav is toi take on a 
particular \k . i_% of seeing the world, and not to 
have such a perspective would rule out the 
possibility of understanding events around us as a moral agent. The moral hcrspcctiv-c 
im olý cs the use of certain feeling-laden beliefs and perceptions which are indispensable 
in coming to what we would we would call a moral understanding. Only the emotional 
responses which are part of this perspective make possible the meaningful use of moral 
c<, ncchts. 
This much has already been argued for, but if a proper human morality is toi be one 
grounded in compassion - one where com assi<)n characterises the moral pershcctivc - 
tllcn we need to come to a more detailed undcrstanding of the nature of compassion in 
order to give a clearer picture of what such a moral perspective must IM ()]\'C. Thc '11111 
of this chapter vvill he to address in greater detail what we mean by compassion, how we 
conic to he compassionate, and what specific implications this has for the current theory. 
11 Gel/ /. Co///P, 1.1: douý 
I hcrc are at least three reasons why it is difficult to arrive at a precise understanding of 
this term. The first is that there are so may other concepts which appear to be so> closely 
related sv mpathv , empathy, 
benevolence and pit. in particular. Secondly, many of 
these terms are used as if they were interchangeable. In a paper on ('»Ipýtl/), one example 
<>f an early manifestation is described as follows, `-At nine months, I I( pe had already 
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demonstrated strong ; q'nipalbe// responses to other children's distress' (italics added). ' 
inallv, there scctn to be important distinctions in the scope of compassion, as it is 
discussed by various philosophers. For Butler, it is `the sight of a man in misery' which 
raises ou suggesting that it is suffering alone which is the object of our 
C( MI)ASSi0n, but for Schopenhauer the emphasis on suffering is extended to include the 
`vvcal and ww-oc' of another, indicating that not simply the removal of suffering, but also a 
wider sense of bcncvolencc has a part to play. ' In the first instance, it will therefore be 
useful to set out what I shall mean when I refer to compassion, and how I shall 
understand the distinctions with regard to other closch related concepts. 
I shall take compassion to be charactcriscd by being moved by the suffering Of another. 
Beint; moved should be understood as involving the feelings associated with compassion, 
which are combined with the belief or perception that someone is suffering, and the 
desire to alleviate the suffering. That suffering should be the object of a compassionate 
resp )nsc seems to follo from any conventional understanding of what compassion is, 
v,. -hich semis toi he a response to `. A person in a negative condition, suffering some harm, 
difficulty, danger'. 
( )nc crucial point to be noted from the outset is that the concept of 'suffering' is to be 
undo stood in a very broad sense which stretches beyond physical pain. I will take 
suffering to include psychological distress and also deprivation or a sense of loss incurred 
by the victim. In order to highlight the reasons for this, consider the possible impact of 
Onc Of the more notorious dimensions of the 'Ialihan's rule in , 
Afghanistan. Imagine a 
woman who, as an adolescent had dreamed of becoming a philosophy lecturer, but who 
had been denied access to education and found herself pressurised into the more 
COn cntimial life of a traditional wife and mother. Let us say she expresses resentment 
and regret at having been denied an education, but seems toi lead a moderately happy life. 
We may well feel compassion on the grounds that she has been denied an t>1portunitv to 
fli)urish in the way she wanted and has missed out on certain possibilities which we may 
feel she ought t<t have had, but this isn't a response to physical suffering, and we need a 
Ross Ai hompson, 'Empathy and [motion Understanding: the [ark Development of : mpathy'. in N 
I: isenberýg and J Strayer edd. 'Empcilir and its Development'. 
Joseph Butler, 'Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue', in DD Raphael ed. British Moralists 1650- 
1800, vol I, 380. 
Arthur Schopenhauer, On [hc Basis (J Aloruliir, 144. 
L a\\ rence Blum. 'Compassion', in plural Perception uni Puriiculariii. I73. 
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broader understanding of what we can perceive as suffering in order to explain cur 
reaction. The range of circumstances which can Occasion compassion seems to go 
l)cVond paradigm cases such as physical pain <>r an acute sense of psychc>li> ; ical pain on 
the part of the person with whom we are concerned, and for this rcasOn a wider amcept 
of suffering is intended to broaden the range of objects to the point where they coincide 
with the range Of our compassionate responses. 
It is also worth chil)Orating further on what it is to be moved by the suffering of another, 
pmrticularlv in order to distinguish it from two mistaken conccptions of what compassion 
is. I' irstly, -\w hen vc sav- we are pained at another person's suffering, this d cs not mean 
that vV c cyhcricncc the same distress as them. 1-lumcan sympathy seems to work like this. 
°1'is indeed evident that when vtic sympathize with the passions and sentiments of 
Others, these movements appear at first in narr mind as mere ideas, and are 
concciv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact. 
°I is also evident, that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the 
crY impressions they represent, and the passions arise in conformity to the 
images we form of them. 
If ww-c take this as a vicvV of compassion (which flume did not), then it looks as if I 
perceive someone as grieving at the loss of a loved one, and I then experience grief as 
well. But this is surely no more accurate than saying that if I feel compassion at the sight 
of a car crash victim I experience the sane sort of pain as they do. This phenomenon is 
better described as an emotion 'resonating', whereby I might see you are sad at the tragic 
conclusion toi a film and I become sad myself in response to the same stimulus. 
A closely related error to thinking that compassion involves experiencing the same 
cmotion is assuming; that compassion involves responding to the same object. This also 
(ycts it wrong, in that although the suffering of tvýýo people may have the same object, this 
doesn't indicate compassion on the part of one for the other. If I am sitting with a 
compatriot watching the English batsmen wilt before the Australian bowling attack, we 
vv ill each suffer, but this isn't yet grounds for saying that either of us is responding 
compassionately towards the other. Compassion takes as its object the suffering itself, 
David II ume.. 17reali. se of llumun Au/ore. 319. 
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not the cause of it. If I feel compassion for a friend grieving at the loss of his mother, it 
is the suffering he endures in the form of his grief which is the object of im compassion, 
not the death of the mother. AV'ith these initial comments iu place, it is worthWhilc 
distinguishing l)etww-ccn the concept of compassion and other similar concepts. 
! /iikr/ (n/«ep/s 
In ()rdcr to provide maXinlum clarity, I shall start vVith those concepts which are most 
distant and work in towards those which appear ch)scst to compassion as I have 
described it. " Perhaps the most (Owl(ais distinction comes with empathy. As I said 
earlier, this often appears in a way which looks synonymous vvith compassion, but is best 
undcrstnx>d , is a luitc separate hhctio mcnon. The C. bauijb, -rc I)<<Yiouc, il deftucs ctnpathv as 
, the p cr of entering into auothcr's personality and imaginatively experiencing his 
c. \hcriences: power of entering into the feeling or spirit of something. ' The reason for 
treating this as importantly distinct from compassion is that one can empathise with the 
pain of another without being moved by it in the appropriate to even in am way. 
\lartha Nussbaum points out that a torturer may empathise in corder to develop methods 
which will have maximum effect on her victim, meaning that empathy might not mcrclk 
fail to deliver up a compassionate response at the prospect of someone suffering, but 
may even prompt satisfaction at uncovering a more effective means of causing it. 
Nussbaum also points out that empathy can nevertheless be a route to compassion, in 
that we can imaginatively construct what we believe someone will feel in a particular set 
of circumstances, and he moved by the prospect of their suffering in the imagined 
scenario. One possibility then, is that empathy may be a necessary component of 
compassion, which results in a compassionate response in certain people and not in 
others. Allis is a view which occurs fairly frequently among; child psychologists, where 
compassionate response are often seen as tied to empathy. 
I, or example, Paul 1, f larris 
vv-ritcs that, 
"I shall follow closely Martha Nussbaums discussion of the distinctions set out in Chapter Six of 
( phcavafs c1/ 7huugh[. 
Ibid. 329 
Tor the moment, the important point to underline is that cognitive factors, 
particularly the ability to look at a situation from anothcr's perspective, appear to 
be intimately connected with the vvillingticss to offer comfort. ' 
such a\ icw seems rather unlikely given the age of the infants whop first respond in what 
one might term a prom-compassionate manner. It is difficult to believe that an infant of 
only eight months is undertaking such a complex calculation, and this looks more like an 
o cr-COMI)licati<>n of the actual process. It seems much more likely that such early cases 
im olvc the infant perceiving the suffering of another, and being moved on grasping that 
the person is suffering, as against considering how it would be for the infant herself too 
undergo) such an experience, understanding how unpleasant it would he, and then 
responding. Crv ing, screaming and certain facial expressions are perceived by the infant, 
and the suffering provokes the distress. The richness of our compassion needn't be 
present in our earliest experiences of it, but can develop later. 
\ further argument which casts doubt on the view that cmpathv plays any necessary role 
in compassion is that we might plausibly feel compassion for those with whom we 
cannot empathise. If I am moved by the sight of my beloved dog gradually slipping 
anti ay, I might sinccrch assert feelings of compassion for him, but this can hardly because 
have the power to enter into his personality and imaginatively experience what it is like 
for a clog to die. It is the perception of suffering which is doing the work in this case, 
regardless of my inability to empathise. 
1f empathv is neither necessary nor sufficient for compassion, then pity sccros somewhat 
closer to an understanding of compassion. Nussbaum's view is that Compassion involves 
not simply the understanding that someone is suffering, but a feeling at some level that 
this is a bad thing. Pity seems to come closer to meeting this rcyuircrncnt than cmpathv 
do cs, in that it involves `a form of conviction that someone else is in pain', " where the 
fonn includes the impression of this pain being bad or unfortunate. The possibility of 
hits ing, soilleonc and being indifferent toi their suffering scums much more problematic 
than is the case with empathy. That said, pity also differs from compassion in certain key 
respects. I, irstly, it has conic to have connotations of condescension. 'I he thought of 
Paul LI Iarris, ('hilch"en uncl Emoiionn. 4I I. 
I udvs ig Wittgenstein, Philosophical ! m"C. 1/ 'bons, § 287 
being pitied is unpleasant to us bccausc it brings with it a certain humiliation being 
Ipitiablc can strctch bcvond bcing in need of help or deserving of help, into being 1Ov, Vcr 
Or CVC1 rcpcllcnt. 
Pr()hably the best example of the complex mix which goes into pity comes in Nietzsche. 
( )n <>nc hand, he extols pity on the part of the strong, yet also finds in it a m<Orc 
p()is(>n<us side. We are told at one point that `a man whop is by nature a uiuslel: when 
such a man feels pity vvcll! This pitv has value. But vvhy should we bOthcr about the 
pity of those \k ho suffer! Or of those who may even preach pity! '"' I'; ven if we reject 
Nictische's vice of pity as virtuous in the strong and irrelevant or unimportant in the 
vý cak, he is surely right about the potentially double-edged nature of pity as a response 
which can bring with it a form of contempt. Perhaps the best explanation for this is that 
pity seems to have wider scope than compassion. Compassion is directed towards 
someone's suffering whereas pity can be directed much more widchy. ( )ne can pity 
som eons for who or what they are, as in cases where a religious bigot might pity 
s<mco>nc for holding a conflicting set of religious \-iew,, -s, or for having chosen a particular 
profession or style of life. In stretching beyond a concern for our suffering, which we 
ourselves will usually wish to end, and into a value judgement of a wider range of 
yualitics which we may hold much dearer, pity can include a disdain or lack of respect for 
aspects of whop we are vvhich we value. 
It is this aspect of pity which allows Nietzsche to present `the priestly class' as the 
`greatest haters in history'. " The prcoccupatMn with not simply the suffering of others, 
but also with a wider moral scheme can be smuggled into pity. The more tightly focused 
nature of compassion makes it less amenable to being co-opted into this sort of project. 
II'his doesn't amount to the claim that pity ants/ entail contempt or (opposition at some 
level pity can be as specifically concerned with someone's suffering as comhassiOOn - 
but the fact that it presents this possibility opens up a conceptual gap with compassion. 
I hcrc is (>»c furthcr point at ,, hich this gap appears. We talk about `self-pity', in which 
assiýýn 1 aim v%c feel s(>rr<)y c(mccrnin", m> Ir mn situation. laut if the acc(, unt <, f c<, rnI 
giv ink is C()1-rcct, compassi(m for ()lusclf is impossible by virtue of the fact that it is 
I" F ricdrich Nietzsche, Bevoix/Good 0/ILl Evil, § 293. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of (orals, § 7. 
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ncccssarilv clircctccl at the suffering of another. I suggest that it is simply part of the 
meaning of compassion that it is directed towards another, thereby- further separating it 
fi- m j)itv, on v. hich there is no such constraint. 
We come a step closer to compassion when we consider benevolence, indeed one might 
even ask whether compassion could not be subsumed under benevolence. If we return 
for a moment to the example of the woman living in (ghanistan under the '1'aliban, 
could One not explain Our attitude towards her as an example Of the sentiment Of 
bcncvolcncc described by Flume as a 'tendency to promote the interests Of cur species, 
and l)cstOýw happiness On human society'. 
" One could argue that it follows trivially that 
an attitude Of haleV()lcncc entails the wish toi see someone's pain ended. At this stage, 
we hav c the additional judgemcnt which is absent from empathy, and as yet no reason to 
believe there is the contempt which can be concealed within pity. 
I :A ell if beim; the recipient of someone's benevolence may make us less uncomfortable 
than being the recipient of someone's pity, there are still good reasons for emphasising 
the distinction , vith compassion. Like pity, benevolence seems to go further, in that 
being moved by someone's suffering is merely one form benevolence, and certainlv- 
docsn't exhaust the possibilities. The presence of suffering is clearly unnecessary for 
bcucvolcncc, in that a millionaire who leaves his fortune to his wealthy son may well act 
out a sentiment of benev olence, and certainly benefits him, but needn't do so in a way 
which can be understood as alleviating any form of suffering. In addition, having said 
that I)encv(>lencc appears to lack the potentially unpalatable side of pity, there is 
nevertheless a side toi it which has provoked concern amongst many liberal thinkers. In 
our aim of benefiting someone, we need not be restricted by the more modest task of 
remuv ing a source of suffering, but might engage in what we sincerely believe to be a 
project of helping them to become someone better. Benevolence naturally stretches 
beyond a c<)nccrn for freedom from suffering into a concern for the freedom to be a 
particular sort of person or lead a particular sort of life. 
'' It aims at promoting the god, 
one means of which may be removing the bad. But compassion is concerned principally 
David Ii*ume.. 1ii L-nyuir_t ('u)7cewiing /he Principals of 21/0/'u/. s. 20. 
As ni aim here is pturel\ to tease out the conceptual distinction between benevolence and 
compassion, I shall not enter into the debate between proponents of negative and positive liberty. 
The classic statement of the distinction bemeen the two comes in Isaiah Berlin's -Two Concepts of 
Libertv', with alternative views presented b\ Gerald MacCallum in 'Negative and positive Freedom 
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with what the victim suffers from, as against what we think they would benefit frOm. 
This means that the voice of the victim is of crucial importance, which needn't be the 
case with hcncv Olcncc. With compassion, we respond to the actual suffering, or to the 
prospect of some future suffering; where the victim herself suffers, and this is the 
ultimate focus of our response. With henevolence, the focus of our response is benefit, 
and the conceptual distinction means that compassion and benevolence can even be 
op Oscd to one another. I can reach the view- that suffering strengthens you in ways 
which are beneficial, and override your protests in exercising my generosity in pursuit of 
this goal. As such, benevolence might endorse suffering and oppose a compassionate 
response toi it. 
Svinpathv is perhaps the tcrm which conics closest to capturing the attitudes which 
have suggested lie at the heart of compassion. Both are normally activated on 
ahhrcluncling, that someone is in difficulty, and involve being moved by that perception. 
Their proximity is such that they are surely interchangeable in many contexts, so) that 
\,. -hcn Flume talks of no yualitics being more entitled to `the general approbation and 
good-will of mankind' than those which proceed from a `tender sympathy with others', 
" 
one could easily imagine substituting 'sympathy with' with `compassion for'. 
Nevertheless, there are perhaps two points at which important distinctions can be drawn. 
the first is that sympathy can shade into something like empathy in a way in which 
Compassion cannot. Onc can he sympathetic to the views of a classical theist who secs 
love of mankind as a her guiding principal in her dealings with other people. Sympathy 
here indicates an affinity or agreement at some level in the way one feels about a 
particular subject. No suffering need be involved. Conversely, compassion can indicate 
an intensity of feeling which sympathy may lack. Consider how best to capture the 
attitude of Achilles ww-hen he responds as follows to the pleas of Priam for the return of 
1 lector's body. "Poor man, how much you've borne pain to break the spirit! "'' 't'here 
is a sense in v,, -Inch describing . 
Achillcs' reaction as one of sy mpathv seems to understate 
the extent to which he is moved by the plight of Priam, and compassion seems better 
and Charles Tailor in 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty'. All are reprinted in David Miller cd, 
Lihrrü. 
[)avid I Iume, 
. 
In l: nyuirt (o/1ceriýin [he Principals u/ AIýn uls, 18. 
I lomer, 77ic Iliac. Bk 24, line 605. 
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suited to co)m-cv the force our emotional responses in the face of such powerful 
cii-cu11lsMIIccS. 
I have suggested that there arc distinctions hctwccn these concepts which emerge under 
certain circumstances, but this is not to imply that these difference arc hard and fast, or 
that they are always obvious. Achilles could be said to feel pity for Priam, and 
compassion can be experienced as one of the `calm passions' which guides our behaviour 
without necessarily involving the kind of intcnsitv Present in the scene from the /lied 
described above But these kinds of fine-grained distinctions arc important if we arc to 
describe , tccuratcly the particular aspect of our moral lives which is being picked out. If 
one is to express the hhenomcnologv of compassion, then it seems to be captured in the 
the>ught 'Ict the suffering stop! '. Fach of the alternative concepts discussed above varies 
somewhat from this basic impulse of compassion, and it now remains to explore to a 
greater extent what is involved in this specific emotion. 
/'/), ' (. oii/e/iI n/ Comp, Iss/ ou 
1'hc previous chapters have set out in detail the characteristics of an emotion., and it is 
n<>v, a (h CStic0n of clplicating compassion within this context If we retain the account 
of elnotiou dcvcl<)hcd earlier as a feeling and a belief or perception combined in 
consciousness, then compassion can be seen as the belief or perception that someone is 
suffering combined with a feeling towards the suffering and a desire to alleviate it. More 
riOvV ncccis to be said about the nature of the beliefs which are involved. 
Nussbaum follows Aristotle in arguing; that the cognitive side of compassion involves 
three separate elements. "' firstly, there must be the impression that the suffering is 
serious rather than trivial. Secondly, the person must not be seen as having deserved the 
sufferin-. Thirdly, the person who is experiencing compassion must be aware that the 
are seeing someone suffer in a vvay which maY rev cal their own vulnerabilities. 1 shall 
argue that only the first of these is a necessary condition for the cognitive side of 
C( 111has, iun. 
" Sec Martha Nussbaum. Ir )hca uls of Thoug{i[ 306, and Aristotle, Rhcio, ic. in the ('01771)ICIL' Works 
r, /. 1risiodc, cd Jonathan Barnes. 
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O tic might segue that the idea that the suffering must be viewed as important represents 
an cov-cr-intcllcctualisatio>n of What goes on. Surely we simple grasp that someone is 
distressed and respond compassionately. This maiv w ell be true in the case Of infants 
vX ho cann<)t distinguish hctvV cai important and uuimhortant forms Of distress, laut there 
is every reason toi think that as we develop we bccotnc much more discerning. Consider 
for cyamplc whether or not we would feel compassion cnl vvitncssing the distress Of the 
American undergraduate on a study-abroad programme in I urohc, h<otttaycd in Jonathan 
1'ranzcn's TA, (, '01'yz'e//o/,. ý. 
Chen I said to 't'iffany: "So mv dad's like, you've got to sublet if v-cou'rc going to 
'. ui-(, I-)c, and I'm like, I promised Anna she could stay there weekends when 
there's home games so she can sleep with Jason, right' I can't take the promise 
back. rights laut tm- dad's getting like all bottom-line, and I'm like, hullo, it's mmil' 
condominium, right:, You hought it for nm', right? I didn't know I was going toi 
have some stranger you know, who, like, things on the stew c, and sleeps in 
my I)ed " 
'l iffanv said: "'That's so-gross. " 
Cheryl said: "And uses my pillmvsý"- 
It seems entirely plausible that Cheryl is genuinely- distressed at the thought of renting 
out her home, yet we may \"-c11 find ourselves less than concerned. The yucstion of how 
vVc come to see some suffering as worthy of compassion and some not is one which I 
shall return toi in a later section of this chapter, but for the time being it is simply worth 
emphasising that compassion involves a level of discrimination by the agent as to the 
importance Of the suffering, with trivial forms of suffering unable to provoke the 
cnu>ti<>n. 
\V'halt then of Nussbaum'", claim that we must sec the suffering as undeserved. She 
argues that `Insofar as we believe that a person has come to grief through his or her own 
fault, \x c will blame and reproach rather than having compassion. Insofar as we do feel 
Comhassi(, n, it is either because we believe the pcrs<ou toi be without Maine for her plight 
1- Jonathan Franzen. The Cori c'c"lions. 456. 
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or because, though thcrc is an clement of blamc, vV-c bclicv-c that her suffering is Out of 
proportion to the fault. "' 
It seems fair to say- that out Compassion may be diminished or ultimately evaporate as a 
result of the agent being responsible for bringing the suffering on herself, but it seems 
qucstic)nahlc whether the conceptual link bctv,, vucn fault, suffering and compassion is 
quite as close as Nussbaum suggests. "There scan to be too many cases where agents 
engage in activities vvhcii they are fully aware of the dangers, and vet xvc are moved by 
their suffering when things go wrong, despite their bearing a degree of responsibility for 
their plight. Those who suffer from drug addictions are surely capable of provoking our 
compassion even where it is tinged with reproach for the irresponsibility and selfishness 
Of the decision toi start down this path in the first place. And this isn't because we see 
the suffering as disproportionate, we surely just see it as bad that anyone should suffer 
like that, regardless of who is responsible. Granted, our compassion may be greater 
where the victim is entirely innocent, but there are certain points when we want toi say 
that no-<onc should suffer like this, regardless of what they have done, and fault now 
becomes almost irrelevant in our consideration of whether or not they are worth- of 
compassion. To take an extreme example, one might feel compassion four the, murderer 
on his v. -ay to the gallows. 
A further pr oblctn for the rice- that there is a hard and fast link between fault and 
compassion is the vvm in which events after the fact can influence ou response. If we 
take the cNample of someone who commits a terrible crime, and initially remains defiant 
and unapologetic, then their incarceration is something we may well see Is something 
g(x)d. But if, after some years, we see in them sincere remorse for what they did, and 
\x hat we take to be a proper understanding of the horror of their crime, is there not a 
sense in which the person now becomes someone for whom we may feel a compassion 
which was previously abscnt: ' We may begin to question whether or not it is right for 
them to be imprisoned for life, and to feel that they now deserve toi be given another 
chance. If this is the case, then our responses can change independently of the degree of 
fault or suffering, which can remain unchanged. The remorseful person may suffer 
a(. ldlitiunalh as a result of seeing what they have done in a different light, but we cl<>n't 
start to feel compassion because their suffering has been increased. We start to feel 
Is Martha Nussbaum. Lpheavals °J Thoug>ht, 311. 
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ccm1hassic)n because vV-c are moved by the plight of someone who is remorseful, but less 
soy bN that of sc, mcOnc vVhO is unrepentant about having committed an action which we 
sec as depl )ral)lc. If our view of someone turns to compassion where there is no change 
in either the degree of responsibility or the level of suffering, then the lint: between fault, 
suffering and compassion cannot be as tight as Nussbaum suggests. 
( )nc might even go further and suggest that we can feel compassion even where the 
punishment is deserved and the victim unrepentant. Consider for example the case of 
Pierre's duel with I)colohcýv in I1 ur ß//I1/ Pe ice. Dolohov is brash, sneering, and assumed by 
Pierre (\w roonglv as it turns Out) to be having; an affair witli his wife. At a dinner, Picrrc 
hcc()mcs incrcasinglc antagonised by his rival's perceived condescension. `I know him. 
I he would find it particularly alluring to besmirch my name and hold me up to ridicule 
after I had exerted myself on his behalf and befriended and helped him. ''' Later can, 
Pierre feels himself provoked beyond endurance when 1)olohoýv proposes a toast to him. 
'I Icre's to the health of all beautiful women, Petcrkin - and their lov-crs! '. 
'`' 
,A further 
slight results in Pierre's challenging hitn, and they fight a duel. killing or wounding an 
(opponent under such circumstances would be entirely consistent with, or even 
demanded b\, the code of honour by which a Russian gentleman lived, and yet whcn 
Pierre surprisingly succeeds in wounding his opponent, he is mortified at the harm he has 
done. `Pierre, hardly able to restrain his sobs, started to run to llolc>hov-'. " 'I'ke 
knowledge that his actions might be formally justified counts for nothing at the sight of 
the suffering, and his response is a `smile of compassion and regret'. " 1xcn `I)olohov 
the hravvlcr, 1)oh>hov- the bully', so deserving of his fate according to the standards 
which commonly applied, becomes the object of compassion from the person who 
Ought above all to see him as receiving the punishment he deserves. 
What, then, of the claim that if I am to feel compassion for someone, I must he aware 
that I myself aim Vulnerable in the same ways Nussbaum takes the presence of `similar 
possibilities' to be necessary, justifying this claim on the grounds that 'o>nc makes sense 
of the suffcrin11 by rca>gnI IlIg that true might oneself encounter such a rev crsal. 'ý' She 
s>>-ucs that \x c collie to understand the mcanint; of the suffering partiv through 





understanding 11<)W it would affect us if we were to undergo it, thereby emphasising the 
close rclatic>nshih 1)ctwvccn Compassion and fear. This also helps to explain why it is that 
we don't feel compassion for just anything, in that only sentient beings capable of 
suffering share with us the possibilities which make us able to sec that we could suffer in 
that way too. 
( )ncc again, there seem to be crucial elements of this claim which advance our 
understanding of compassion, but in the midst of an overall argument which is too 
strong. Consider the yucstion as to whether or not the God of classical theism felt 
compassion for the dews when they were enslaved by the Pharaohs. We would surely 
v, ant toi sec compassion for the suffering of mankind as a consequence of the log c such 
(; od would have for us, but his omnipotent, immaterial and eternal nature surely make it 
unthinkable that I Ic might he enslaved by humans. Nevertheless, there doesn't appear to 
he anv j)Izrim /driir' contradiction involved in the idea of God's being compassionate. In 
addition, there are cases where we feel compassion for people who are suffering in ways 
in vw hich we couldn't Babies born with a congenital illnesses from which they will die 
within a fe months suffer from having their lives truncated in such a way which is 
impossible for us. I : vcn though it is a contingent aspect of my life that I . i\-coidcd such a 
horror, it is now an impossibility that it should ever befall tne. Similar cases would be 
when childless couples, beyond the point when it is possible for them to have children, 
feel compassion for someone who has lost a child, or when we feel compassion for a 
suffering animal. 
Where Nussbaum's argument carries greater force can be seen if we loosen somewhat 
the rcquircmcnt that each of us must be aware of our individual vulncrabilitics to fucl 
compassion. It is surely more convincing to talk of the way in which seeing others 
suffer, rei ard1ess of our own specific circumstances, alerts us to dangers and 
vulnerabilities of people in general. This may sometimes include aspects of our on 
condition, in which case compassion can make us aware of how fragile our own lives are. 
In such cases, compassion can play an epistemological role from which our knowledge 
of ourselves and others is increased, but this removes the requirement that we must share 
the potential vulnerability of those whom we see suffering. 
Martha Nussbaum, C, pheavals of Thought, 316. 
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There is a further reason for i)cing suspicious of the \-icw that compassion relics on 
shared vulncrabilitics between the compassionate agent and the person who is suffering. 
If the thought is that we feel fear on realising that the state in which we see someone else 
Could he ()Ile in which I might end up myself, it calls into question the ethical credentials 
of compassion. If I help someone lying in the street because I personally fear such 
states, then this looks like an explanation of compassion which is reducible to self 
interest. If m\ fear is a necessary condition in bringing me to sec that I should help 
someone, in that I could not reach this conclusion Without experiencing fear, then 
concern for the fate of others requires a healthy concern for myself if it is to get off the 
gr(>uncl. -17his surely flies in the face of (pur understanding of compassion at a profound 
level, in that our compassion is directed specifically at the suffering of (ruot/o: and 
d()csn't rely on our mx n imagined suffering for its motivational force. Whilst I may be 
m(, \ ccl to help someone as a result of grasping how much I would dislike it if I were in 
their shoes, this is clearly distinct from compassion. if fear is doing the leg work here, 
there is a basis in self-interest. If not, we are back to empathy again as a route to 
C01111)f1SS1On. 
The point of these reflections is to emphasise how much rests on what is to count as 
important suffering. ]Factors such as blameworthiness, fault, degrees of suffering and a 
sense of our own vulnerability may have some explanatory role in sonic cases, but it is 
uni when we understand how we conic to discriminate between important and 
unimportant forms of suffering that we can understand how compassion vvOrks. The 
central structural relationship is seeing suffering in a particular light, and what is required 
is st bettet- understanding of how it is that we come to `sec' in this way. 
'A' 
.S 
/eipil r 0/ (ompil. l. i1011 
f co inivSS1 m is constitutcd by a bclicf or pcrccption about the suffering of s<ýniconc, a 
feeling t( wvards that suffering and a desire to stop it, then the key toi understanding when 
vVC come toi see suffering in a compassionate light will be understanding how it is that 
)Ui desires and mir feelings towards suffering come toi he directed in the \\ ay the are. 
I'hc mo dcl I have proposed for emotions in general is derived from lýaý icls<>n's concept 
Ot rriangulati<m, and the corresponding process described within child psychology is 
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sOcial referencing. " V'c now need to consider hovv this explanatory framework can he 
used to chart the development of our capacity for compassion. '1'cß be more precise, we 
need to understand how it is that we come to sec some suffering; as important, and other 
cases as trivial. I shall begin by coffering an eyplanati(n which derives from the mcxlcl set 
Out in the previous chapter, and then offering evidence from empirical psychology to 
suhhc)rt this account. 
What each Of us starts with, is a capacity to be moved by the distress of another person. 
This capacity will cdcv clop to varying degrees according to our social environment. This 
mains that the behaviour of the primary carer towards ourselves and towards Others will 
shape the way- in which we respond to the suffering of others. Learning to respond to 
different degrees of suffering c\-()I\-cs through seeing certain levels Of suffering, such as 
pin sical pain, receive more intense concern than other forms Of suffering. This sort Of 
concern is expressed through activities such as physical comforting, and also through 
more subtle x\-. t-\s such as the tone of voice and the facial expressions of the carer. 
1, ß)w er lev cls Of suffering result in much lower levels Of concern from the carer, and the 
infant vv, hoo Observes this comes to see these sorts of suffering as less important car trivial. 
The input from which our feelings co n-ic to be directed in these ways is consistent and 
patterned. Similar levels of distress receive similar responses time and again, to the 
extent that we abstract from the examples. 's The overall impact of this shaping Of our 
feelings is that we develop into persons who distinguish between which levels of 
suffering are important It is these patterns and the responses which they inculcate in us 
which are the norms that govern our behaviour in conjunction with reason. 
If this model is correct, there are various ways in which it ought to he identifiable within 
the empirical evidence regarding our development. There ought to be a correlation 
between the behaviour of the primary carers in response to distress, and our emotional 
dcv cloitncnt. Morc specifically, in cases where the carer shows greater concern, this 
shý>ulýl result in turn in a greater sense of concern for the distress of others. Cons etsch-, 
where a child receives less attention vvhen they are in distress, or sees less attention being 
lavished can others \"-hen the., are upset, this should induce greater indifference to other 
people's suffering. 
See 56-62 above. 
"Phis is not to suggest that perfect consistency or reproduction of the same responses is required, anV 
more than it is when we learn to speak. 
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liefere considering the evidence it is worth offering a word of warning about problems 
within many of the empirical studies, which relates to the distinctions between 
C( 1npassiun and other closely related concepts discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
"There is an overwhelming tendency to talk of empathy and sympathy as if they were 
interchangeable, to the extent that it sometimes becomes difficult to know which 
concept they are referring to. l, or example, Mark .A 
Barnett tells us that `. A child whop has 
been shielded from particular distressful experiences, or discouraged from displaying 
overt expressions of distress would presumably have a difficult time utnpathizing with a 
nccdv other whose prcclicamei t or emotional reaction is perceived as foreign or 
unfamiliar. ', In such cases, it is not clear whether lack of sympathy for the distress of 
others makes empathy more difficult, or lack of empathy makes sympathy more difficult, 
or both. 
1'hc rcas<n for this tendency not to distinguish bct', ', -ccn the two may well partly stem 
from an apparently widespread assumption within psychology that we start out as egoists 
and acyuirc the capacity for sympathy starting from our selfish drives and travelling via 
empathy. [, '()I- example, Eisenberg and Miller state that `the child learns that behaviors 
that make other people happy or relieve their distress are pleasurable for the self as well. 
Thus pr()social behau ions are, in essence, self-reinforcing and frequently performed 
because of the child's experiencing others' affective states. 
' I have already rejected the 
model of empathy being either necessary or sufficient for compassion, ' and the same 
Birg umcnts will hold against empathy as a pre-rcyuisitc for sympathy in cases where it is 
sv mpathy for the suffering of others. 
With thcsc caveats in mind it is ncverthclcss possible to draw on the results from a wide 
raugc of research, and I shall argue that much of the evidence supports the explanatory 
framework for the development of compassion which I have set out. In the first place, 
what one might hlausiblv interpret as proto-compassionate responses conic as early as 
'o Mark A Barnett. 'Empathy and Related Responses in Children', in N Eisenberg and J Strayer eds. 
l; ný/ý iIn and its Dcrelopnicn/'. 154 
Nancy Lisenberg and Paul A Miller. 'Empathy. Sympathy and Altruism: Empirical and Conceptual 
Links'. in N [isenberg and J Strayer edd, -Empnihn' and as Dcvclopmcnt'. 
'` See 110 to III above. 
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eight months of age. This seems improbably early for an infant to have acquired the 
relatively complex skills associated with empathy, xvhcrebv they would have to come to a 
view as to how they would feel if they were in the place of a distressed person. I'he 
unliklihood of such a process being able to explain compassionate responses in children 
of such a young age is compounded by the observations surrounding the separate 
question of the development of a sense of self and other. If empathy requires an 
understanding at some level of what autollml- is experiencing and how I would feel in their 
place, then it also requires a sense of self and other to he in place. But the evidence 
suggests that this sense does not usually emerge until a later stage of development than 
that at which infants are capable of reacting sympathetically to another's 
distress. If this 
is the case, then even if empathy may be one route to compassion on certain occasions, it 
cai>>not be the only one. 
I low then cl(es the empirical evidence support the positive claims I have made for the 
development of compassion according to the behaviour of those around us? Two initial 
observations which need to be addressed are that there is a wide variety of responses 
identified in children in response to others' distress, and that there is a good degree of 
c()nsistcncv- in the reactions of individual children. '' The issue then becomes one of how 
we explain the reactions in each case, and whether or not they emerge as a result of 
environmental factors. There is evidence from at least two studies which support the 
model set out above. Carolyn /ahn-Waxlcr'' '/ ct/ argue that particular forms of 
behaviour on the part of mothers influence the future emotional responses of their 
children. 1, w- example, in cases where an infant has hurt someone, and the mother both 
e( mfcrts the victim and explains in a `moral tone"' both that this is wrong, and why, the 
child will tend to go on to comfort others when they are in distress. Similarly, vvhcn an 
infant is not the agent of the other's distress, but merely a witness to it, and the mother 
offers what one might think of as a concerned response to the victim, the infant 
witnessing this is more likely to develop strategies for comforting those who are in 
distress. 
"' See Ross A Thompson. 'Empathy and Emotional Understanding: the Lark Development of 
F. mpath%'. in Lisenberg and Strayer eds. Empulh-r and its Dcrelolmici t. 119-45. 
o Paul LI larris suggests that we first develop a sense of self and other at around two years of age. See 
C'hildr'en (Inc! Emotion, 56. 
lhid. 32 
Carolyn Zahn-Waster. M Radke-Yarrow &RA King, 'Child Rearing and Prosocial Dispositions 
I owards Victims of Distress'. in Child Develolmeni 50. 
l his is I1arris' interpretation in C'hilchren and Emotion. 36. 
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scco>nd and more disturbing source of evidence comes from a study on children from 
abusive backgrounds. Mary Main and Carol George compared groups of children from 
similar social backgrounds, some of whom had been victims of maltreatment within their 
families. " I'hc findings were that abused children did not exhibit obvious concern when 
ccýnfn)ntca xv°ith othct children who were upset, and tended to react aggressively-, 
sometimes even attacking the other child. '1'hc children from homes where there was no 
record 0f amuse tended either toi make a simple attempt toi comfort such as patting on the 
head, or often displav-cd a much dccpcr concern. 
Similar patterns seem to cmcrl e fro in both studies. ýX'hcic the parents exhibit 
concerned, comforting behaviour in the face of distress, and try to offer reasoned 
explanation, the infant will tend to develop into someone who is more concerned with 
others' distress. Children who have been ahuscd tend to react not simply with 
indifference, but even with outright hostility to the distress of others. It would be rash to 
suggest that this material offers conclusive evidence for the theory I have advanced, and 
many of the studies in this field stress not only the relative youth of the research into 
children's ctncýtio>nal development, but also the presence of various interpretations of the 
data. Nevertheless, there are three factors which emerge from these studies which 
provide support for the outline I am defending here. l irstly, it is difficult to sustain the 
vicvv of our emotions, including compassion, tieing somehow `hard-wired' into us from 
birth. Such a position would posit an ability to respond to suffering with which we enter 
the world, or which develops in much the same way our powers of sight or hearing do. It 
is just there at birth, and a standard range of external stimuli will allow it to develop. The 
empirical research will support the claim that this is a natural capacity- for which external 
stimuli are necessary if it is to develop, but also indicates that both what we perceive as 
suffering and which suffering is important is determined to a greater degree by social 
environmental circumstances than, for example, colour perception. " .A second point 
closely related to this first one is that there is strong evidence to suggest our social 
envirOrntncnt is of crucial importance in shaping our compassion. How compassionate 
we arc, hovv powerful our reshonscs are to others' suffering, and whc, sc suffering we are 
nu>vcd by are all susceptible to social influence. And finally, the early stage at which 
Main and George. 'Responses to Abused and Disadvantaged Toddlers to Distress in Agemates: A 
Study in the Daycare Setting'. in Developinenlul Psvchulogi'!. 
See ý8-59 above tor further discussion ofthis. 
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cc)tnpassionatc respcroscs have bccn identified indicates there is strong; rcasuýn to consider 
it as a direct response toi others' suffcrini;, rather than cmc which is routed through 
ciij arhv. 
I hav c ff>cuscd exclusively on compassionate responses in infants in order to support tn\ 
claims about its direct responsiveness to the suffering of (others, but there is a clanger of 
underestimating the dcchcr nature of compassion which we experience as adults. Whilst 
compassion may start out life as a relatively crude response to the suffering of someone 
in the immediate area, what I have called proto-compassion, it comes tct take on a much 
richer form. 
( )ncc we haty c language, we can be moved by descriptions of the plight of others who are 
distant from us. We acquire a conceptual resource which eb, (pe//S our emotional lives in 
comparison to the cruder emotions we experience as pre-linguistic infants. If an infant 
experiences compassion, it is a not a response which she can reflect upon. ifwe as 
adults are moved by the plight of someone close to us grieving at the loss of a family 
member, language allows us to consider how awful the loss is, judge how best to offer 
comfort, contemplate the value and significance of our own friends and family. This in 
turn may provide the basis for further emotional responses. We might suddenly come to 
reaffirm our feelings for those around us in light of our reflection, or perhaps he brought 
closer toi the person who has endured the loss on understanding the full significance of 
such a tragdry. Onc way of phrasing this is to say that although infants may experience 
compassion, they cannot recognise it as compassion and reflect upon the nature and 
significance of their experience. It is language which opens up these further aspects of 
our emotional lives, and it is in describing these sorts of phencnlcna that vvc come to see 
what is meant by having a greater depth to our emotional responses towards others. 
Raumond Gaita discusses an analogous distinction when comparing; the lives of animals 
to those of humans. I Ic writes that, 
( )n\ human beings (of the beings vVc know) have an inner life. That is because 
only human beings can reflect on what happens to them and take an attitude toi 
what happcns to them because of such reflection. An animal can suffer, but it 
cannot curse the ciao it was born; an animal can be afraid, but cannot be ashamed 
)f its fear and despise itself; an animal can be happ but it cannot be joyous; an 
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animal cannot ý; iVc Of its substincc to ccrtain pursuits and be adm<)nishcd for 
dcýith s(). 
A further process v., hich enriches this side of our moral and emotional lives is the 
capacity for vvhar has been called 'imaginative reconstruction'. ' This may involve 
reconstructing in our minds the distress someone would have felt given their 
circumstances. It could also) involve imagining how 5O>mconc who is hitherto unaware of 
some disaster is likely to react on hearing the news, or even imagining how future 
gencratiOns will suffer as a result of some virulent disease or environmental disaster. In 
each case, the imaginative process can move us to a compassionate response, and thereby 
hind us to a much wider group than is possible when these responses first emerge. 
I have alrcach argued for the stable role emotions can play in our lives, and this is true Of 
COMI assign als() the compassionate person is someone who is disposed to react and 
act co mhassi<)natchv can a consistent basis. This will receive much wider discussion in the 
chapter on moral reasoning, but vv-c arc now in a position to draw on the material in this 
chapter to 1)i()N-ide a fuller description of the moral agent, where 'moral' is taken toi 
indicate a c<mhassic)nate perspectiv-c. 
In the first instance, the moral agent is someone who has been brought up in such a way 
that she has acquired the right sort of emotional responses, a point made most famously 
by Aristotle. " This places a considerable degree of responsibility for our moral character 
outside our personal control, in that we are dependent on this around us for the right 
sort csamplc when we start out. But this claim does not rule out personal responsibility 
for our actions, as reason also plays a central role in the life of the moral agent, and even 
where v, c can trace a generally non-compassionate set of dispositions back to a difficult 
background, wc still expect the agent to be able to use reason to determine that actions 
about which she personally- may be indifferent cross moral boundaries in ways which are 
considered to be unacceptable. Reason can provide a route into) the Moral perspective 
vw hich can replace that of the ideal upbringing. 
Raimond Gaita, Gnod MO Eril:. 411, I Fi5u/n1e Conrep[ion, 120. 
For discussion of this see Lawrence Blum, 'Compassion', in Hora/ Perception uml Pcrriicu/ariiiy. 
See in particular, Vicrmruchean Elbics, II 03b24-25. 
I his will be discussed at much greater length in the next chapter. 
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I lic next key characteristic of the ideal moral agent is that she responds directly to the 
suffering of others. The internalised other of the moral agent includes a background of 
directed feeling which causes her to perceive suffering in a particular way. Such agents 
are distressed on coming to believe that someone else is suffering, and independently of 
concerns that they may suffer the samt fate, or of thoughts that they would not like it toi 
happen to them. It is this directness of this response and the co responding lack of sclf- 
intcrest vVhich characterise the moral outlook. 
A third 1cc\ point is that the mature moral agent, one whose moral perspective is a 
compassionate ()tic, will bring to moral situations a degree Of discernment. I, css 
sophisticated compassionate responses, what I have called prOt<ý-compassion, involve an 
inability to distinguish between suffering which is important and is therefore to be 
alleviated vVherc possible, and that which is not an appropriate object Of concern. What 
is to count as important suffering will reflect a complex range of shared ideals and 
standards across a community. ylorc straightforward cases will conic in the form Of 
sources of suffering which affect more or less any agent to a significant degree, such as 
physical pain or the loss Of someone close. More complex cases will be those whose 
cntrv into our scheme Of what counts as important can be explained less easily by means 
Of our 'natural constitution'. If we take cases such as the loss of a centuries old familv 
estate by an irresponsible heir, then one might plausibly argue that at least the suffering 
Of Other family members might be a form of suffering which merits compassion, or else 
one which is trivial in light of the fact that they didn't deserve such wealth in the first 
place. 
'I he first and third pints highlight in different wav s the role of reason in the overall 
thesis I am presenting. I have claimed that reason can both lead us into the moral 
perspective, and that it is crucial once ww c arc there. It is for these reasons that I have 
claimed that compassion and reason are jointly necessary and sufficient for a proper 
moýralit-\, and having provided a justification of the claim that compassion is necessary- I 
will o on to justify the claim that reason is also necessary in the final chapter. But prior 
toi this I wish to address the related issue of how One mischt use this approach to explain 
arnuthcr area of moral thought which traditionally poses difficulties for those v, ho> wish toi 
defend sentimentalism. How can a theory which claims that morality is grounded in the 
contingencies of our emotions explain practical necessity which morality invok cs? 
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Practical Necessity 
In perhaps the most moving scene in In/k! Kau-rnhla, harenin returns home to . 
Anna on 
receiving news that she is likely to die after giving birth to V'ronskv's child. I Living 
initially hoped for her death in light of the terrible humiliation he has endured clue toi her 
v cry public affair, 1ýarunin is implored by Anna toi forgive both her and V'ronskyý for 
what they have done. Faced with the depth of : 
Anna's despair and the force of her 
appeal from what he takes to be her deathbed, harunin finds it in himself not only to 
forgive them, but to offer comfort to V'rolskv. `Itiarenin took V'ronskv's hands and 
m<ov-C(l them away from his face, terrible with its look of suffering and shamc. '1 But even 
more extraordinarily , 
he then sets aside consideration of the shame he himself has earlier 
suffered. 'You may trample me in the mud, make me the laughing-stock of the world, -I 
\k ill not forsake her and will never utter a word of reproach to you...... I must and will 
remain with her. '- V'ronksy is simply bewildered in the face of such a gesture, but not to 
the extent that he is v. holly oblivious to the nature of what he has witnessed. '1Ic could 
not understand Karmin, but felt there was something high and inaccessible to one with 
his outlook on life. " 
! t; 'hcn K'arcnin explains his actions, he tells V'ronskv that `the joy of forgiving has 
revealed my elute to me. '4 And it is once the demands of duty have been revealed that it 
becomes clear toi harnrein what he 1ilrf., 1 do. And it is here where we begin to uncover an 
area of moral thought which raises a series of issues which sentimentalism traust be able 
to, explain if it is to be a plausible moral theory. Vronksv has not acted in a boorish 
manner, and has not set out at any point with the prime purpose of humiliating harcnin, 
but has acted primarily in pursuit of his love for . 
Anna, who has acted with a 
corresponding desire to be with the man she genuinely loves. But it is harenin who rises 
above the pull of inclination to act in accordance with what he believes to be right, as 
opposed to what he desires. Front a Kantian perspective, there is an account of what 
explains harenin's behaviour, and why neither of the other two protagonists are capable 
of the same sort of action. The `high and inaccessible' point of which V'ronsky is only 
v aguel\ aware is the moral law which commands us all insofar as we are capable of 
practical reason. Rc ardlc of inclination, and not because of it that this lam applies, and 





this law is the source of our (obligations to one another. It is the rcc()l nitiou of his 
oohliiation as a Christian and a husband which grounds his ! ii// /o remain with the wife 
he believes to by dying. It is because Vronskv has been guided primarily by inclination 
rather than a sense of duth, that he is incapable of comprehending harenin's response toi 
him, and it is why 190th he and Anna have conducted an affair which both of them 
hclieV-c toi be inappropriate in light of Anna's marriage. If sentimentalism cannot explain 
the necessity which springs from obligation, then it fails to account of a key area of moral 
thought. It is therefore essential to providc such an account, and this v,, -ill he the prime 
aim of the current chapter. 
I shall hcgin by setting out Humc's account of the source of obligation (()tic to which I 
am ho )adlv loyal), and place it in the context of the theory I have so far developed. I 
shall then consider one of the most powerful, recent Kantian critiducs of this sort of 
theory, that proposed by Christine horsgaard, and offer a response to her concerns for 
any moral theory which tries to explain the normativity of morality with reference to 
human nature. 'I he overall position which I shall argue for is that one can provide an 
account of practical necessity which is consistent with a Humcan approach, and which 
meets many but not all of the responses a Kantian is likely to raise. But I shall further 
suggest that hantian concerns which cannot be answered need not be fatal toi 
sentimentalism as it is unlikely that any theory could pass the kinds of test set out he 
K rsgaard. 
f Innýý° oil 0/)/rOalra/t 
The key test for sentimentalism in this context is ttý-ing to provide an account of the law- 
like demand which obligation makes of us - the sense in which obligation compels us act 
in a particular way, often in opposition to our desires. There are moments when it is not 
simply that we feel x-c ought to do something, but also some reticence due to competing 
demands, but when wvc feel we imi>/ do it, and no competing; demand carries any real 
force. What can explain the `must' in such instanccsý 1-lumc's account of obligation 
stems from his account of human nature. ' Our basic constitution is (mc which combines 
`selfishness and cc>nfin'd gencr(sitv'. " ( )Lir `a>nfin'd generosity' is further combined with 
Much of the following account follows that provided by David Wiggins in 'Categorical 
Requirements: Kant and Hume on Duty. in The Aloni. tit. Vol. 74. No. I. 83-106. 
(' David Hume, 
.1 
ireaiL e o/ Hunmm Aaii e, 498-499. 
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our capacity Of sympathy, which in Hume's terms is the tendency for persons to react in 
a similar to way to others one's they have recognised the suffering or the joy Of the other 
person. This means that the kinds of actions which promote happiness in One person 
arc likely toi have a similar effect in others, and it is when such actions have a positive 
impact that they are called virtuous, and when they have a negative impact they are called 
Vices. 'c very quickly come to recognise that unless we restrict our Own selfish 
tendencies through the following of rules laid down by wider society, then we will not be 
able tO cnjOy the benefits of participating in our community. But whilst in the first 
instance we act largely cut Of concerns grounded in self-interest, we eventually come to 
realise that even very distant acts of injustice, which have no direct impact On our own 
situation `arc prejudicial to human society', and as a result 'we partake in their uneasiness 
swJrýýýý/)t. by 
The key Point which now emerges with regard to the question of obligation, is that we 
engage in a process of what is csscntiallV moral induction, such that a `general rule' can 
be derived from the limited number of instances we have observed. This rule covers not 
only our own actions, but also those of others who act in an unjust manner. In this way, 
I Iumc is able to explain the emergence of obligation out of a combination of different 
characteristics to he found in our natural make-up. `-I ms 2-/in/cr-c. ýl is //)(' 017"411,11m0filv lo 
//i establishment o/ j: rslitv: brr/ a sympathy : aýi/b prrhli, irrlere. ý! is 1/1 . ohne o/ /LA, moral 
approbation m/iCh cr/lends 7/mt i'ir/ire. ' Hume never claims that we lose our sense of self- 
interest, but simply that we come to recognise that observing the wider rules of society 
are actually the best form of satisfying our selfish desires. Phis combines with our 
capacity for benevolence to create a strong commitment to the obeying what we take to 
be the rcyuiremcnts of justice, and the condemnation of those who fail to observe them. 
"l he most we can ever achieve in terms of improving the general moral standards of 
mankind is to v ork within the confines of what nature has imposed on us. °1'hc utmost 
politicians can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds; 
but still nature must furnish the materials, and i. ivc its some nation of moral 
distincti<ms. ", 'l he limited potential pof what can be achieved in the public realm is 





so private education and contribute to the same effect. "'' What we can hope to achieve 
in raisin; children appropriately, is that `the sentiments of honour may take root in their 
tender minds, and acquire such firmness and solidity, that they may fall little short of 
those principles which are the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply 
radicated in our internal constitution. 
'10 What extent then, could I claim support from Flume for the arguments I have made? 
irstlv-, I suggest there is an obvious correlation between I lumc's contrast between our 
selfish and generous impulses on the one hand, and what I have called selfish desires and 
the claims Of the internalised other. Like Flume, I am committed to the view that these 
twin forces both exert a pull on us, and both provide us with reasons for action. 
Scc>ndly, the idea that the emotions can be educated is one which I hay c suggested is 
central to both Our understanding Of the nature of emotion and to how we conic to he 
concerned with the plight of others. " A third key point is an emphasis can certain 
emotions as the key to understanding what makes morality possible. Hume talks 
variously of benevolence and natural sympathy, whereas I have placed the emphasis on 
compassion. '' The point of overlap is that each Of these emotions is concerned with the 
vý eliai°c Of others, and therefore open up the potential for a moral theory which avoids 
the sort Of rcductivism which would come if we w ere to try to ground morality in an 
emotion such as fear for our survival. 
It is nox important to return to the more specific question of how far this sort of 
approach can adequately explain the force of moral obligation. To begin with, it will be 
helpful to shccifv what is to be meant by the `moral' part of the obligation. Within the 
context of the thesis I have set out, this will be an obligation to respond to the claims of 
others, v,, -here those claims can be understood as the need to relieve or avoid important 
suffering. Important suffering is to be understood in a very broad sense as enduring an 
unpleasant experience or missing out on important opportunities which can reasonably 
be provided. " What then can be said to explain the force which allows us to describe 
this as an obligations One quick and easy answer which needs to be set aside is that an 
expression such as `I had to help her' can be understood as expressing a thought such as 
"' I/ icL, SOO. 
Ibid. 50 I. 
See chapter three for full discussion of this. 
For the key distinctions hetýticcn these concepts. see chapter six above. 
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, the reasons for helping her were much stronger than those of not helping', or `I felt very 
stronglv that helping her was the thing to do'. The reason whv such an approach won't 
do is that, as Bernard V 'ilhams points cut, `Ncccssitv is not the same as üccisiý cncss. 'ý' 
In practice this bcc<ýtncs particularly important vVhcn -,,, °c realise that either of the putative 
analv scs of the first proposition could he followed by `but I still didn't help her. ' If we 
are to take seriously the `had to' or the `must' of such expressions, then we must make 
sense of them as expressions of the of complying with obligation, rather than just 
expressing a sense of feeling that there Evas a powerful but not irresistible reason to 
perfl>rm a particular action. 
In light of this, the force of the sentiments which are inculcated in us must be such that 
rhev hro iclc not simply a reason to act, but one which compels us to act in the face of 
v,, harcvcr (opposing reasons we tnav be aware of. This is the position I shall go on to 
defend, but before cluing so I wish to address the response which wishes toi rule out this 
sort of approach altogether, as it is this sort of approach which best sets out the nature 
of the challenge which must be overcome in order to provide a satisfactory account of 
the nature of moral obligation. 
LAS- hrurliaii (, i i/inne 
1 he problem which anm Kantian is likely to find in the sort of Humcan account I have 
set out is that it fails adcquatclv to address the demands which moral obligations place 
upon us. In hantian terms, all moral imperatives on this account will be hypothetical 
ones, in that the most one can hope to achieve is the claim that if we are to he 
cOmpassiOnatc , vC will help those who are suffering, and if we arc compassionate then 
this will lead to a richer life both for us and those whom we strive to help. But if this 
argument is addressed to someone for whom compassion has no pull, and whop disagrees 
that it will promote his own interests to be compassionate, then there is no further 
appeal we can make from within the moral realm. This means that all those for whom 
the force of such appeals carries no weight have no reason toi act in accordance with 
what I have called a proper moralitv, one which is consistent with our nature as human 
beings. ( )nlh a categorical imperative can provide the law like necessity which applies to 
See 108-109 and I 15-120 above for further discussion of this. 
Bernard Williams, 'Practical Necessity, reprinted in his Aloral Luck. 126. 
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all agents, irrespcctivc of inclination, and only practical reason can provide this 
incscapable source of normativity within the moral realm. 
In order to respond to this sort of attack, I shall begin by setting out 
in greater detail why 
the sentimentalist account of obligation set out earlier must fail the Kantian test, and 
then suggest how one might respond. One of the most prominent, recent works of 
hantian moral philosophy provides not only a detailed contemporary hantiarn theory of 
moral normativity, but also an account of why any moral theory which 
is grounded in 
human nature must fall short of the required standard. In 7Ge So/fnes Of , Aolrllalrni/}', 
Christine K(>rsgaard argues that in order for a theory to stand up, it must be able to 
answer what she calls the 'normative question'. 
"' This question is must 1 do itr', 
vv here the `must' is one which springs from the demands of morality. There are three 
criteria which must he mot in order for there to be a satisfactory response. 
' The first is 
that the answer is one which the agent herself must accept, and it is not sufficient that we 
judge from a third person perspective that she must act in a particular way-. It must be an 
,, ins«cr such that the agent herself feels that in brings her moral enquiry to an end with a 
clear answer that she must act. The second criterion is that of 'transparency', which 
is to 
say that the agent must be aware not only of what she must do, but why. Justification 
is 
a part of any adequate answer to a normative question because we taust understand the 
nature of the moral theory under which we are acting in order to be sure we are not 
acting under the influence of a motive we do not wish to endorse. Finally, the answer 
`must appeal, in a deep way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of identity. '° 
korsgaard emphasise that the extent of what morality can demand of us, even giving up 
our lives in S(>mc cases, means that it must mean that on occasion the alternative to 
death 
is even vv-orsc `not being ourselves any more'. 
"' A satisfactory answer to the question 
will bring the questioning to the end. 'The unconditional answer must be one which 
makes it impossible, unnecessary or incoherent to ask why- again. '''' 
Christine Kors, -, aard, 
The Sources of Normutivilt", 16. 
See Ibid. 16-17. 
lhicl 
lhiil, 18. I his rather curious criterion is one criticised bN -1 homas Nagel in his response in the latter 
sections of the book (see page 206). As lie points out, it would rather cheapen the motive of an act of 
self-sacrifice to sav that we made it because we didn't want to lose our identity. The explanation ought 




l'he clucsti011 no>w becomes whether or not the kind of sentimentalism I have defended 
can meet the criteria which horsgaatd has set down, and she suggests certain ways in 
which such a theory could not. 'I'hr problem which I'lo sgaard highlights is essentially 
that once WC reach the end of teegal explanation in this kind of theory, we can still ask 
significantly if we must act in accordance with what it suggests our obligations are. If the 
clucsti, m can still be asked in such a vvay that a reasonable person might still demand an 
answer, then we have not reached the 'unconditional' point that an adequate moral 
thco ry must lead us to. Such a response this can be deduced from her criticisms of 
I lumc and Bernard Williams. " 
Slic argues that II lumc defends his moral theory from two different standpoints, that of 
self-interest and that of the moral sense. 
" Put brieflv,, she understands I-turne toi he 
claiming that our sentiment of benevolence snakes it possible for us to be concerned with 
the welfare of others, and self-interest reinforces this on the grounds that we derive 
personal pleasure from the pride which stems from being virtuous. She understands 
\Villiams t<t be arguing that `if we find that a social world promoted the best life or at 
least a flourishing life for human beings, this would justify the values embodied in that 
se; cial \k-corld. "` According to korsgaard, the similarities between IJume and \w'illiams 
exp()se the limitations to each of their theories. Where Hume establishes normativity by 
showing that morality is congruent with self-interest, Williams asserts that it would have 
to be established by congruence with human flourishing. ' In each case, we could 
meaningfully ask whether or not we must act in accordance with an obligation based on 
these premises, and the fact that the question stands in need of an answer indicates the 
inadequacy of the theory. The claims I have made over the last two chapters have drawn 
heavily on I lumc, and the same question therefore emerges. If an obligation is one 
which stems from a morality based in compassion, and this sort of morality is consistent 
with the kind of being I am as well as one which will promote a richer life for me, must I 
tobe- its If this is a genuine question, then it raises genuine doubts, and if there are 
genuine doubts then we do not seem to have the certainty embodied in the rn/i. cl Of Our 
moral obligations. I, or this reason, there is a need for an account of how sentimentalism 
call account for the force of obligation in the face of the normative question. 
See Ibic(, 49-78. 
lhicl, 55. 
I Not 75. it is worth noting that Williams broadly accepts this characterisation ot'his views, although 
he claims that Korsgaard somewhat exaggerates his neo-Aristotelianism. See N(12 13. 
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'1 o begin vy'ith, let me make plain that I do not believe that I can provide an answer 
which will satisfy the criteria Korsgaard has set down as they stand, but I 
do believe it is 
possible to provide an adequate account of how sentiments provide the force of moral 
Ohligati(nn without meeting these criteria. More specifically, I 
believe that we can give an 
explanation of why we feel we must perform certain actions which accounts 
for our 
sense of practical necessity in ways which do not require the unconditional answer 
demanded by the hantian. In order to elucidate this, consider for a moment the 
comment korsgaard offers at the end of her attack on Flume, Williams and : 
Mill; 'The 
test of reflective endorsement is the test used by actual moral agents to establish the 
lu rmativity of all their particular motives and inclinations. 
'' This approach toi morality 
has been earlier characterised as follows; `If we find upon reflecting upon the true moral 
theory that we still are inclined to endorse the claims that morality makes on us, then 
morality will he normative. I call this way of establishing normativity the `reflective 
endorsement' method. ', ' 
1t is not clear to me ho-, ti- literally we are 
intended to interpret the claim that `actual moral 
agents' use this test. I take this group to be something like ordinary persons, 
in which 
case we are faced vvith two options. 
The first is that horsgaard believes that ordinary 
people reflect upon whether or not they ought to endorse the claims morality makes of 
them. As a general empirical observation, this seems obviously false, and surely not what 
she itntendedl. . 
Altcrnati\-chv and more plausibly, the above passage is intended to mean 
that ordinary people engage in moral enquiry in which they reflect upon moral questions 
and sometimes conclude that they must act in a certain Nay. If the 
first option is 
obi iouSIyý false, then it is the second option we must consider, and this means that we 
need to explain the force of obligation in the context in which it appears, which is to sav 
in ordinary discourse, and not as a feature of advanced mctacthical theory. 
In this -\-ay, 
we may be able to explain the force of obligation in the context 
in which it appears in 
ordinary moral practice. It is toi this that I shall turn in the 




with the O1)\ 1()us riposte that this vVill not satisfy the categorical requirements of the 
mc, ral lavV. 
I'oo heim with, it will help to specify with greater precision the realm of moral (obligation. 
I have already said that the object of such obligations will be alleviating car avoiding the 
suffering of others within what I have called a proper morality, and the laxv-like sense is a 
reference tt the `general rule' which is acquired as a part of our emotional education. 
But further precision is required here. l, irsth-, the `must' or `have to' of moral obligation 
does not exhaust the modalities involved. Bernard \Villiams' work in this areas"' focuses 
primarily on the impossibility of certain actions, and we also need to consider what is to 
be meant by expressions such as `I couldn't just walk by and not do anything'. Next, we 
need to rule out certain senses of the modal expressions used. When we say- `I had to 
help him', we are not referring in this context to any, external force which compels us act, 
as in `1 had to help him because he -vas holding a gun to my head'. And when we say `I 
couldn't just walk by', this is not to be understood in the same way- as `I couldn't climb to 
the top of the tower because inv- vertigo prevented me from doing so. ' The way in which 
we must understand incapacitics in this context is as what Williams calls `incahacitics of 
character'. ' These are to be understood in contrast toi physical or psychological 
incahacitics, and a distinct set of reasons to explain our action or inaction can be given 
depending can what the source of such incapacitics are. If I say, `I couldn't just , valk 
bv', 
then this might be explained by a physical force such as a strong wind preventing my 
advancing any further. Or it might be a psychological state such as a compulsive 
curiosity toi see how people react when others help them up. It might also be out of 
ignorance, such as in cases where we might add, `I didn't realise I could get away with it'. 
But it might also he for reasons which we express in distinctly moral terms such as `I 
realised it \x as the right thing to do, and had to stop and help', and this fourth category is 
the One which leads us toi the question of character. 
" 
'('See in particular Practical Necessity', reprinted in his 1lorol Luck. 123 -1; 1. and 'Moral Incapacity 
reprinted in his Puking Sense of humanity. 46-55. 
See Alorul Luck 129. and Alaking> Sense of Hiumanitl'. 47 for further discussion of the different sense 
of the modal expressions in this context. It strikes inc that Williams discussion owes much to 
Aristotle's in Book III of the . Aicomucheun Ethics. For detailed analysis ofthat position. see Terence 
Irwin. 'Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle'. in AE Rorty (ed. ), Esscis nn APPistotle's Ethics. 
One point of similarity in all three cases is that when we say 'I couldn't do it', this is followed b) not 
doinu it. 
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The «aý in v' hich charactcr can he used to explain our feelings of incapacitv or our sense 
of having to icr in a particular way- is because our dispositions 
11 condition the way- in 
which we hcrcciv-e the events with which we arc confronted. 
What I recognise, when I conclude in deliberation that I cannot do a certain 
thing, is a certain incapacity of mine. I may he able think of that course of action, 
laut I cannot entertain it as serious option. Or I can consider it as an option, but 
not in the end choose it or do it. ' 
\V'illiatns 1)i()%-idcs further detail of how cxactly this process works in a latcr articlc, and 
()ncc again, I shall yu0tc at length. 
All this comes about because the dispositions that are the ground of the agent's 
incapacitics are focused on to a particular case through the vtiavs in which the 
feature of the case impress themselves on the agent vVaVs that arc best 
represented by a deliberation, even though the deliberation need not consciously 
occur. It is because of this, too, that when there is a conscious deliberation, 
which issues in `I can't', that conclusion presents itself at once as a decision, and 
as a discovery. It is a decision, as being indeed the conclusion of a deliberation 
whether to do that thing. But it presents itself to the agent also as a discovery, 
because the underlying dispositions have not before been focused through and 
on to that very conjunction of features. 
\V'ithin the context of what I have alrcadv set out on the subject of our ctn<ýtional 
development, I would argue that the reason why certain features of a situation impress 
thcinsch-cs on us in a particular fashion is a conscyuencc of the background of directed 
feeling which provides the backdrop to our perception of the vvorld. ', We come to feel a 
particular way about certain features of the world, and part of that is constituted by our 
feelings concerning the needs of others. It is on perceiving someone in need that such 
feelings are brought into play, and it is this sort of response which allows us toi rcco gnisc 
the disp) iti(, n-, 1(th in I )thcrs and in ourselves. As Williams points out, it is in part a 
"' ,I he vav in which our emotional development helps explain the development of dispositions of 
character is covered in `I he Moral Perspective'. See 76-87 above. 
° Bernard Williams. Aloral Luck, 128. 
Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessihv. 52.. 
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discvv cri- vehcn we realise that we cannot do something, and such 
discoveries can 
provide us with a better understanding of our ovVf dispositions. 
\\ hen we reach a point vdhcre we feel we must act in a particular way, or else we are 
incapable of acting, the necessity or incapacity indicates that the reasons for action or 
inaction are ()\-Cl-\X helming. It is not that there need literally be no alternative, but rather 
that the alternative exerts no serious force in the range of options before us. A'c 
perceive a situation, and we are struck so powerfully by certain features of it that some 
actions will present themselves as either required or out of the question, and 
it is the 
dispositions of character to which Williams refers which explain why our perception of 
the situation operates in the way it does. As an extreme example of this, one might take 
the nnc offered hý Hume in the second enquiry of the parent who `flies to the relief of 
his child; transported by that natural sympathy Which actuates hitu. ' 
'1'hc reason v by the need for action can press in on us so powerfully is because 
dispositions of character -- kindness, concern 
for others, love of one's children, loyalty, 
etc - inv(>lvc 
feeling a particular way about the world. When we are confronted with 
situations which bring; those feelings into play, our response will necessarily 
be one 
involving our emotions, and emotions always have the potential to motivate us to act. 
In some cases these situations will contain a level of urgency or extrctnity, or else such an 
unimportant series of alternatives, that one option will appear so crucial that its appeal 
o\-crwhelms the motivational force of the others. In such instances, the motivational 
force of that option is such that it is the only one which exerts what we feel to be any 
serious pull, and it is in such cases that we feel we mm/, r., /act in a particular way. 
" 
There. is one important caveat here which \Xlilliams introduces. We might well be asked 
On occasion to betray a close friend, and find it impossible to do so, but it is entirely 
See chapter two above for full discussion of this. 
David Ifume, Enquiries Uoncer-ning Human U17de1'Nh1Flding uncl Concerning the Princi/ple, c of 
Alorals, 303. 
See chapter three for an account of the motivational force of our emotions. I say the have the 
fnolcntial to motivate us to act, on the grounds that there may be others motivations which are more 
powerful, and prevent our acting out of emotion on a particular occasion. 
". lohn McDovvell makes a similar point in 'Virtue and Reason, when lie claims that our reason for 
action in such cases is seen. 'not as outweighing or overriding any reason for acting in other ways. 
which would otherwise be constituted by other aspects of the situation (the present danger, say), but as 
silencing them. Here and now the risk to life and limb is not even seen as any reason for removing 
himself. " Quoted from A>inil. I'u/rrc and Reulio. 56. 
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ýýýýssih1e that umaunv Of us will do so nevertheless under certain circumstances. 
There are 
forms of brutality or `ingenious coercion' which may result in our committing such acts 
of betrayal. But as Aristotle points out, `In some cases, not praise 
but pardon is given, 
, vhen a person 
does wrong because of things that strain human nature to breaking-point 
and no-()ne would endure. " In such circumstances we might reasonably claim that this 
d( es not reflect the character of the agent, and that when we talk of moral 
incapacity we 
can do so meaningfully whilst acknowledging that dispositions of character are not 
invulnerable to other influences under all circumstances. I have alread said that in order 
to understand what we mean by the term '<obligatio>n' as it is used 
by `actual moral 
agents', then we must consider how such terms apply in ordinary discourse. In 
light of 
this, it is perfectly Consistent to claim that the agent who couldn't betray her friend under 
ordinar circumstances might do so under torture. 
In short, moral obligation in the form of either having to or being 
incapable of 
performing certain actions can be understood as a consequence of how we perceive the 
world in light of dispositions of character. In some cases, we 
find ourselves confronted 
by sets of circumstances which bring down certain emotional responses, 
because we are 
the sorts of people vvho are disposed to respond in this way- when confronted with 
just 
such circumstances. In some of these cases, our perception of the situation vvill 
be such 
that only one course of action has any force in terms of what we are motivated to 
do (jr 
not to do, and this can be explained in terms of dispositions such as being compassionate 
or kind. The compassionate agent will perceive the suffering of someone 
in need as 
something which she needs to respond to, and on occasion the force of that need can 
explain why slic can honestly report that `I just had to help. There was nothing else 
I 
could do. ': 
lt/u irng Sense (1/7/uniwaitt'. 54. 
Arisotle, Aicomuchcw) Gihics, I I09a. 
Perhaps some qualification is required here. We take loyalty to be a characteristic we could not 
attribute to someone who consistently betrays a friend. but it would be a mistake to assume that this 
requires us to avoid any breaches of trust. All of us are prone to slip into disloyal attacks on friends at 
some stage. sometimes for the most trivial of reasons. Nevertheless. we are usually prepared to allow 
such a slip and to continue to think of the person who is guilty of it as a loyal friend. It is precisely for 
these sorts of scenarios that we have the expression to act 'out of character. 
11) There is a need here to consider that contrast between statements such as -I had to help' and 'I Iclt I 
should, so I did it even though I didn't have to'. This will be dealt with in the course of the next 
chapter on moral reasoning. as it concerns how it is that the process of deliberation can result in 
conclusions which have overwhelming force, as in the first example here, or ones which are less 
compelling. as in the second example. 
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In this way , vti-c can pn vide an account Of the 
force of obligation as it is used in ordinary 
discourse, but it is unlikely that this will satisfy a hantian critic. There are two points at 
which such a theory is still likely to fall short Of what Kant demands. I "irsth , One could 
argue that the compassionate agent has not reached the unconditional response when she 
says she must CIO the compassionate thing, hccausc she might still ask herself \\-hether or 
not she really must do it. The second point is that if we are to ground moral obligation 
in the contingencies of human nature, then how are we to explain the intuition that even 
if people cloy not have any compassionate dispositions towards others, they must help 
others v, hen they are sufferings llocsn't the obligation stretch beyond our contingent 
dislx>sitic)ns? 
As far as the First of these criticisms is concerned, it is far from clear that this presents a 
genuine problem for the sentimentalist. 'lhc concern is that the compassionate agent 
may perceive someone in need of help, feel that she must help, but then ask herself 
vv-hetlur she really must help because it is the compassionate thing to do. Once the 
1ucsti<ýn is asked in a serious way, then the doubt that it allows in diminishes the force of 
the original claim, and it therefore no longer appears to be an obligation. In order to 
dra,, the teeth of this challenge, we need to distinguish the different ways in which such 
an agent might ask this elucstio>n of herself. The first way in which she might ask it is in 
the sense of vv, hethcr or not there are possibilities which exist in the sense of their being 
ph- sicall) or psychologically possible. The sense of the question in such cases would be 
similar to my asking if I could run the hundred metres in under ten seconds, or if I could 
stand firm in the face of battle in the face of ()\-ciwhelming odds. Such questions require 
of an agent answers which indicate the range of possibilities from the third person 
perspective, and the agent can recognise the existence of such possibilities without 
acknowledging that they are possibilities for her. 
'l he Other relevant way in which the 1ucstion might be a significant one for the 
compassionate agent is if she asks herself whether coming to the aid of someone in need, 
where there is 11 0 obvious hurdle to her doing so, is really something she must do, or if 
she Couldn't simph i nýýre such a claim. If such a yucsriom really Could present itself, and 
it is ()nc that agent poscs and understands in a distinctly eioral light, then it would appear 
that we have not yet an adcyuatc account of the necessity of moral obligation. I or the 
oohv ic>us inference would be that if she genuinely doubts that she must do it, the 
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rcyuircmcnt of acting c(>tnpassionatcly cannot be one she feels she 1111r. ct perform. We 
vV Ould need a wreaker claim such as `she felt very strongly that this was the right act'. 
But 
the simple answer to this point is that genuine doubt over whether or not to come to the 
aid of someone in need in such circurnstances is not a hossihlc thought 
for the 
compassionate agent. TO be of a compassionate disposition means that she will hcrcciv-c 
suffering in a particular light - as something to 
be ended or prevented as a matter of 
priority. Such a disposition is not simply one among many in the sense of competing 
with other dispositions as to what will determine our course of action v. -hcn confronted 
with suffering. "k) describe it as disposition of character 
indicates that it plays a 
dominant role in our perception of situations where suffering is involved. Oncc we 
come to see suffering as something which requires our attention but in competition with 
non-moral demands such as the cost to us in time and effort, then the agent who 
has 
these thoughts just isn't one whom we would describe as having a deeply held 
c>>rnhassionatc dis11ositiOl. As such, the normative yucsti()Il 
is not (ie which the 
cOmpassi(mate agent can ask in the sort of way which would lead 
her to question the 
moral force of her obligation, and open uh the need for a deeper foundati(m 
for her 
cOnvictiOns. 
1'hc suggestion here is that a compassionate disposition of character 
blocks the 
potentially destructive path of the normative question. '1'hc answer to the question will 
he compelling for that agent whose dispositions condition her perception of the world 
in 
such a vvav that it seems obvious that suffering is a had thing. Once the 
intellectual 
onslaught that korsgaard wishes us to engage in is encountered, then the only way 
in 
which it will generate a diminution in the force that the disposition provides 
is if it first 
damages the disposition itself. We might become intrigued by the intellectual exercise of 
striving; to suspend our tendency to respond compassionately to those in need, 
but this is 
alrcadv the thought of an agent whose dispositions have altered. TO 
be sure, such 
dispositions are 
indeed vulnerable, and they may conic to be worn doom by misfortune 
or extreme circumstances, but this is a separate concern. There 
is as yet no reason to 
think that the compassionate disposition cannot stand firm in the face of the normative 
question, v1Jhcn that 1ucstiom is asked and answered in a distinctly moral 
light. As an 
example of this, consider once more Hutnc's example of the parent who 
fies toi his 
child's relief. AV-hcn asked later if he felt this was something he really had to do, then the 
genuinely loving parent could only ansv. -ct in one way. The dispositions of character 
141 
which condition his perception of his child's circumstances make no other answer 
possil)lc. If he were to say that he saw that helping his child was something 
he now 
realises he could have not bothered with, our horror would 
be compounded with the 
vie that the parent lacks the dispositions which are rcyuircd to 
describe him as loving 
of his children. 
this still Icav-cs in place the widcr issue of how our obligations to our 
fellow humans rust 
on the contingencies of human nature, and this 
brings us into conflict with the thought 
that there are acts which -\Nwould he wrong even if no-one objected to them. 
It is a 
perennial problem for any sentimentalist as to how to address F-lume's 
`sensible knavc', "' 
someone who has correctly calculated that is to his advantage to act unjustly, who 
feels 
no qualms about doing so, and whom we cannot bring to sec that 
it is in his interests to 
act justly in this instance. 1'hc theory I have defended 
leaves open the possibility that if 
all persons thou ght as such, then no-one would have a reason to act 
justly because none 
Of us would have the right sort of sentiments. But the thought stubbornly remains 
in 
place that even if none Of us thought it right to treat others with respect, 
it would still be 
right to do so and we would all have reason to do so despite our 
inclinations. The only 
cOursc open to sentimentalism here is sitnph to deny this 
is the case, and the best way to 
account for why we are so committed to the 
kinds Of obligations we currently feel is best 
cyhressed bv I Iutnc. 
I'hc interest on which justice is founded is the greatest imaginable and extends to 
all times and places. It cannot possibly be served by any other 
invention. It is 
obvious and discovers itself on the , -crv, first formation of society. 
All these 
causes render the rule of justice steadfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as 
human nature. And if they were founded on human instincts, could they have 
any greater stability 
The personal needs, interests and characteristics which make justice 
both possible and 
necessary are aimongst our very deepest. Our need for affection, our 
fear of suffering, 
our capacity fort 10) c acid compassiom, mean that 
in any community we are likely to sec 
rules emerge which conic to reflect in sonic form such primal 
features of whop we are. 
Sec David Hume. In Ei quire Concerning the Principles of <%lou/s, IX. 2. 
David Hume, 
. 
17rrulisc o/ Human Vaiurc, 620. 
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Our obligations are therefore ultimately contingent, but far from random. They are 
grounded in the deepest aspects of what it is to he human, and our needs and capacities 
arc sufficicntly stable to provide a robust basis for a powerful sense of obligation. As far 
as the concern over the ultimate contingency is concerned, we can do no more than 
observe that if the fundamentals of human nature were very different, then it is 
rcasOnable to claim that what we take out obligations to be might also be very different. 
I do not expect these arguments to satisfy a Kantian critic. korsgaard's demand for the 
unconditional response which will appeal on the basis of practical reason alone means 
that any space for a contingent basis for our sense of obligation must be ruled out. But I 
do hope to have provided an account of just how sentimentalism can explain the force of 
obligation without recourse to a moral law which holds independently of inclination. 
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8. Moral Reasoning 
Iii/im/1i "/inrr 
I have ar&ucd that our emotions play ,i crucial role in our moral lives, and this brings us face to face 
with the (lucstiOn of the role of reason within such a theory. The need here is particularly pressing 
for the simple reason that emotion and reason are often taken to be antithetical to one another. In 
an autobiographical aside, Antonio 1)amasio states what is surely a common view of the 
relationship between these two aspects of our lives; '1 had grown up accustomed to thinking that 
the mechanisms of reason existed in a separate province of the mind, where emotion should not be 
allov-,, cd to intruclc'l Within a theor of ethics, such a ,, rate of affairs would raise a serious problem. 
We appear to reason iii the ethical domain in a similar way- to many other areas of practical reason - 
drawing inferences, assessing the consistency of our bchcfs, coming to conclusions about the best 
course of action. But if reason and emotion are so distinct, then how could such moral reasoning 
take place at all? Wouldn't the emotions deliver up simple unreflective responses which guide our 
behau i(ur in the way fear prompts us to flee from danger? 
licvond csplaining hc>v, - the process of moral reasoning is possible, a further problem arises with 
regard toi the stability of our moral VicvV-s. Kant's view of inclination (under vx-hich he subsumed 
cnuýtiOn) captured a powerful intuition about the problem of relying on emotion within a theory of 
morality, ' 1I inclinations vary; they grow with the indulgence we allow them, and they leave behind a 
greater void than the one they intended to fill. ', This view of emotions as a capricious and 
unreliable conforms to a common view of emotions, and such criticism led Kant to regard with 
suspicion even our more praiseworthy ones. 
Inclination, be it good-natured or othcrvvisc, is blind and slavish; reason, when it is a 
clucstion of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but, 
without regard to them, as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the 
cxclusit, n of all else. Even the fccling of sympathy and warmhearted fc1lox". -feeling, \', -hcn 
preceding the consideration of what is duty and serving as a determining ground, is 
hurdcnsom e even to right-thinking; persons, confusing their considered maxims and creating 
the wish toi he free from them and subject only to law-giving reason. 
huch tllinl: in captures claims which must he dispelled if the theory I have set out is to stand up, 
and I shall sct out an account of moral reasoning which explains how the emotions can provide a 
Antonio R [)amasio, l)c'. ccwNes' Eu, o,. xi. 
Immanuel Kant, ('riligue of Practical Reason, 124. 
Ibicl 124-125. 
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perfectly satisfactory basis for such reasoning once we have before us a more rounded (ontology Of 
the emotions than the slavish (opponents of reason 1--, ant was so concerned about. 
In order to address the key issues surrounding the role of emotion in our moral reasoning, I shall 
lO()k at four central yucstions, the answers to which will provide a general account of the nature of 
this process. In the first instance, I shall look at the question of whether or not there really is an 
o ppositiOm between having an crnotion and good practical reason. After this, I shall 
look at the 
nature of personal deliberation, and at what we are doing when we engage in this. In particular I 
shall l()()1, at the issue of deliberating about ends and means, and discuss whether or not we can 
usefully talk of moral reasoning being concerned principally with one rather than the other. ( )ncc I 
have considered the nature of individual deliberation, I shall look at the nature of reasoning with 
others, and look once more about how and why this occurs. finally, I shall make some 
brief 
cc, tnments about what conclusions moral reasoning can hope to deliver up, and in light of this, the 
implications at the rnctacthical level. 
It will help at this stage toi give an indication of the position I shall be arguing for. In the first 
instance, I shall show that the emotions play a far more important role in practical reason than the 
hantiaul view ackncncledges. I shall draw on the influential work of Antonio Damasio to suggest an 
account of practical reason in which emotion plays an essential role in the overall process of 
reasoning and acting on Our conclusions. Far from disrupting the process, I shall argue that 
emotions provide the initial impetus for practical reason, then impel us through our deliberation, 
finally delivering uh the required motivation to ensure action in line with the conclusions we reach. 
With regard to the process of individual dchberation, I will try to show that conceiving of this 
process as one of strictly ends and means presents a misleading picture, and that this should be seen 
as more of a heuristic process in which reasoning and acting come toi alter what we see as 
appn)priatc ends and legitimate means to achieve them. 
I shall also try- to show that the process of individual deliberation is analogous toi the process we go 
through when we reason with others. In both these processes, we need to explain how reasoning 
can take place at all, -, x-h\ we reason, and what we arc trying to achieve. tip- aim is to show that 
«. hen «-c reason iudividuallv we aim at right action, and when we reason with others we aim at 
bringing them toi sec things aright. 1, ina11v, I shall suggest such views reveal a series of sceptical 
c(, ncertus ah()ut the limits of moral cnyuirv. 
Hie line of thought I shall be taking with regard to what seem initially like a series of distinct 
(1ucsti()ns is unified by the overarching vice- that all of our moral reasoning takes place fr<m1 within 
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what hohn McDoxx-01 describes as 'the midst of the way of thinking one 
is reflecting about'. ' '1'hc 
image McDowell borrows from Ncurath is of the sailor overhauling his ship whilst still at sea, and 
the central claim of this chapter is that this image captures the nature of our moral reasoning. 
If 
this is the case, and it is to be compatible with the theory set out over the previous chapters of this 
thesis, then it also requires that our emotions be conformable to such a process, and 
it is to this 
which I shall llm turn. 
I: nin/rnu (rurl IZtw. ou 
Before moving on to discuss the supposed opposition between emotion and reason, 
it will be as 
well to clarify the use Of the terms in play here. I shall treat moral reasoning as a species of practical 
reason, which stands in contrast to theoretical reason. 'I'hc principal contrast 
lies in the purpose of 
each, with theoretical reason aiming at describing the way the world 
is, and practical reason aiming 
g is a species of at coming too a decision as to what action to talk. To say that moral reasonin 
practical reason means that it is concerned with deciding what the morally right action would 
be in 
the circumstances. Although all moral reasoning will therefore be an example of practical reason, 
the latter has a much wider scope. It will include reasoning about yuintcssentially moral dilemmas 
such as whether or not to kill an innocent person to save other innocent 
lives, but also non-moral 
dilemmas such as deciding which exhibition to see given the aesthetic appeal of the various 
candidates. 
In this section, I shall be defending the claim that cmotion is essential for effective practical reason, 
but let me begin by admitting; the obvious fact that there arc clearly tithes when our emotions 
disrupt the smooth progress of reason. The most obvious examples are in the kinds of cases Peter 
(; oldie is referring to \x-hcn he talks of 
'when the red mist comes down over the eyes, and we can 
feel the blood Pulsing in the temples, things look other than the way they are, and, accordingly, our 
emotions can mislead us profoundly'. ' Such disruption can occur in a number of ways. AV'c can 
he 
soy jealous of someone that we cannot treat than with the fairness we believe thcv- are entitled to. 
We might be so distracted by our smouldering anger that it becomes impossible to focus on a task 
at hand. Or we might be so crushed by a sense of grief that no 
issue seems worth thinking through 
in order to reach a decision as to , x-hat to do about 
it. In each case our emotions disrupt or block 
the process of practical reason, thereby preventing us from reaching what we ourselves would 
consider the better decision vVVc would have come to were we not in the grip of these emotions. 
John McDowcll.: 11ind and 11,01. /c/. 81. 
Peter Cioldie. Can We I rust Our Emotions"', in Richmond Joiu"nul of Philosophl", Vol, Issue I. Summer 2002.27. 
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To admit that there are some cases vvhcrc emotion prevents good reasoning is clearly insufficient 
for the conclusion that in all cases emotion prevents good reasoning. Indeed, notwithstanding such 
examples, 1 shall suggest that all cases of effective practical reason require our emotional 
engagement, and that when our emotional lives arc disrupted we cannot engage in such reasoning. 
When I talk of 'effective practical reason', I shall take it to be composed of three constituent parts. 
The first is an ability to think through all the information at hand, weighing the different factors 
appropriately. The second is an ability to come to a decision as to what to do in light of the prior 
process of deliberation. And the third is a capacity to act on the decision. What follows is a 
eOnccptual outline of 11(m emotion aids us in the process of practical reason, and empirical evidence 
to support it. 
)ur cinoti<ms orient us to wards the world. " Certain features of the external world have an 
emotional impact on us, xvhilst others leave us cold. When we arc presented with certain situations 
which are trightcning, disgusting, worrying, unpleasant, attractive or classifiable under a wide range 
of other such 'feeling-laden' descriptions, we may be prompted into immediate, unreflective action 
such as in cases of 'blind panic', or we may he prompted into reflection about v hat to do , bout it. 
the latter cases bring us to the process of practical reason, but why are we prompted into it in the 
first hlacc% the situations which provoke us provoke certain feelings, which I have characterised as 
'perceptions of the state of one's body'. ' l, cclings have a variety of properties, including being 
pleasant or unpleasant. The phenomenon with which we associate the feeling, which could be an 
action, an abject, a person or a state of affairs, either attracts or repels us as a result of the feelings 
we have about it.. We are motivated to reason what to do as a result of the pleasant or unpleasant 
nature of the feeling, and the feelings guide the ensuing process. 
To put it more crudely, vice either want more of what it is that attracts us, or less of what repels us. 
( )f course this fails to capture the subtlety, complexity and depth of our considered moral 
reflection, but my aim here is to do nothing more than outline the properties of such reflection 
which are responsible for initiating it in the first place, driving it forward, and then producing 
action. I shall return to the danger of reduction in a moment, but it is worth emphasising that in 
v crv different v-vavs both Ilume and Aristotle also place great importance on the nature of our 
feelings within the process of morality. for . 
Aristotle, it is pleasure that causes us to do base actions 
and pain that causes us to abstain from fine ones, "and it is for this reason that it is crucial for us to 
have the right sorts of feelings if we are to be virtuous agents. I'or Hume, '\\, 'c do not infer a 
'-'See chapter three above for further discussion of this. 
I, or a full discussion of action caused by emotion, see Peter Goldie, The Emotions, 37-47. 
See chapters two and three below for the full discussion of both what feelings arc and how they come to be 
influenced. 
Aristotle. N icnniucheu;, Ethics. Bk II, 1104b, 10-I 1. 
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charactcr toi he virtuous because it pleases But in feeling that it pleases after a certain manner, we in 
effect feel that it is virtuous. 
"'' Once again, the feelings we have will be of central importance in 
shaping, our attitudes towards the world, and the way we reason in light of those attitudes. If this is 
ri ht then vVC need to understand exactly how our feelings operate xvithin that overall process. 
In the first instance, the account set out here indicates that we are hurled intot reflection rather than 
choosing or deciding which issues we will devote ourselves to. "There is a passive clement to our 
emotions and feelings, a sense in which they are already responding on our behalf before we atme 
to reflect about the circumstances in which we find ourselves. We are already immersed in a world 
prior to any reflection, and this brings with it certain involuntary reactions to events which confront 
us. AVc sec someone in pain, and if we are compassionate we react on seeing the person, prior to 
any, process of reflection which then takes place, but in a way which provides the impulse for that 
nrc)cess. 
hic lprooccss of deliberation, then, is impelled forward by feelings, but how clues it operateP In a 
different context, and in the midst of a very different theory, Thomas Nagel sets out certain criteria 
to which any smind theory of practical reason must surely conform. 
Beliefs provide the material for theoretical reasoning, but finally there is something 1)csidcs 
1)clicf, namciv reason, which underlies our inferences from one set of beliefs to another, and 
explains both the conclusions and those logical beliefs which embody our inferential 
principles in general propositional form. '' 
Such views look initially as if they represent a clear obstacle to the kind of non-cognitivist account I 
am arguing for, in that I have already accepted that our emotional episodes are capable of disrupting 
the inferential passage of one belief to another. But this obstacle is illusory in light of the way I 
have characterised the intentional and complex character of our emotions and feelings. I have 
referred already to the term 'feeling-laden belief deployed by Alichacl Stocker. '-' Such beliefs differ 
from their neutral counterparts in the sense that they prow idc a different dimension to the process. 
If I am deliberating between watching a soap opera on television and going to the funeral of a close 
friend, then the latter seems to a exert greater pull than the former. The reason it is distinct is 
because concepts such as friendship entail having certain feelings about the person we see as a 
friend. ( )nce those feelings are present, then they guide our reflection, providing it with a distinct 
content. Going to the funeral now becomes an act of loyalty, because it involves answering the 
David I Iume.. 1 1) cali. ee n/ Hw)wii A'aturc. 471. 
Thomas Nagel. The I ssihiliir u/. 11/riuism, 31. 
See page 28 ahove. 
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claim of friendship, a claim which is »'/t. ()tic just could not sincerely consider someone to be a 
friend if one -\k-crc indifferent to her, and it is here where the contrast comes in with the watching 
television. Such an option maY well offer an appeal which is also felt, but it does not v et bring into 
play feelings about others, and does not therefore brim; into the process of reflection the as 
powerful a set of loaded, feeling-laden concepts such as friendship or loyaltti. The presence of 
certain feelings which are intricately 
bound up with the beliefs dramatically alter the path the 
reasoning takes. Although it scarcely does justice to the role such beliefs can have, the term which 
captures the way in which such beliefs contribute to the process is that they carry greater meeii//, and 
as such, this category of belief has the ability to ovem-hclm the weaker counterparts. 
lt is <>hcn to the hantian at this point to counter that the claim of friendship need not be a>nccivcd 
of in terms of feelings. Could it not he the call of duty and respect for the moral law which explains 
whv it is that such claims weigh more heavily with us? This strikes me as a plausible suggestion, but 
my principal focus at this stage is to sct out a coherent account of how emotion and feeling can he 
rcco ncilccl with the process of practical reason. AVhcn considering the empirical evidence, I shall go 
()n to say that this offers mcrc support for a sentimentalist account of practical reason than a 
hantian one. 
'1 oo return toi the p()int al)Out the role of emotion in moral reasoning, a sceptic could simply accept 
the premise about motivation, in that it would be difficult to deny that emotions certainly mcotiN-ate 
us to act in certain ways, and as we have seen, Kant will certainly grant the power of certain 'good- 
natured' inclinations. But the question still remains as to whether or not the 'feeling-laden' beliefs I 
have referred to could conform to the standards of reason which Nagel referred to. If our moral 
reasoning involves feelings and emotions, then don't they invariably bring with them a non-rational 
clement which will get in the way of drawing inferences and reaching conclusions which conform to 
the cold hand of reason? 
I ackn<>Medgcd at the beginning of this chapter that vv-hcn the 'red mist' descends it is unlikely that 
vVc will be aide io reason effectively, but I have also stressed throughout this thesis that it is a 
mistaken \-icvi- of our emotional lives to see it entirely in terms of unreasoned outbursts. ( )III 
emOtiOns are often stable, open to change 
based on reasoned argument, and entirely co mhatihlc 
with a central role in practical reason. In order to highlight this, we can consider they way in vchich 
v-, c expect coherence and Consistency amongst our o,,, -ii views and those of others when it comes to 
arguing in ways Which are clearly infused v,, Vith emotional responses to a state of affairs in the world 
around us. Cý>nsiclcr the following example: 
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It is m<)rallý vv-rong under all circumstanccs to support a law which pcrnnits the lives of the 
inn()ccnt to be taken. 
In c(>untrics %,, -hcrc the death penalty operates innocent people are executed. 
Therefore 
SUI)l)(wting a law permitting the death genalt is morally wrong. 
I'. yen if the person offering this argument slid so using the premise that emotion was the basis of all 
rauoral commitment, this wouldn't lead us to doubt that this is a sound use of the practical syllogism. 
)race wc have a fuller understanding of the stability, persistence, and coherence of cur feelings, and 
the vV ay in vv hich they comme to colour our beliefs in a consistent manner, then we have taken a 
majOr step in explaining why a process of reason v, vhich has a central role for emotion leaves open 
the possibility of rational criticism and rational deliberation. The reason why this is so is because 
the vay in which -, w: -c acquire the direction of feeling involves the consistency that sound practical 
reasoning requires. W c strike someone, and we receive a look and tone of admonishment. We do 
the same thing again with the same result, and we come to associate the act of violence with the 
stern reslxrnsc, and thereby con-ic to feel a particular wvav about violence. There is sufficient 
coherence built in toi the education of the feelings and emotions, an education that entails the 
combining in consciousness of the unpleasant feeling and the belief that we have struck someone, 
that feeling and emotion can conform to practical reason in view of their association with certain 
relevant beliefs. The beliefs provide, as Nagel suggests, the material for the process of reasoning, 
but we are 
dealing with a material of a distinct nature, distinct in light of the feelings which they 
now bear. 
The best -, x-a\- to capture this process within the current discussion, is toi say that our feelings 
towards the ýti cn-1c1 make certain aspects of the world c, /icvil when we conic toi consider which course 
of action to take. When we have developed an aversion to violence, the perception of violence now 
hcc<mlcs salient in our process of deliberation in ways which would not have been possible without 
this sort of emotional education. This phenomenon of certain states or activities conning to Inc 
perceived, so to spcak, under the influence of feeling, is what it is for such states or activities to take 
can greater v, eight vvithin mir process of reasoning. 
In short, feelings impel us into the process of practical reason in virtue Of the fact that they just are 
a tcsp )ii c to what is pcrccivcd in the world vvhcn thcv are experienced vvithin cincýtii>ns, emo ti<ms 
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being intentional states. AV'c have already been drawn in before we come to reflect on what to do, in 
that we already have pro or con attitudes with regard to certain features of our situation. 14 In 
addition, they provide greater weight for beliefs about some courses of action rather than others, 
and the fact that there is a level of consistency and coherence in the beliefs they colour means they 
present its with the possibility of rational criticism of our practical judgements. That is to say-, ,i con 
attitude tOvvards violence wilI emerge across a range of different circumstances and scenarios which 
involve actual or possible violent acts. Where there is such consistency, then there is the possibility 
of criticism whenever we find inconsistency in our responses, or lack of coherence in our beliefs 
v, ith regard toi v iOIent acts. 
Soy cur feelings provide us vVith the impetus which drives us to reaching decisions. It is only once a 
decision has been reached that appropriate action can commence to resolve the problem, and it is 
for this reason that feelings push us through the process Of deliberation until a satisfactory outcome 
has been settled upon. . 
And this structure is reflected in our manner of explaining our actions and 
those Of people around us. We sec s( mconc being attacked. The belief about the violence of the 
attack is com1 bincd iu consciousness with a feeling. ']'his combination of these two elements is an 
emotional response, which might be, in this case, anger at the aggressor. This means we have 
already responded before we come to reflect on what to do, and that response is the emotion. The 
anger involves a con attitude, which explains why- we contemplate action at all, and if we decide that 
the thing to do is to inten-cnc, the anger will than offer an explanation at two lct-uls. If asked 'Why 
did you even think abtut doing something?, and then 'Why- did you do something?, the ansmcr 
'Because I was angry. ' rationalises both our entering into the process of practical reason and the 
ensuing action, which is to say- the anger is a reason for both, it explains both, and it caused both. ° 
1'hc third and final clement of effective practical reason is that appropriate action must emanate 
from it. It is not sufficient that we come to a view as to what action to take - we must also take that 
action, and gee must take it because of the decision wk e have come to. "' As such, feelings spur us 
into reflection in the first place, then impel us through the deliberative process, and then provide 
the impetus for action. But beyond this, there is a further role they must play. The decision which 
See chapter three above for the full discussion of how our feelings come to be directed. 
For fuller discussion of the relationship between feelings and pro and con attitudes, see page 39 above. 
See 39-42 above for a more detailed account of emotion and motivation. I am aware that this may seem like a 
painfully analytic consideration of an action whose phenomenology may be much more unified and swift than this 
suggests. but this is not intended as an account of the phenomenology of such angry responses. there will be a 
discussion of what I call 'simple moral responses' in the final section of this chapter. 
"' The Position I argue for here is consistent with that expressed by Davidson in 'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. 
reprinted in his Ls. tiers on , fc. diuns and Events. Like Davidson, I hold that reasons cause actions, and I would wish 
to argue. which Davidson does not. that the causal force is provided by our feelings and emotions. A further 
consequence of this thesis is therefore that all reasons for action are 'internal reasons'. in the sense argued by 
l; ernard Williams in 'Internal and Lxternal Reasons', reprinted in his collection l>oral Luck. On my account of 
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issues from deliberation may well require an ongoing coi mitmcnt on the part of the agent. .A 
decision such as committing oneself to working in the public sector for the sake of one's fellow 
citizens rcyuires a sustained engagement with certain activities, a disposition to ignore the appeal of 
alternatives, a readiness to persist in a particular career even during periods of particular 
dissatisfaction. It is what I have called a background of directed feeling' which makes this possible. 
Wlicn we reflect on which course of action to take, we arrive at a decision which involves coming to 
feel a certain xv av vvith regard to the action we have settled on. This guides us in a settled, stable, 
ongoing fashion, which persists despite the kind of obstacles I alluded to earlier. This is not to say 
that such feelings are static, and many x ill be open to revision or even rejection further clown the 
line, laut mY point is simply that they provide the platform for an ongoing implementation of the 
decisions issuing from practical reason, one which complements the motivational force they offer at 
the moment of the decision being taken. I , clings perform this role in light of their making certain 
features of the world more salient within the deliberative process, often on the kind of ongoinL 
basis required for sticking at certain projects. 
Before setting out the evidence which supports this conceptual outline, it is worth emphasising one 
point with regard toi the limitations of what i am arguing for. What I have set out is no more than 
the form of hovV emotion and feeling contribute to our practical reason, but once one acknc)wledgcs 
the crucial role for Such Phenomena, then there is a constant clanger of appearing hopelessly 
reductive in the descriptions we offer. I have argued already that one problem we face in describing 
our feelings and emotions is the impoverished vocabulary at our disposal when it comes to saving 
what they are like, and it is crucial not to lose sight of this point when discussing the way we actually 
reason. 't'here is depth of what it is like, of how it feels to love or hate, to grieve or to fear, and the 
argument I have set out here should be seen as a formal outline of the reflective process often 
prompted by such emotions, and nothing more. The phenomenal feel of such thinking will often 
be far better explored in poctr\ and literature, and by way of example consider one of the seminal 
cases of practical reason from literature: 
'"You mean I have to choose" 
"Y( u'rc a P<>hick, not a Yid. That gives you a privilege -a choice" 
I Icr thought processes dwindled, ceased. Thun she felt her legs crumple. "I can't choose! 
I can't choose! ' She began to scream. Oh, hon,, - she recalled her own screams! Tormented 
angels never screamed so loud above Hell's pandemonium. "Ich kanrn uic1it mi/i/ru" she 
scrcamcd...... 
reasons for action. a reason vvill come out as a combination of a belief and a feeling combined in consciousness, and 
which would have to form part of the agent's 'subjective motivational set'. 
See chapter three above. 
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"Don't make me choose, " she heard herself plead in a vchispcr, "1 can't choose. " 
"Scud them both over there, then, " the doctor said to the aide, "nach link. s. " 
"Mama! " She heard I. va's thin but soaring cri at the instant that she thrust the child away 
from her and rose from the concrete with a clumsy stumbling motion. "'l'ake the baby! " 
she called out. "'l'ake my little girl". "" 
T() tall: of feelings and beliefs as anything more than a rather lifeless, technical description of the. 
rcasOning which goes on here would be grotesque, and this point will be crucial when I return to 
the (1uesticýn of h()\\- we reason with others. But I cite this here merely to emphasise there is a need 
to be aware that discussit>n of our emotional lives through analysis of concepts or consideration of 
NicolOglcal factors can be expanded to include the kind of exploration found in literature, which may 
SOmctl mcs provide us with a fuller account of what we are discussing. What I wish toi consider now 
is whether or not there is wider evidence to support the theory as a whole. 
If the outline set out above is correct, then it entails certain claims which can be measured against 
empirical cv idence. One such claim is that if a background of directed feeling is essential for the 
smooth operation of practical reason, then in cases where someone is incapable of standard 
emotional and fccling-related responses, they should be incapable of effective practical reason. A 
second claim is that if we are capable of reasoning at an abstract level about what course of action 
one should take, this will be insufficient to generate action once a decision has been reached, or else 
insufficient to make the decision stick where one is required to act consistently over an extended 
period unless there is a feeling or emotion involved. Both of these claims are supported by the 
findings of Antonio l)amasio's research into patients who have suffered brain damage to areas such 
as the vcntrcýmcdial prefrontal cortices and the somatoscnsotN- cortices in the right hemisphere. '" 
IDamasicý describes the condition he has identified as the 'Phincus Gage Nlatrix', after a nineteenth 
century American railroad worker who suffered but survived horrific injuries to the prefrontal lobes 
as a result of ßu1 explosive charge prematurely detonating. 
llarnasico anale scs the medical history of Gagc and similar victims of brain damage to these areas of 
the brain which are regarded as the seat of the emotions. With Gage, as with the others whom 
I)amasia studied, 1ýý>ýlily sufival was accompanied by a transformation in character. 'Gage's 
clishý>siricm, his likes and dislikes, his dreams and aspirations arc all to change. Gage's ho>av may be 
William Stvron, Sophie' Choice, 589-90. 
"' Antonio Damasio. Ocscarics' Error. 
153 
, 111v"C 111 C1 well, 
but there is a new spirit animating 
it. " Part and parcel of this transformation was an 
inability to interact successfully- with those around him, as he had done before. An increasingly 
Chaotic social life in which he was unable to sustain previously stable relationships, 
devc1op new 
<)ncs, ()i- remain in work, sa- him finish up in a circus before an early death. 
( )tic of the patients l)amasicý Evas ablc to study in person prox-ides 
further evidence for the \-icwx 
that (lisruhtion in the elm )ti( nal life severely impairs our ability to reflect and act effectively. 
Tallot' 
had had a brain tumour successfully- removed, but not before it had 
damaged the frontal lobes 
;i aitlst which it had buch pressing. 'ftc 
impact on I . 
lliot was that he could no longer organisc his 
life in the way he had done previously. DamasiO describes his behaviour as fo>llo>ws; 
I- Ic nccdcd prompting to get started in the morning and prepare to go to v. ork. ( )ncc at 
\v ()rk lie vv as unable to manage his time properly; he could not 
be trustee] with a schedule. 
When the job called for interrupting an activity and turning; to another, he might persist 
nonetheless, seemingly losing sight of his main goal. Or he might interrupt the activity 
he 
had engaged, to turn to something he found more captivating at that particular moment. 
" 
In short, 1 iliot had lost the capacity to plan, organise and prioritisc either short-term or 
long-term 
tasks. But there is a further dimension to his condition of particular importance to the theory set 
out earlier. The psychological analyses of 1 aiot indicated that 
his intellectual abilities, far franz 
heim; impaired, were either average or superior, including in tests where he was asked to judge 
which course of action would be appropriate in moral 
dilemmas, where his answers indicated an 
outstanding ability to think through respond in ways which were consistent with the responses of 
those who had suffcrcci no such brain damage. 
the area vv here l)amasio concluded that I Iliot was wildly at odds with others who participated 
in 
the tests he undertook was in his emotional responses. In tests where he was shown emotionally 
charged images such as people injured in terrible accidents 
he was unmoved, and even when 
describing the do onward spiral of his own life he spoke as a 'dispassionate, uninvolved spectator'. 
What adds to both the tragedy and the curiosity of the case was that 
he was aware of ho different 
this was to the va N he would have responded in the face of such circumstances prior toi the tumour 






h) what extent does this provide support for the account of practical reason I set out carlicrý, 
I, irstl%, Damast() himself concludes that our capacity for feeling provides us with the 'somatic 
markers' which he describes more colloquially as 'gut feelings'. '1'hcsc attract or repel us from 
certain stimuli, and he secs them as essential to cur capacity for impelling us to act on a decision, 
and toi stick at it over time. l'urthcr support conics in the form of the ability of some of Damasic, 's 
patients to) C nltinue to reason through abstract problems in ways which do not translate into an 
ability to act cffcctiv eh in real life. I? lliot's performance in the laboratory tests was exemplary, yet 
he sirnhlý could not translate such ability into effective action. The reason given for this is his 
cnuýtic, nallv flat response toi the situations he was asked toi address. In the terms set Out at the 
beginning ()f this chapter, it is as if conclusion,,, reached at the end of a process of practical reason 
which wmild normally constitute reasons for action, v, -crc treated as conclusions of theoretical 
reason which did little more than describe the way the world is. They either failed to generate the 
actions they should have or else failed to provide the persistence which was required. 
It is at this point that vVc find a particularly strong challenge to the Kantian view. If respect for the 
moral Ia«V provides the required motivational force for us to perform our duty, and Conclusions 
reached about vxliat to do require no additional motivational support from the emotions, then 
": llic)t's condition appears difficult to explain. The evidence suggests that he retained an outstanding 
alhilitv to reach conclusions about how to act, but clearly lacked the ability to act accordingly. One 
response might be to ask how confidently we can count on the empirical evidence given the handful 
of relevant patients Damasio has treated, and it would be over-confident to treat this as a 
knuckdOvv-n argunment, but it adds force to the v-icv-, - that the emotions are necessary 
for our practical 
reasoning given the detailed analysis of the individuals llamasio has looked at. It also conforms to a 
standard Flumean claim that reason on its own cannot motivate us, and it coheres with the wider 
claims contained in the present outline of our process of practical reasoning. 
The conclusions reached by 1)amasio arc consistent Faith the line of argument developed in chapters 
tv,, -o and three above, and at the beginning of this one. We arc oriented towards the world by 
background of feeling which conics to he directed in a variety of ways over the course of our 
development. It is vdhctl sec are confronted by unusual or pressing circumstances that these feelings 
often erupt within the context of our emotions, and it is only, when these feelings arc operating 
nootmally that we can deliberate in which will allow us to act on the decisions we reach. 
111(lirirlifal I )"Ii/'r., i/lour 
Having set out this outline of how feeling and emotion contribute to practical reason, it is now time 
to focus nu>rc hrccisclV on the subject of mural reasoning. When someone deliberates about what 
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vvould the moralh right thing to do would be, how should we understand this I'irsth-, we need to 
have a clearer idea of how the moral part of the question distinguishes these examples of practical 
reason from others. I have characterised the moral hcrsl)cctix-c as an aspect of the internalised 
other, ' - the feelings and emotions which have been shaped 
by those around us such that this 
influence has hccomc part of our own perspective on the world. 
Moral deliberation vvill aim at deciding on the right action in light of the claims, needs and interests 
of the others around us. It will involve the same processes of reason as other forms of practical 
reason - deciding what the relevant considerations are, considering the probable outcome of 
different actions, drawing inferences from our premises, aiming; for a conclusion which will 
Constitute our reason for acting - but the content of this sort of practical reason will be distinct. It 
will stand in contrast to deciding what to do in order to satisfy what I have called personal desires. 
the involvement of other persons generates a series of feeling-laden beliefs which provide the 
content of our reflection with a significance beyond that of deliberation about more self-regarding 
subjects such as which television programme to watch. 
then should we understand the dclibcrativc part of moral deliberation? One very 
straightforward way of breaking down the problem is to say that either Aristotle was right when he 
argued that is deliberation of always of means, or else \urcl Kolnai was right when he entitled one 
of his articles 'llcliberatiol is of I nds'. " This might be the most straightforward approach, but it is 
unlikely that it would provide a satisfactory theory in this context. kolnai's title is deceptive in light 
of his discussion of the complex way in which ends and means relate to one another, and at least 
one important interpretation of Arisitotle's dictum suggest that we need to be on guard against 
being too oluick in how we understand what Aristotle meant. '' I shall nevertheless approach this 
part of the discussion by focussing on the question of means and ends, but argue that in the final 
analysis that they are interdependent. 
I ct us first consider the starting point of any instance of moral dclibcration. '1'hc first crucial 
observation is that the theory of emotion set out so far indicates that there could be no such thing 
as a neutral standpoint. We arrive at any situation with a background of directed feeling wti-hich 
orients us towards the world around us, and which involves a way of seeing and understanding what 
we find heforc us. This orientation is acquired from a very early age, and develops as v,. -c do. This 
means that we arc disposed toi respond in certain ways which reflect a wide range of influences 
See chapter four above for a full discussion. 
See Aristotle, 
, 
Aicoinuchean Ethics. Bk III. II I2b, and Aurel Kolnai. 'Deliberation is of Ends'. Proceedings (? / Ihc 
lri. rtntcliun Society (I962). 195-2 18. 
David Wiullins, 'Deliberation and Practical Reason', in N'ceds, I aloes. Truth, 215-239. 
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cndu red over the course of a life» 't'his much mai- be admitted without ncccssIrilY- impinging upon 
a dcl)atc al)<)ut means and ends, in that two people from radically 
different backg round muht still 
be expected to converge on the same answer as lang as we could 
isolate a series of moral facts 
which ally rational individual could recognise. But the theory I have argued 
for rules out such an 
option with regard to moral deliberation on the grounds that both means and ends are 
dependent 
not c)nlv on Onlc anOthcr, but also on the perspective of the agent herself. 
Let me offer an example from literature. Ian Nicl : vvan's . 
Ilotteilmmvu/ tells of an adolescent fantasist, 
l, ri(>ny, «ho is deeply suspicious of the man, Robbie, who is pursuing her elder sister. 11er 
suspicion is such that she opens a letter from Robbie intended for her sister. She 
knows that 'it is 
wrong to open people's letters, but it was right, it was essential, for 
her to know cý cri thing .ý 
Her 
sincere conVictiOfl that 'it was right' stems from her genuine fears about Robbte, and 
her heartfelt 
desire to protect her sister. ( )n reading the letter, an obscene note which has been mistakcnh- 
placcd in the envelope, Brionv is reinforced in her previous view of the situation. With the 
letter, 
something elemental, brutal, perhaps even criminal had been introduced, some principle of 
darkness, and ..... she 
did not doubt that her sister was in some way threatened and would need her 
hclh. ', 'ý '1'hc than not only prcscntcd a fearful picturc to Brian-, but 'disgusted her profoundly. ' By 
this stage she is convinced there is a genuine threat to her sister and the wider 
household, and she is 
motivated to protect both. She seizes her chance vvhcn another girl visiting the house is raped, and 
Briom dishonestly identifies Robbie as the assailant, resulting in his ultimate imprisonment for a 
crime he has not committed. 
When rcflccting, she is avvarc of ccttain doubts regarding her course of action, but remains constant 
ncv-Clthclcss. 
It1he glazed surface of conviction was not without its blemishes and hairline cracks. 
Whenever she was conscious of them, which was not often, she was driven back, with a 
little swooping sensation in her stomach, to the understanding that what she knee- was not 
iitcraliv, or not only rased on the visible. It was not simply her eyes that told her the truth. 
It was too dark for that. I Ivcn I ola's face at eighteen inches was an empty oval, and this 
figure was many feet avv av , and turned 
from her as it moved back around the clearing. But 
n<)r \kas this figure invisible, and its size and manner of moving were familiar to her. I Icr 
eves confirmed the sum of all she kncv\, - and had recently experienced. .... 
'1'lic truth 
See chapter three above for a full discussion of this. 
Ian MCI, an, . 
Ilonenrern. 113. 
`` Ibid, 113-114. 
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instructed her eves. So when she said, over and over again, I saw him, she meant it, and was 
pcrfcctly honest, as well as passionate. 
I suggest Brionv's bcha\-iour is representative of the »rnhe. is of moral reasoning in general. In the 
first place, she starts out with a series of relevant feelings which orient her towards the particular 
circumstances she is Confronted with - hei suspicion of Robbie and 
her love of her sister. These 
feelings then shape her understanding of subsequent events. She judges that opening the letter is 
right because of the overwhelming need to protect her sister and the household from Robbie, and 
believes lying to the police is justifiable on the grounds that her understanding of the truth has been 
enhanced in a way which may escape them if the bare facts are presented. What she 
'knows' 
extends bcv and what she saw with perfect clarity, and this honest conviction provides 
her with the 
basis of her testimony. In the terms set out above, her background of directed feeling conditions 
her understanding of events and then guides her as to the right course of action. At each point, it is 
her emotional responses and her fccling-laden beliefs which elicit reactions with a particular 
content, and prompt her in certain directions. Her understanding of which actions would be right 
and wrong is conditioned by the subjective standpoint of her emotional make-up. She reasons 
from 
the premises that these responses provide her with to conclusions which guide her ensuing actions. 
Flic problem now lies in explaining how someone who is reasoning in what I have suggested is a 
representative way has got things so horribly vvrong, and requires an explanation of what is needed 
for us to get it right. 
c// lt 1. Id0171 
It is as well to begin by pre-empting the obvious objection that this example helps to demonstrate 
that once N uu allow- the emotions to intrude into any process of reasoning then this sort of disaster 
is likely to ensue. I have ark Lied that Briom's behaviour is rcprescntativc of the process of moral 
rcasoning, which is distinct from the claim that it is an instance of good moral reasoning, and to use 
the example to impugn any emotional involvement in reasoning would be like taking the mistakes 
of a child in her maths exam to be representative of the redundancy of mathematical reasoning. 
What is required is an explanation of what has gone wrong, and what has to happen for things to goy 
tight. 
( )nc of the most intcrcstina features of Briom's cast is that she starts out With many of What <Ouc 
might intuitively consider to he the right emotions - love of her sister, fcar of threats to 
her family, 
an attachment toi ensuring that things turn out as they should. She is genuinely motivated bV a 
co nccrn for <othcrs, and it is this which makes possible her conversion in the later sections of the 
, <, Ibid. 168-I69. 
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book which pn i idc it with its title. Years later, when she has reflected and confronted what she 
has done, her 'familiar guilt would 'pursue her with a novel vibrancy'. The transformation she 
undergoes leaves her with an intolerable sense of her own wrongdoing. 'She felt the memories, the 
needling details, like a rash on her skin. "`' When, years later, she meets Robbie again, she is tempted 
toi defend herself on the grounds that 'She hadn't intended to mislead, she hadn't acted out of 
msilicc. 
I suggest there is an Ol) imis connection between the dcccncv of her motives when she was 
v, (>un cr, and the motives for her atonement whcn she is older. It is hccausc she has a concern for 
at least some others that she is capable of coming to see her (vii actions in a different light. The 
compassion and concern which are part of who she is offer the initial motivation for reflecting 
ulx>>i her actions and drive forward the process which culminates in remorse for her previous 
actions and the desire for atonement. But why did she go wrong at first 
Onc factor which seems central to answering this is Briony's extreme youth when she acts to 
incriminate Robbie, and it is surely central any correct explanation that her change of heart Occurs 
over a period of years which see her pass from adolescence into adulthood. In order to understand 
the change and to move us closer to an idea of 'getting it right' when it comes to moral reasoning, 
We can distinguish hCN Ccu two different senses of getting it right. One possibility is that Brionv 
has come to understand a series of true propositions which she did not know before, and this has 
altered her understanding of events. But this just seems wrong at two levels. Firstly, Briony has not 
come to be aware of any new facts. She is aware throughout that opening other people's letters is 
wrong, that lying; is wrong, that she did not clearly see Robbie's face, that she did not state the bare 
facts of the matter to the police. In other words, the transformation which moves her from getting 
it wrong to getting it right does not involve learning new facts, but a different way of judging the 
old ones. The second sense in which this explanation seems wrong is at the purely intuitive level, in 
that the sense of guilt, the desire to atone, the constant shame, seem to he bound up in an essential 
wa in the changes which have taken place, but seem out of place in any explanation which centres 
around learnin g some new facts. It is at a profoundly personal level that the kc\ changes have taken 
place, and that very personal aspect points us surely in the direction of the emotions than towards 
the acquisition of factual knOwlcdgc. 
sav that the kcv changes have taken }lace at a profouncily- personal level means that Brinnv has 
come to 'sec' events differently, that she has acquired different feelings about the actions of others, 
and about her c>vVf actions. Oncc the feelings change, this is a change in her attitudes. I'Ivents 
Ibid. 324. 
Ibid_ 3 36. 
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v hick previously elicited one response now elicit a different one, and this new way of feeling about 
events drives her reasoning in a new direction, and generates new conclusions. icl : wan hro\-ides 
its with frustratingly little material about the process of change in his character, but we can speculate 
as to what a good explanation might he. One key clement would surcly be a greater humility in the 
cc>nhclcnce Bricnv has in her ov, -n convictions, a greater awareness of her own limitations eben it 
comes to a full understanding of events. 'Chcrc might also be a greater deference t<t the ability of 
others to reach sound judgements in the face of the facts, and a corresponding increase of faith in 
the effectiveness of existing procedures for reaching good decisions. finally, there could be a 
heightened understanding of the awfulness of what she has done to Robbie, and the unreliabilitv of 
almost wholly unreflective, youthful intuitions as a premise for justifying her actions. 
Much of this brings us back to the discussion of the intcrnaliscd other in chapter four. Many ()f 
Bric, nY's responses are Ones which I would claim are a product of her emotional education. But 
v hat the description of the process above indicates both the complexity and flexibility of the 
various parts of our identity involved in such cases. '['he protectiveness towards the family is in 
conflict with her acquired attachment to honesty at an earl- stage in the narrative, and the conflict is 
resolved in favour of what she initially 'knows' to he right - the incrimination of Robbie. The 
changes which take place involve changes in her understanding of events, but also in her identity - 
hunlility, shame and the desire for atonement have now emerged as dominant aspects of who she is. 
These are transformations brought on by the interplay of the original features of the internalised 
other and the force of reason in throwing a new light on who she is and the actions for which she is 
responsible. I lcr perception of herself as having done the morally right thing is altered in light of 
the facts pressing in on her, and this in turns forces a change in her understanding of what kind of 
person she is. This process of change is only possible given the initial concern for others which was 
always a part of her through the presence of the internalised other, and the responsiveness of the 
internalised other to the light of reason. 
If this sort Of explanation is right, we need to consider a second concept of 'gutting it right' which 
focuses not <>n propositional knowledge, but on the idea of msdoin. One advantage of such a 
concept is that it helps to explain why it is that time is needed for a someone to achieve 
understanding in ethics in a way in which it isn't in, say, mathematics. In this context, Kaimond 
C iaita ww rites, 'In moral matters ... the achievement of 
deeper understanding requires that vvc have 
the depth to receive it, and that depth in ourselves is not a depository of propositions..... but an 
hist<ricall\ vbl' rv 'r/ individuality. ', It is this 'deeper' understanding which only age can bring, and 
Raimond Cjaita, (I ocl and Evil: Jn Ahsolulc Conception. 271. 
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y to go astray, " and for this reason that characteristics wirh<ýut which our judgements are likch 
such as impetuousness, arrogance and impatience which are associated with youth constitute a 
persistent danger to sound judgement. Only age can give us a fuller awareness of our own finitude 
and the enormous complexity of what we are often confronted with. It is only from a more mature 
standpoint that we can reflect upon the very intuitions and emotions which guide us in the first 
place. It is when vV. -c do this that we are no longer simply acting, but acting in a way- towards which 
we have a considered attitude. We not onh act compassionately-, but sec it as a compassionate act, 
as a good act, an act which makes sense given the nature of who we are and of those around us. A 
child simply could not have this sort of more rounded understanding. 
The thinker whop has perhaps been most influential on this topic is , 
Aristotle, and I shall therefore 
turn toi him, and to the outline and paraphrase offered by David Wiggins, as well as "files 
ßurnv cat's interpretation of his discussion of the emotions. '4 lýirsth let us be clear about the terrain 
vv'e are on. The key points at which sound judgement will be required will be when we are 
confronted with new challenges in the moral realm, where we have no precedents or bank of strictly 
relevant examples to fall back on. We are required to judge what to do in a situation where that 
judgement vßi11 represent a new step, and this means we must be clear about the unique features that 
each new situation will have, and the novel demands it will make on us. As Wiggins puts it, 'few 
situations come already inscribed with the names of all the concerns that they touch or impinge 
upon'. " It is rare that all the crucial features of the situation will be evident to us, and we require 
the ability to reflect and imagine in such a way that we take into account the full import of our 
1 ssiblc actions. We may also find ourselves having to confront inconsistencies in our own 
outlook, torn perhaps between achieving what we are convinced is the right outcome, but reluctant 
to use what we consider questionable means. We may find ourselves forced to reconsider sonne of 
our deepest convictions on the grounds that they now stand in conflict with a cherished aim. We 
may find it is necessary to stop and start again, in that all the options hitherto considered are 
unpalatable. 'there must also be an awareness of ourselves as 'finite creatures who face an indefinite 
or infinite range of contingencies with only finite powers of prediction and imagination, of practical 
raric)nalitv itself. 
It is in light of these sorts of considerations that we can see why vVisd<mz could not he acquired in 
out-11. I. ypcricncc is the indispensable forerunner of wisdom because it is Oily whcn oonc has 
CI 'Miles Burnyeat, 'I he learner is envisaged as a young person who lives by the feelings of the moment and ter 
that reason makes mistakes'. 'Aristotle on Learning to by Good', reprinted in Essars on : irisvollc's Ethics, ed AF 
Rort\. 78. 
David Wig gins. 'Deliberation and Practical Reason'. reprinted in his NcecA, I-aloes, Truth, 215-238, and 'Aristotle 
on I. carninu to by Good' by Miles E3urnyeat. reprinted in Esscis on Irisfolle'S E[hics, 69-92, ed AF Rorty. 
David Wig, -, ins. Deliberation and Practical Reason', reprinted 
in his Needs, I'aloes, Truth. 23 I. 
[bid, 233. 
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acduirccl a certain level of experience that the results of this can aid stur judgements during the 
course Of cur practical reasoning. As Wiggins puts it, 'The person Of real practical wisdom is the 
<uic who brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number Of genuinely pertinent concerns and 
genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the dclibcrativc contcyt' 
( )nc must add that this sort Of wisdom is not simply a yucstion cif accumulating lots Of experiences, 
and it could only come over time. As such, it cannot be directly compared to acquiring new items 
of propositional knoýwvledgc. This in turn is explained by the fact that it is Our emotions rather than 
our hewers Of cognitive reason which are at the heart of how we are learning. '1 he emotions are 
shaped over time, not in an instant. The process Of understanding is one which often requires a 
slon" and painful rcliucluishing Of previously- held commitments, a process which we may resist. The 
Conclusion", we reach may be unwelcome, and we may he reluctant initially to contemplate the 
conseclucnccs. The key point is that the experiencing over time of our own mistakes, limitations 
and successes partly constitutes the acquisition of wisdom, and the kind of beings we are means that 
this can only be accomplished over time. The understanding Of the wise agent is that Of someone 
whose is familiar with her limitations at an experiential level, and this means we simply could not 
have a child prodigy in wisdom in the way we seem than in mathematics. 
TO return once more the example of Brionv, it is the failure to understand the limited extent of her 
<ovw n pow ers of understanding as 1 have used the term in this context, and the inability to bring toi 
bear a sufficiently wide range of relevant concerns and considerations which allow her toi follow 
such a disastrous course of action despite her being motivated by her compassionate concerns for 
those around her. If one accepts this, then our tendency to defer to those who arc 'older and wiser' 
makes sense as m<)rc than simply an adage, and Brionv's change of heart reflects the changes in 
someone who has been through exactly the sort of painful process described in the previous 
paragraph, and is wiser as a result. 
Soy far, I have focussed on the formal aspects of practical wisdom, the acquisition of the necessary 
skills, as it ww ere, but what of the content? \ristotlc famously claimed that only those with the right 
sort of emotional education could possibly hcncfit from his teaching, '' but what will be the content 
of the Vicws which shape the thoughts of the virtuous agcntr \Ve know that it is someone 'who has 
learned what is noble .... anal ... come to 
love it. "" It is the agent whose emotions have been shaped 
in the ahhropriatc way , and who 
has benefited from the right sort of formal education who can 
conic to have the sort of practical wisdom under discussion here. Such an agent xv-ill have the right 
sort of dispositions, will come to enjoy acting in a fine and noble manner, will have an 
Ibid. ? 33. 
See Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. 1179b 5-19. 
Miles Burn}yeat. 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good', reprinted in Essau, on Arisio! /e's Ethics. ed AE Rorty. 76. 
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understanding Of vvhv she acts in the way she does, and will have , iccuircd a level of experience 
which allows her to apply such skills in the face Of novel and challenging circumstances. '1'hc 
content Of such understanding will also be shaped by the nature of other persons, certain facts 
ahc>ut their status as loving, suffering, caring beings. 
But even this account of the wise and virtuous agent could not deliver up a rule along; the lines Of a 
calculation Of utilitv Which could given us an in principle' response to any conceivable situation. 
Out- deliberations can aim at nog more than applying the principles which constitute our reflective 
understanding Of what is tight in ,t novel situation, aware of our finite capacities, and infirmed bv 
the facts of the mattet. What we believe toi be actions which are noble, just, fine, co lupassmnate, 
her>>ic or ones which fall under any other such loaded descriptions cannot be given content 
independently Of the ideals that an agent brings to the situation, and these ideals themselves will 
have a content which is shaped by what we sec and discover and experience in our struggles in just 
such situations. 
To he sure, there will he easy cases such as where we must choose between alleviating enormous 
suffering and giving up what we see as trivial sources of personal satisfaction. In such cases the 
virtuous agent will find it very easy to decide on which course of action will bettet- reflect her moral 
values, but this falls short of some straightforward principle which can guarantee us something like 
an objectively right answer on all occasions. '['he most difficult circumstances we face are precisely 
those where we cannot weigh so easily the merits and demerits of what may he a wide range of 
possible actions and likely consequences, where we must deliberate in a patient, imaginative way to 
come to what we know will be no more than the best judgement we are capable of from our finite 
perspective. In such cases, we cannot start with a question such as what the compassionate 
response vw. -ould be and then arrive by means of calculation at a correct answer, because it is in 
precisely such cases that we cannot know from the outset what the range of outcomes will be., hone 
much suffering it may cause, how heavily the different sorts of suffering (cg the mental anguish vs 
mild ph sical pain) should vv-cigh. Wisdom cannot guarantee us the kind of objectively right answers 
which we may wish for, merely the best ones we are capable of, and if this is a disappointing 
conclusion then it does no more than reflect the nature of the problem. 
1 am no in a position to return to the question of means versus ends, and to clarify their 
rclati<, nship in light of the comments of the last few Pages. 1-irstly, neither can be seen as fully 
independent of the other. What is to count as an acceptable means must be conditioned by what 
vv, c take to be our considered ends. AV'c are not talking here about what . 
Aurcl ko>lnai called the 
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'technical pi-ramble' to our delibcration, "' meaning certain relevant factual information such as 
numerical and causal connections. If we wish to help someone, the dispositions which provide this 
motivation in the first place will help to rule out certain courses of action. -1'hc agent who sees 
alleviating the suffering of others as an end is unlikely to see the causing; of suffering as an attractive 
mcatns. I, xcn if this proves a necessary means, this in itself v, -ould he a subject for further 
deliberation on the part of the agent. The parent who holds her child as the doctor inoculates it 
secs the suffering as justified only because it avoids the danger of even greater suffering. Without 
that thought her actions would be unintelligible as those of a caring parent. 
Similar1v, Our use ()f certain means may well alter what we take to be our ends. As kolnat points 
out, '( )ur ends are not ready-made, awaiting their fulfilment when the proper means should have 
been found; they, may come to life and harden into shape in fairly unexpected contexts and their 
fixation inv-c>hvcs to some extent ..... a rev, 
isio>n, modification and reorientation of our pre- 
established structure of permanent or comparatively lasting ends -1 would rather say our £0/her//s - 
itself. '" Within the context of what I have said earlier, this means that means and ends will have an 
essential interdependence, with each shaping, altering and influencing the other. Our ends in any 
given situation will proscribe certain courses of action and encourage others. The means may well 
he so daunting that they bring into question the value of the end, or else so costly in their use that 
they transform our vice of the end to v hich they contribute. In all of these ways, each concept 
must be seen as part of a wider picture in constant flux, where our perception of specific means and 
ends are conditioned by the wider set of ideals and values we bring to situation, and where the onset 
of experience will change the ends we pursue and the means we find it acceptable to use, 
constrained and guided by certain features we find in ourselves and other human beings. 
Keusoiiiu, /adlig O/1a'is 
I hav c focussed at great lcngth on the form and content of the deliberations of the individual agent, 
but this form of personal deliberation is only part of the kind of moral reasoning we often engage 
in. ( )nc other key form such reasoning takes is when we try to persuade others of our moral point 
of v ieww, often with the aim of getting them to act in a particular way, and I now wish to apply the 
principles of the previous sections of this chapter to this question. 
\\'c might begin by asking vVhcthcr or not vV-c really do reason with others in the moral domain, and 
it is a uscful point of entry into the discussion to consider Perhaps the most sceptical position On 
this issue, that Of _A 
J 
. 
Aver, , -,. -ho argued that 'one never really does dispute about questions of 
Aurea Kolnai. 'Dclberation is of Ends'. Procccdiiigs of the Aristotelian Society 62,200. 
Ibid. 205. 
164 
v aloe. LIl is reasons for holding this view were that moral wends simply assert our own feelings on 
a particular matter and aim at exciting similar ones in the person with whom we are talking. As 
such, wc do not assert anything about the particular object or action in question, but rather about 
our ovVn attitude towards it with the aim of promoting the same attitude in the other person. 
l, Ithical judgements arc 'mere' expressions of feeling expressed through a series of 'pseudo-concepts' 
which are ultimately meaningless, and are therefore worthy only of being jettisoned along with our 
language of theology and metaphysics. According to . 
Ayer, a common process of moral 
conditioning is required for two agents to agree or disagree, and where this is absent we will tend to 
abandon an attempt at persuasion on the grounds that the other person 'has a distorted or 
undeveloped moral sense; which signifies merely that he cmplovs a different set of values from our 
0 \v t]. 
( )ncc one sifts out the derisory attitude towards ethics, there are nevertheless certain points of 
overlap bet viceii the position developed in this thesis and Avers v-icw. I agree that our ethical 
language does express feelings we have towards a certain object, and I shall goy on to say that when 
we argue we are trying toi bring others to hold the same 'feeling-laden' beliefs that we hold. Ni 
arguments with regard to the importance of our social environment in the development of our 
emotions are also consistent with Ayer's discussion of 'conditioning'. 1, r<ýnn a taxoýnomical point of 
ic, \w, I have also been defending what could be 
described as a fortm of suhjcctivisui. Where there 
are differences between my own position and Aver's is that I think there is the possibility of moral 
dispute and moral reasoning with others. 
To he in w ith, consider . 
'n ct's analysis of our moral language. He argues that 'in saving; that any 
type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even as a statement 
about mý own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who 
is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments, so there is plainly no sense 
in asking which of us is in the right in that neither of us is asserting a genuine pro position. '41 The 
line of thought here is that the feelings which are expressed can be uncoupled from the 
propositions to which they are hooked up. Once we accomplish this, we can now translate the 
original pn)p(>sitions which have the form of factual descriptions about the world, into statements 
which describe what we are feeling. statements such as 'K is good' and 'K is bad' can be translated 
into 'I like K' and 'I don't like 1', and whereas we seemed to have a disagreement bct-wecn two 
agents who had expressed different /e//c/. r about the way the world is, '\v-c can now sec that it is 
simply that the don't /tv/ the same way about the way the world is. 
c1 .1 
Aver. Laue uuge Truth and Logic-, 114. 




I he point of departure bctvveen Avcr's arguments and my own lies in his analysis of how our 
feelings relate to the propositions through which they are expressed. Rather than the propositions 
standini separately from the feelings, it is better to see the feelings as scared into the beliefs about 
the persons, types of action and categories of value to which they apply. If I believe that the death 
penalty is wrong, then we can go through the motions of talking about the modalities involved or 
talk of possible worlds in which the death penalty is right, but this just doesn't address the 
hhcnomenOlogv of the way in which such beliefs arc held. When one does hold such feeling-laden 
beliefs, the. arc held in such a win that the feeling and the proposition are held as inseparable, and 
it is only when we accept this that we can begin to understand why it is that people will slic for such 
hcliefs. '' In light of this, consider the earlier passage by Styron quoted above. "There is something 
absurd about claiming that the Nazi doctor and Sophie don't really disagree about how she and her 
children Ought to be treated, and the reason it appears sot absurd is because such a theory ignores 
the v cry real ww-ay in which the feelings and beliefs involved in such thought just cannot be separated 
out from one another in the forensic way- suggested in I, iar/, /faro, TI-111h (a/u! IJJ(ir. 
In light of this, I suggest . 
Avcr's claim that there could be no moral beliefs needs substantial revision. 
I accept that moral beliefs do not express facts about the world in the way- a scientific theory aims 
to, but the v. -ay to address this is not to separate out the feeling and the propositional content and to 
dispense with the whole domain as meaningless, but to recognise that moral beliefs are a distinctive 
categor of belief, distinctive because of their feeling-laden nature, and capable of forming the 
source of a distinctive form of reasoning with others - moral reasoning. 
L, ct inc now turn toi . 
Avcr's talk of the importance of what he calls conditioning. I have argued 
throughout that our ctnoticms are indeed shaped by our social cnvironment, 4and that our moral 
beliefs, in 5(>mc sense, bottom out in our emotional and fcclingful responses to the world around 
us. but the theory ()f cm<rticros I have defended and the discussion in the previous chapter provide 
the basis for understanding how moral views can vary in a way which conforms to certain moral 
intuitions and to our observations of moral reasoning. 
In the first instance, We must distinguish bctv, ccn the claims that our emotions (and hence mil 
moral hcrsrcctiý c) arc shaped by the social cilvironmcnt, and the claim that they arc entirely 
', I accept that there are cases Miere such beliefs might 'go dead' on us. and where we might continue to express 
them more through habit than because they retain the feeling-laden force they once had. In this respect, I accept the 
contingent relationship between the leeling and the proposition. but dispute that this sort of separation is one which 
is consistent vvith the phenomenology ofsuch beliefs across the board. 
See in particular 56-62 above. 
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determined by it. '1'hc empirical rescarch canvassed in chapter two' indicated that certain features 
of mir emotional lives appear to be cross-cultural. That is to say that the expression of umcýti(ms 
and mir cýlpacin to grasp the emotions others are cxpcricncing have a common core which even 
those from cultures who have had no contact with one another can discern. This supports the 
nunc colourful claim of William Jamcs that if you sec an elephant charging towards you then Your 
cultural background «will probable have very little influence on your reaction. 
1'his in turn lends support toi the 'scnsiblc subjectivism' of Wiggins, in which we should understand 
the intcrhlav between the subject and the world as one in which 'there is something in the object 
that is /111k/" /iu- the sentiment it would occasion in a qualified judge'. -"ý To take the example of 
compassion, then the suffering we observe brings down the sentiment upon it, a sentiment 'diele /ot' 
this sort of event. Oncc we have certain features of the world which elicit emotional responses that 
are universal in mankind, then we have the means to restrict any form of relativism which may 
emerge as a result of acknowledging the developmentally open nature of our emotions, and at the 
same time explain why a divergence in the full content of our moral perspectives is to be expected 
vvithin and across different cultures given that develoopmentali y open nature. 
In order to elucidate this, let me offer an outline of how this sott of theory would describe what we 
, cc in practice. If vVc imagine a person born into a particular community, then she starts out with 
certain relevant capacities which are universal, including the capacity to grasp the responses of 
others and the ability to have her feelings and emotions shaped according to those responses. 
)ther general features such as aversion to pain make it likely that there will be a high degree of 
convergence across different communities with regard to certain responses the agent will elicit or 
vvitness around her, and these responses will result in the internalised other taking on a content 
which is likely toi involve the kinds of ideals which are likely to overlap with those of agents brought 
up in different coýtnmunities, given the kind of creatures we are. Once we take into account these 
crucial common characteristics, then we have the basis for discussing them in the context of a wider 
moral theory, it is surely for this reason that characteristics such as our aversion to pain and our 
attraction to pleasure are capable of praying such a central role in the thought of both Flume and 
Aristotle. 
File OUtcOOnlc ctf this is that vVC can engage ill discussion capablc of producing a dccisiv-c conclusion 
insofar as there is a cO>nsistcncv l)Ctvycon agents \\-11( )SC feelings have comic toi influence a similar 
rail c of beliefs in a similar Within a sin k community there is likely to be a greater degree ()f 
Coiiv'cr (cncc, less S() aC OSS different communities. But there is alwav s, in principle, the likelihood 
See page 47 above. 
Day Id VVi-eins. 'A Sensible Subjectivism', reprinted in his A'ec(Z,;, I clues, Tralh, 194. 
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that Our common humanity' will generate more rather than less potential for discussion and 
1crsuasion. .A mother's 
loving care for her child is likely to enter the scheme Of values in any 
culture, and this means that the ability of one mother to respond to the suffering Of another who 
has lost her child is created, as is the possibility of a wider moral discussion on this subject If this is 
correct, a sentimentalist theory of ethics retains the possibility of universal standards even if we 
accept the dcvclopmcntallv Open nature Of our emotions. Once there are shared feeling-laden 
beliefs, then there is the opportunity for reasoning and discussing with others which can result in a 
clear agreement. We will search for agreement because we are pressed into moral discussion by the 
feelings and emotions which condition Our responses to the world around us, and guide our 
thinking. ( )ur aim in individual deliberation is to settle on the right course of action, and our aim in 
reasmniiig with Others will be to bring them to the point , vhcre they see things aright. To do so, we 
appeal to a shared set of feeling-laden beliefs about the world, and reason from these premises to a 
conclusion which we can both 'sec' in light of these premises. In this context, coming to see things 
aright will mean acquiring; a similar understanding and set of responses to our interlocutor, and 
thereby coming to agree On which course of action would be the best. 
1'hc drav, -back is that such an outline also throws up at least one major limitation on what could 
possibly be achieved through a process of reasoning with others. For all the universality of our 
hh. sical make-uh, our dispositions to love our children, our aversion to pain, these factors simply 
make morality more likely to develop in some ways rather than others. In the final analysis, the 
precise content of any specific moral belief will be contingent upon the vagaries of the community 
within which the agent is raised, and this theory is consistent with the view that there may be points 
of fundamental moral importance within one community toi which there is an equally fundamental 
opposition in another. 
The moral realist holds out the hope that any such dispute might be settled by the moral fact of the 
matter, an Option not open to the subjectivist There is little option but to bite this bullet, and 
identify this as an unfortunate but unavoidable aspect of the human condition. In such 
circumstances we may be able to throw up our hands in frustration and agree to disagree. We may 
be able tos reach some sort of compromise. But we may also find ourselves in the position \%-here 
there is simply no alternative to a conflict which we «-ill describe as a just -war. " The conclusions of 
the previous section about the open-ended nature of moral deliberation also hold for reasoning vV-ith 
others, and on this theory it is not even possible in principle that there could be a final set of moral 
ideals which can be translated on any given occasion into an answer tos a particular moral dispute. It 
simply turns out that there are going to be occasions where we cannot Persuade our disputant of 
'° I or a %N ide-ranging discussion of the ditterent possible approaches to this question, see Alan Gibbard, 11 ise 
('howcc.. lp/ Feelirigs. Chapter I hirteen. 
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our (vVn 1)usitic)u, and our position is such that we cannot cornproýmisc on 
it. Not only this, but we 
will fitu(l OOur",, C]\-cs in a 1)O>siti()Il which may well be charactcriscd 
bv a form of into mhrchcnsiOn. 
The hOsitiOn of our disputant will be one which we simply cannot understand given our own 
uutlcx, k. 
I licrc is ap )yvcrful and disturbing cxplooraticon of this in ý i\1 Cooct>cc's novel Ii r11//ih /ür l/Ar' 
13arbairmzti, in which a former magistrate who has fallen foul of his country's tyrannical regime tries 
to COmprehcnd the viewpoint of his torturer. 
1 am trying very hard to understand your feelings towards mc........ uch mo rc than an 
opportunity to address these people to whom I have nothing to say, would 
I appreciate a 
fcv% words from you. So that I can come to understand why you devote yourself to this 
vV( rk. And can hear what you feel towards me, whom you have hurt a great deal and now 
sccm toi be proposing to kill. ' 
'Do \ ()Li sec this hand' he says. He holds his hand an inch from my face. 'W'hen I was 
younger' - he flctics the 
fingers - 'I used to he able to poke this 
finger' - he holds up the 
index finger - 
'through a pumpkin-shell. ' He puts the tip of his finger against my forehead 
and presses. I take a step 
backwards. "" 
I1'hc response, of course, is chilling, but there is nothing to suggest that either of the two has any 
understanding of what it is like to view the world in the way- the other 
does, and this is confirmed 
later when the victim sincerely appeals once again for answers to the same sorts of questions. 
'Forgive me if the question seems impudent, but I would like to ask: flow dog you find it 
possible to cat afterwards, after you have been ....., xorking with pcoplc% 
That is a ducstion 
I have ahv aý s asked myself about executioners and other such people. Wait! I , 
istcn to me a 
mOmcnt longer, I am sincere, it has cost inc a great deal to come out this, since l am 
terrified of you, i need not teil ou that, 1 am sure you are aware of it. Do you find it easy to 
take food aftcrwardsr I have imagined that one would want to wash one's hands. But no 
ordinary washing would he enough, one would requires priestly intervention, a ceremonial 
of cleansing, don't v, ou think-r some kind of purging of one's soul too - that 
is hoýv, - I have 
imagined it. ( )thcrvv isc ho vV ould it he hossiblc to return to cv crv day life - to sit do v,. n at a 
table for instance, and break bread with one's family or comrades%'....... I am trying toi 
l IM Coetiee. II criiin, f()r tlrc ßurha, ions. 129. 
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understand the >O>nc in which you live. I am trying to imagine h<ýv, V you breathe and cat and 
live from day to clay. But I cannot! That is what trOýublcs mc! '' 
this time tic is met not veith the detached, cold nostalgia of the previous occasion, but with 
frightened abuse from a figure v-, -ho has now come under threat himself as events more against him. 
But \ý hat is illuminating here is the gcnuitnc failure to understand the way 
in which someone else can 
conduct his life in a fashion so uttcrlv, devoid of the values and dispositions which shape one's own. 
What we sec hear is not simply disagreement, but bctnusemcnt, and this stems precisely 
from a set 
Of cmotiOnal responses which provide no common ground 
for understanding. The beliefs that each 
man has with regard to torture and execution lack a comparable fecling-laden clement, thereby 
making understanding between the twO impossible. It is when such 
instances take on a more 
generalised form that agreement on moral questions could not occur, 
because there is no pre- 
existing common emotional framework against which beliefs are 
formed. Such disputes could not 
result in agreement, because there could be no understanding out of which 
it might emerge, no 
consistency in the content of our moral concepts. It is hure where we 
find the most depressing 
aspect Of the the rv set out here - the denial of the prospect of universal moral agreement around a 
set Of objectively correct moral principles. 
Silllple \1 of il I . ipousw s 
1'hc accounts of moral reasoning which I have discussed so far have focussed on processes which 
im olve what one might think of a process which aims to answer questions such as 
'What is the right 
thing to d( ', where we are required to consider at some 
length the appropriate course of action, 
and where this may not be at all obvious to us from the outset. But something now needs to 
be 
said about the sorts of simpler responses which we often see, where there is no obvious process of 
deliberation. In circumstances where we see the person is in need of help, and just help without 
thinking about it, what is going on? 
NIuch (>f,,,, -hat has been said in the previous three chapters will help to explain this sort of response. 
l irstly-, the perception of need must be one which is salient in the cognitive economy of the agent. 
hohn McDowell makes such a point vo. -hcn he claims that 'The sensitivity is, we might say-, a sort of 
perceptual cahacitý .' 
"I-his means that the person who responds ctmpassionatcly ýw hen seeing 
s()mc()ne is suffering is not necessarily thinking toi herself that she must now offer a compassionate 
t-csh<)usc, laut is rather SOnnaanc who is notices suffering when she is confronted with it, secs is as 
something toi be addressed, and is disposed to help where she can. 'I'hc virtuous agent 
is someone 
lhi(L 138. 
lohn Mcl)o ell, 'Virtue and Reason'. reprinted in A/ind, I "aliwe and Rca/ily. 
170 
hO will, as it v, -cl-C, just ,, cc 
helping as 'the thing toi do'. NIcl)owccll once again captures the sort of 
underlying feature of the virtuous agent in such circutnstanccs when he describes virtue in general 
as an ability to recognise rcyuirctncnts that situations impose on one's behaviour. It is a single 
cOrnplcs sensitiv-itv of this sort we are aiming to 
instil when vcc aim to inculcate a moral Outl(>ok'. " 
When we sav that the virtuous agent has the sort of sensitivity to the situations she encounters 
which vß-i11 lead her to simply act without need of lengthy deliberation, this does not mean that she 
could not offer an explanation if required. The virtuous agent may well respond to questions such 
as '\\'h\ did ou help her? ' vV-ith general answers such as 'Because she needed it' or 'Because it is was 
the thing to do', but this does not make it akin to a blind, instinctive response The dispositions of 
the virtuous agent are revealed in her sensitivity to certain situations and her tendency to respond in 
certain ways, but this also reveals a much wider web of beliefs one would expect such an agent to 
have. 'I hcsc will include considerations such as ho to conduct oneself with others, hone- to treat 
others, and vV-ill also reveal deeper beliefs about the kind of life a human being should lead. It is in 
the context of these sorts of beliefs that individual actions and response will make sense. 
If so inco ne guides his life by a certain conception of how toi live, then he acts on particular 
occasions, so as to fulfil suitable concerns. .1 concern can mesh with a noticed fact about a 
situation, so as to account of an action; as, for instance, a concern for the welfare of one's 
friends, t( gcthcr with awareness that a friend is in trouble and open to being comforted, can 
explain missing a pleasant party in order to talk to the friend S4 
As such, the actions of the agent, when performed consistently-, reveal the kind of sensitivities the 
agent has, and thereby the kind of wider values which inform the agent's life. The arguments 
advanced over the previous chapters of this thesis indicate both how the virtuous agent comes to 
have the sort of responses she has, and what responses will count as Virtuous. Acquiring the 
sensitiv itics of the virtuous agent is a function of the education of the emotions. This agent reacts 
in the way she does because her fcclings have been shaped such that certain features of the world 
non-\, bcco me more salient than others when she per-cei\-cs them, and this salience is a feeling-laden 
aspect to the beliefs and perceptions of the world we find before us. It is this feature of our identit 
vv hich 1 have described as the internalised other. 
'I he content of the responses of the virtuous agent - the agent who has a proper moral perspective - 
is a content Vchich matches up to our need for others, the ability of others to respond to those 
needs, and our ability to respond to their needs. Nccds are rc\-calcd through suffering, and the 
Ibid. 5 3. 
lhid, 67. 
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resi)Onsc of the v it-tuous Igcnt to suffcring is cmpassion. This means the 
kind of simple responses 
vV. hctc we sec s(omeo)ne acts without the kind of 
deliberation or discussion described in the previous 
two> sections are the responses of someone Who has hccn educated to recognise and respond to the 
needs of others, and is therefore disposed to help others when such circumstances present 
thernsclres. 
(. ismlir. ýion 
liv vý aý of conclusioon, 1 shall set out in broad outline the conscyucnccs this theory 
has for 
tnlctacthics. Nh rc specifically, I shall suggest the direction and 
limitations of any conclusions in 
ethics given the nature Of this thesis. 
The first Observation one can make is that the ethical domain is one which claims us 
long before we 
come to reflect On it. The internalised other is formed 
from a very early stage, and the nature of our 
emotional attachments which stem from this source ensure that we arc 
bound within the moral 
sphere. One property of emotions is that they have a passive clement - there 
is an involuntary side 
to any emotional response, and if emotions play a crucial role within the ethical 
domain it means we 
arc involuntarily drawn into that domain by the nature of our responses. 
This is what I mean by the 
ethical claiming us. It also follows that there could be no 
'view from nowhere' with regard to the 
ethical, nog neutral position from which we could determine what the 
best content for morality will 
he. \Vc arc all raised within communities which shape our emotions in such a way that we come to 
understand the world in ways conditioned by that social education. 
This means that all moral 
reflection takes place from a moral perspective. To be sure, we can theorise about morality, 
commenting On the behavioural components, the cross-cultural comparisons, the 
interest it has 
provoked within philosophy, but the moment we address specifically moral questions such as 
how 
We ought to treat others then an answer could only be arrived at under the guidance of the 
feelings 
and emotions which give morality content in the first place. To be without these 
feelings and 
emotions would indeed give us a perspective from the moral now-, -here, 
but such a position would be 
one from where the very question would have neither the 
force nor the content morality entails. It 
is only when I have some sort Of emotional engagement with others around tnc that 
life is breathed 
into morality . 
In that sense, it is closer to love than it is to reason. 
\ furtlicr a)nscyucncc is that thcrc could he no final moral answers, vVhcrc this would 
be an 
OhjcctiV c account of what morality dcmands of us. There will certainly 
be cases where all of the 
wisdom anal kn(J«-lcdgc we have indicates that particular courses of action arc right or wrong, 
l)ut 
mY posit i,, that this conviction could never stem from an ol)lcctiv-c account of what right and 
wrong arc. Our mc>ralitv is partly constituted by our responses to the ý, vorld around us, and our 
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sentiments are 
brought down upon the world by what we find there. But the complexity of the 
human condition means that morality must always remain open-ended. It is an inescapable aspect 
of human life that we are constantly confronted with novel circumstances which require acts of 
judgement as toi what morality requires, and where there is no detached, right answer which could 
be available to us. What counts as tight in such cases will be partially determined by what we see 
and ho, \w, we feel, and even if we managed toi reach some unlikely point of universal consensus, it 
would still be no more than a contingent judgement on how too act rather then a correct response 
oohjcctiV-clv correlated to the way the world stands. 
In light of this, what can we hope to achieve through deliberation about moýralitvr We can begin by 
ackno,, v1cdging our own status as moral agents - people , ilrc, dv claimed by ethics and who are 
alrcadv engaged in the vý-ýýrld with a perspective. We can also recognise the necessity and the 
limitations of what we are engaged in. Necessit, \-, given the partly involuntary nature of our 
responses, and limitations in the sense that there could be no final stamp of approval for the 
judgements we arrive at. David Wiggins makes both these points in setting out his sensible 
subjectivism. 
In this matter the subjectivist really has to do the same as everyone else; he can only urge 
that, in shits of the possibility of irresolvable substantive disagreement, but in a manner 
partially conditioned by that possibility, we should perscv-urc as bust we can in the familiar 
process of reasoning, conversion, and criticisms - without guarantees of success, which are 
almost as needless as they are unobtainable. " 
We can do ()ur best to ensure that we are aware of all the relevant facts, and that we are reasoning 
soundly. AVc can strive for a life which is consistent with what our best account of how we ought to 
live, and we can try to remain aware of the limitations of our abilities. For anyone who believes that 
\\c arc required to produce much more than this for a satisfactory moral theory this will seem a 
pallid attempt at understanding what we could achieve. Opposition would doubtless centre on the 
v 1( ý,, that our emotions are so crucial to our morality, and ought , Ncll look to restore a more 
prominent position for reason over what may be seen as the 'slavish' way in which emotion directs 
our behaviour. There is no more I can say in defence of im position than has appeared on the 
pages of this thesis. 
11 David Wiý-gins. 'A Sensible Subjectivism', reprinted in his Needs, I"c//ue. s, lruih. 210. 
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